The Art of Manipulation: Agents of Influence and the Rise of the American National Security State, 1914-1960 by Arlington, James R.
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by 
James R. Arlington 
May 2015
  
 
THE ART OF MANIPULATION: AGENTS OF INFLUENCE AND 
THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STATE, 1914-1960 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
Presented to 
 
The Faculty of the Department of History 
University of Houston 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
By 
James R. Arlington 
May 2015
 ii 
 
THE ART OF MANIPULATION: AGENTS OF INFLUENCE AND 
THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STATE, 1914-1960 
          
_________________________ 
James R. Arlington 
 
 
APPROVED: 
 
 
_________________________ 
 Gerald Horne, Ph.D. 
                                                                                                                    Committee Chair 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
Thomas O’Brien, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
Martin Melosi, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
Jeremy D. Bailey, Ph.D. 
University of Houston 
 
 
_________________________ 
Steven G. Craig, Ph.D. 
Interim Dean, College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences 
Department of Economics 
 
 
 iii 
 
THE ART OF MANIPULATION: AGENTS OF INFLUENCE AND 
THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STATE, 1914-1960 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
An Abstract of a Dissertation 
 
Presented to 
 
The Faculty of the Department of History 
University of Houston 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
    
 
 
By 
James R. Arlington 
May 2015  
 iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
Throughout the twentieth century, British and Chinese agents of influence, fellow 
travelers and their unwitting allies conducted political warfare campaigns designed to 
exploit America’s rising xenophobia to achieve specific diplomatic goals.  The result of 
these “friendly” political warfare campaigns led the United States to not only fight in two 
world wars but also lead to a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign and domestic policy.  By 
creating a culture of fear, these political warfare specialists influenced the U.S. political 
climate making it amiable toward their respective governments’ diplomatic agendas.  
These foreign agents infiltrated the media, created front organizations, and quietly 
worked behind the scenes to shape American foreign and domestic policy. 
During the First World War, British intelligence played on American fears by 
suggesting that “hyphenated” Americans might be treasonous.  Patience, luck, and nerve 
finally paid off as a reluctant president asked Congress to declare war.  Two decades 
later, England, once again, found itself embroiled in war.  By the summer of 1940, 
Winston Churchill, the newly appointed British Prime Minister, knew the only way the 
British Empire could survive was to drag the United States into the conflict. 
Using the lessons learned from the Great War, British intelligence began working 
to drag a reluctant nation to war.  British agents of influence suggested that German Fifth 
columnists working on American soil sought to undermine the nation.  The fear of 
subversion helped to shift U.S. attitudes.  The British were not the only nation struggling 
to survive.  Half a world away, the Chinese fought Imperial Japan, and like the British, 
the Chinese began lobbying the United State for support.  The British and the Chinese 
 v 
competed for American aid.  The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did not end this 
competition nor did the defeat of the Axis powers. 
As the “Good War” ended, the British and the Chinese worked to ensure that U.S. 
aid would help rebuild their shattered economies.  The blowback from these operations 
led the rise of the American national security state.  This is the story of how these agents 
of influence and their domestic allies worked to change the course of a nation. 
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In the high ranges of Secret Service work the actual facts in many cases 
were in every respect equal to the most fantastic inventions of romance and 
melodrama.  Tangle within tangle, plot and counter-plot, ruse and 
treachery, cross and double cross, true agent, false agent, double agent, 
gold and steel, the bomb, the dagger, and the firing party, were interwoven 
in many a texture so intricate as to be incredible and yet true.  The Chief 
and the High Officers of the Secret Service reveled in these subterranean 
labyrinths, and pursued their task with cold and silent passion.  
                                                                                          —Sir Winston Churchill1
                                                 
    1 Winston Churchill, Thoughts and Adventures, (London: T. Butterworth, 1932), 87-88. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
State of Fear 
 
 
Figure 11 
..-. .-. .. . -. -.. .-.. -.--  .--. . .-. ... ..- .- ... .. --- -. 
On April 18, 1946, Captain Gustave Gilbert, a German-speaking University of 
Columbia trained Jewish-American psychologist and American intelligence officer, 
walked through the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg, Germany.  Making his nightly 
rounds, Gilbert headed to the prison complex.  It was the first day of the long Easter 
break and Gilbert knew the men awaiting trial would need to talk, which would lessen 
their apprehension.  The psychologist admitted, years later, that his intelligence duties 
and his medical duties overlapped.  Gilbert explained that his real job was to “watch” 
                                                 
  1 Figure 1: Herblock, “The Recording Angels,” 1955, Library of Congress. 
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over the prisoners.  It was his responsibility to “be with them at all times” to have his 
finger “on the pulse of morale” and to “ensure the conduct of an orderly trial.” The 
uniformed military psychologist spent every day with these men.  He spoke to them 
“during court intermissions and during lunch hours.”  He had “extensive conversations 
with them at night in their cells and over the long weekends.”  Gilbert’s rapport with 
these men lasted “from the beginning of the trial to the end of the trial.”  He did not miss 
a day.  And since doctor patient confidentiality did not exist; Gilbert passed any 
information, he considered important, to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) 
prosecutorial staff. 2 
On that Good Friday evening, Gilbert found Hermann Göring, the former 
Reichsmarschall and the former Commander of the Luftwaffe, “sweating in his cell.”  
Gilbert described Göring as an aggressive extrovert, who often viewed himself as the 
hero.  Göring protested that Germany, during the war, had been a sovereign state.  The 
IMT, therefore, had no jurisdiction to try him or his associates.  The former 
Reichsmarschall began to realize, however, that his trial would more than likely end with 
a short walk to the gallows.  The self-professed “jovial realist who had played for big 
stakes and lost” had been replaced by a defensive and despondent man who was “not 
very happy over the turn the trial was taking.”  Gilbert, trying to calm Göring, began 
discussing international relations, a topic he knew the former Reichsmarschall, enjoyed.  
The prison psychologist stated that he did not believe “the common people are very 
thankful for leaders who bring them war and destruction.” 
                                                 
  2 G.M. Gilbert, The Nuremberg Diary, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), 12, 278. 
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“Why of course, the people don’t want war,” Göring shrugged.  “Why would 
some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out 
of it is to come back to his farm in one piece  Naturally, the common people don’t want 
war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany.  
This is understood.  But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy 
and it is always a simple matter to drag people along, whether it is a democracy or a 
fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.” 
Gilbert pointed out, “There is one difference.  In a democracy the people have 
some say in the matter through their elected representatives in the United States only 
Congress can declare war.” 
“Oh, that is all well and good, but, voice or no voice, the people can always be 
brought to the bidding of the leaders.  That is easy.  All you have to do is tell them they 
are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the 
country to danger.  It works the same in any country.”3 
What the prison psychologist did not realize was that Göring had just succinctly 
explained how the state, through manipulation and propaganda, can influence its 
population.  On that warm April night, Göring explained to his captor just how easy a 
state can control its citizens.4  What Göring failed to mention is that it is just as easy for a 
foreign power to influence public opinion.  Political warfare, described as “the art of 
heartening friends and disheartening enemies,” uses “words, images, and ideas” to 
                                                 
  3 Gilbert, 12, 278. 
  4 Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, War: Ends and Means, (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006), 
151. Paul A. Smith, Jr., On Political War, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), 3. 
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persuade rivals to alter their opinions and actions.  During the twentieth century, foreign 
agents of influence and their domestic allies shaped U.S. foreign and domestic policy by 
creating a culture of fear that exploited the republic’s growing xenophobia. 
By 1957, this culture of fear had become so prevalent that General Douglas 
MacArthur stated 
Our government has kept us in a perpetual state of fear—kept us in a 
continuous stampede of patriotic fervor—with the cry of grave national 
emergency.  Always there has been some terrible evil…to gobble us up if 
we did not blindly rally behind it by furnishing the exorbitant funds 
demanded. Yet, in retrospect, these disasters seem never to have happened; 
seem never to have been quite real.5 
And yet, U.S. policymakers used these feelings of insecurity to rationalize their 
decisions to sacrifice liberty for security.  A detailed examination of the influence 
of “friendly” political warfare campaigns on U.S. foreign and domestic policy has 
yet to be conducted.  Great Britain and Nationalist China, considered by many as 
having developed a “special” relationship with the United States, conducted 
numerous political warfare campaigns during the early twentieth century.  By 
using friendly persuasion, these agents of influence, acting out of self-interest, 
worked to shape U.S. public opinion.  The unintended consequences of these 
operations helped provide the rhetoric to rationalize the establishment of the 
American national security state.  A key characteristic of the national security 
state is the state’s fixation on defending itself from external and internal enemies.  
                                                 
  5 An Address to the Annual Stockholder’s Meeting of the Sperry Rand Corporation, 30 July 1957, New 
York, New York, quoted from Edward T. Imparato, General MacArthur Speeches and Reports, 1908-1964, 
(New York: Turner, 2000), 227-230. 
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Theses enemies are always portrayed as being ruthless and cunning; so, it is 
crucial to employ any means necessary to control or destroy these threats.  The 
British and the Chinese used the fear of German intrigue and Communist 
treachery to further their own ends.  This fear of internal subversion became 
integral to the early Cold War decisions  that ultimately killed the New Deal with 
its emphasis on social spending and ushered in the national security state.6  To 
understand how these “friendly” political warfare campaigns differed from enemy 
action it is important to examine how German and Soviet agents worked in the 
United States.  Ironically, allied and enemy political warfare campaigns worked in 
a similar fashion—by trying to manufacture consent. 7  
The most important factors in manufacturing consent, like Göring pointed 
out, is domestic propaganda and information control.  The early twentieth century 
communications’ revolution allowed political warfare experts to orchestrate 
seamless campaigns.  Signals intelligence (SIGINT) proved to be the greatest 
secret of the Second World War.  Breaking allied and enemy codes allowed 
nations to read each other’s mail.  Success and failure of a propaganda campaign 
could be tracked and adjustments could be made to improve it.  To understand 
how these campaigns impacted U.S. foreign and domestic policy, it is also 
                                                 
  6 For more on the national security state see Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the 
Origins of the National Security States, 1945-1954, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
  7 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922).  Lippmann first 
coined the phrase manufacturing consent in his 1922 monograph.  Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, 
Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2011) 
used Lippmann’s phrase as the title for their book. 
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important to examine the rise of SIGINT.  These intelligence operations provide a 
unique insight into twentieth century global diplomatic history and explain, to 
some extent, American’s hegemonic rise.  SIGNIT also provided American 
policymakers with another reason to establish the national security state.8 
The clandestine world of espionage usually brings to mind Ian Fleming’s 
dashing protagonist, James Bond—an iconic literary hero, who came to personify 
the Cold War spy.  Luxurious locations, beautiful women, fiendish villains, and 
exotic weapons provided the basis for Fleming’s novels.  Fleming knew that 
while those ingredients made a best seller they did not accurately portray the life 
of a spy.  The English author, who worked for British intelligence during the 
Second World War, understood the realities of this clandestine world, and he 
knew the work of the spy was one of persuasion over violence.  Fleming 
recognized that James Bond was not a hero “but an efficient and not very 
attractive blunt instrument in the hands of government…a highly romanticized 
version of the true spy.”  According to Fleming, a real spy “is another kind of 
beast altogether.”9 
In the United States, the business of spying began during the American 
Revolutionary War (1775-1783) with the Continental Congress’ decision to set up the 
                                                 
  8Alexander Cadogan and David Dilks, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, O.M., 1938-1945, (New 
York: Putnam, 1972), 21.  Cadogan stated Intelligence “is the missing dimension of most diplomatic 
history” and it should be used to help fill in the historical gaps.  Also see Christopher Andrew and David 
Dilks, The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984). 
  9 Ian Fleming quoted in H. Montgomery Hyde, The Quiet Canadian: The Secret Service of Sir William 
Stephenson, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962), x. 
 7 
 
Committee of Secret Correspondence.  The Continental Congress ordered its members to 
discover the disposition of foreign powers toward the plight of the colonies, report their 
findings, and exert influence on foreign powers to garner support for the colonial cause.  
These colonial agents employed a rudimentary form of tradecraft.  They worked 
undercover, wore disguises when necessary, and used secret writing as well as codes and 
ciphers to communicate. 10  General George Washington, the commander of the 
Continental Army, set up a network of agents to support his military campaigns.  The 
colonial general believed in “the necessity of procuring good intelligence” as well as 
understanding the importance of secrecy.11  With the war won, Washington’s spies, who 
never discussed their wartime exploits, resumed their prewar lives.  Believing that spies, 
like a large standing army, were the tools of the despot, the new republic wanted to 
dismantle its intelligence apparatus.  President Washington, however, believed the 
executive office should, in times of distress, have the funds necessary to mount 
clandestine operations.  In 1790, Congress created the “Contingent Fund of Foreign 
Intercourse,” which became known as the “secret service fund.” 12  The role of U.S. 
intelligence during the eighteen and nineteenth century was irregular.  During times of 
conflict—the War of 1812, the Civil War, and the Spanish American War—the army and 
                                                 
  10 Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency 
from Washington to Bush, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 7-10. 
  11 Washington to Col. Elias Dayton, 26 July 1777, quoted from John C. Fitzpatrick, The Writings of 
Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1931-1944) 8:478-489. 
  12 “An Act providing the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations,” Annals of 
Congress, 1st Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington DC: Gales and Seaton, 1934), 2:2291.  In 1790, Congress 
allocated $40,000 to this secret service fund.  Within a few years, this secret fund would represent ten 
percent of the federal budget. 
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the navy expanded but once the threat was gone the military shrank back to its prewar 
levels.  These conflicts, also, resulted in the increase in the U.S. government’s use of 
spies but once the threat had passed these men and women, just like their Revolutionary 
War colleagues, returned to their civilian lives.13 
By the mid-twentieth century, however, this cycle of military expansion and 
contraction underwent a fundamental change.  The republic, out of fear of another Pearl 
Harbor style attack, decided to keep a large standing army as well as set up its first 
centralized civilian peacetime intelligence organization.  In 1947, President Harry S. 
Truman, with legislative approval, created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for “the 
sole purpose of getting all the available information to the president.”14  During the early 
days of the CIA, the agency relied predominately on human intelligence (HUMINT).  
Case officers handle human sources known as agents (spies).  These agents, because of 
their placement and access to a particular target, gather information, which they pass on 
to their case officer who gives it to Langley.  Once evaluated and analyzed, the data is 
passed on to government officials (the end users), who use the information to make 
policy decisions.  Often, these officials ask specific questions to address particular 
security concerns.  Langley, then, relays these requests to the case officer, who orders his 
                                                 
  13 Christopher Andrew’s survey of U.S. intelligence only devotes twenty pages (out of 541 pages) to pre-
twentieth century U.S. intelligence operations because eighteenth and nineteenth century intelligence 
operation were sporadic and usually tied to a major conflict. 
  14 Harry S. Truman to William B. Arthur, 10 June 1964, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Post-
Presidential Secretary’s Office Files, Box14.  Memorandum for Mr. Clark M. Clifford, “Proposed enabling 
legislation for the establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency, 2 December 1946, Harry S. Truman 
Library and Museum, Papers of George M. Elsey, Box 56. 
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agent to acquire the intelligence needed to answer these questions, which brings the 
intelligence cycle full circle.15  
The first rule of espionage is don’t get caught.  The case office, during his daily 
routine, constantly runs the risk of exposure.  For example, agent recruitment is 
strenuous.  A case officer spots, assesses, recruits, tests and trains agents.  A single 
mistake, during recruitment, can unmask the case officer, which might lead to 
deportation, imprisonment, or execution for either the case officer or his agent.  In a 
perfect world, the information gained justifies the risk.16  An agent of influence, on the 
other hand, is someone who uses their position to exert influence on policy or public 
opinion.  These intelligence professionals work to shape the course of a particular 
event—making the agent of influence “far more valuable, subtle, and dangerous” than a 
mere spy.  These agents are considered more valuable than a well-placed mole.  To 
succeed, the agent of influence enlists domestic allies to carry out specific tasks.  Fellow 
travelers, for example, are those people who sympathize with the cause but had no formal 
ties linking them back to the agent while “useful idiots” were individuals who had no 
idea that their actions were furthering the interest of a foreign power.  The agent of 
influence, like a puppet master, pulled the strings and domestics allies worked to shape 
national policy.17 
                                                 
  15 For the office view on the Intelligence Cycle see Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook on Intelligence, 
(Langley, VA: Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, 1993), 14.  
  16 Victor Suvorov, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, (London: H. Hamilton, 1984), 57-65. 
  17 Angelo M. Codevilla, “Political Warfare: A Set of Means for Achieving Political Ends,” Strategic 
Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda and Political Warfare (Washington D.C.: Institute of 
World Politics Press, 2008), 220; Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in 
Soviet Strategy, (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), 193-194. 
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The work of an agent of influence almost defies understanding.  With a subtle but 
deft touch the political warfare specialist can exert enough influence to shape policy.  
Stanislav Levchenko, a Soviet defector, who worked for Service A of the KGB First 
Chief Directorate, the department responsible for conducting Soviet political warfare 
stated “The Soviet Union has been tricking the West for almost 70 years.  There is in the 
West a factor of elementary naiveté,” a naiveté the British and the Chinese used for their 
political gain.18  By exploiting a nation’s fear, agents of influence manufactured consent.  
These clandestine operations led to a shift in U.S. foreign and domestic policy, which 
helped establish the American national security state, the military-industrial complex, and 
the multijurisdictional U.S. intelligence community (IC).  
During World War I, Great Britain employed political warfare experts, who 
worked to drag the United States into the conflict.   George Kennan, noted Sovietologist 
and the father of containment, stated, in the spring of 1948, that “the creation, success, 
and survival of the British Empire has been due in part to the British understanding and 
application of the principles of political warfare,” which Kennan understood to be the “art 
of heartening friends and disheartening enemies.”19  The use of “words, images, and 
                                                 
  18 Interview quoted in Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-
87, (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Publication 9627, August 1987), 87. State and Justice 
Department reports on Soviet active measures include Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and 
Process of Anti-U.S. Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns, (Washington D.C.: Department of State 
Publication 9630, August 1986); Soviet Active Measures in the United States. Washington D.C.: 
Department of Justice, June 1987); Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and 
Propaganda, 1986-87, (Washington D.C.: Department of State Publication 9627, August 1987). 
  19 National Security Council Policy Planning Staff Memorandum, May 4, 1948, National Archives and 
Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2, box 32; United 
States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the 
Intelligence Establishment, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 668-669. 
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ideas” to persuade rivals to alter their opinions or actions was not new.20    And like, Sun 
Tzu, a sixth century B.C.E. Chinese military general, strategist and philosopher, Kennan 
knew that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”  Military 
conflict mired in bloodshed and turmoil should be avoided whenever possible.  Sun Tzu 
urged his readers to understand their opponents—a skilled tactician can psychologically 
manipulate, unnerve and demoralize his enemies.  A true strategist employed every dirty 
trick short of war to mislead and to outmaneuver his opponent.  Making war nothing 
more than just one tool in the diplomat’s arsenal—a blunt instrument that should only be 
used as a last resort.  Something that modern political warfare experts understand all too 
well.21 
George Kennan knew that political warfare encompassed more than just words, 
images and ideas.  Like Sun Tzu, the Sovietologist viewed political warfare as using all 
the dirty tricks short of all-out war to achieve strategic diplomatic goals.  An idea, the 
author of the Long Telegram, feared the American public would never embrace since 
most Americans  
have been handicapped…by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic 
difference between peace and war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of 
sporting context outside of all political context, by a national tendency to 
seek for a political cure-all, and by a reluctance to recognize the realities of 
international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.  
 
                                                 
  20 Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, War: Ends and Means, (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006), 
151; Paul A. Smith, Jr., On Political War, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), 3.  
  21 Victor H. Mair, The Art of War: Sun Zi’s Military Methods, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), xiv-xv. 
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Kennan realized that most Americans would view political warfare as being incompatible 
with the nation’s democratic values and traditions, which might spell the end of the 
republic.  He understood that political warfare was simply the logical application of Sun 
Tzu’s doctrine of war.22  
As the “Good War” ended, peace proved elusive.  Fighting over America’s 
limited resources, the British and the Chinese exploited the growing postwar political and 
military tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union to gain the postwar 
financial support they needed to rebuild their nations.  Direct confrontation between the 
Soviet Union and the United States compelled the two superpowers to limit their struggle 
to a shadow war where both nations courted public opinion.  This struggle crossed 
national boundaries as journalists, media moguls, and scholars strove to win the “hearts 
and minds” of a nation.  By 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican Party 
presidential candidate, realized the risk of America fighting an “out-and-out shooting 
war” was far less likely than the danger confronting the United States on what the former 
World War II general referred to as “the political warfare front.” 23  Cold War rhetoric, 
written by journalists and scholars employed by American, British, and Chinese 
intelligence during the Second World War, provided the prose used by U.S. politicians, 
drawn into the fray by smooth talking influence peddlers, to crucify their political rivals.  
                                                 
  22 National Security Council Policy Planning Staff Memorandum, May 4, 1948, National Archives and 
Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, NSC 10/2, Box 32; United 
States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950, Emergence of the 
Intelligence Establishment, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 668-669. 
  23Eisenhower to George Arthur Sloan, 20 March 1952, quoted in Alfred D. Chandler and Louis Galambos, 
The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1970-1996), 13: 1098-
1103. 
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Charges of treason and sedition swept the nation.  A communist witch-hunt tightened the 
thumbscrews on American civil liberties.  The Soviet-American arms race resulted in 
establishment of a stable military-industrial complex.  Through almost fifty years of what 
has become known as the Cold War, American presidents and politicians struggled to 
prevent nuclear Armageddon.24 
By using the psychology of fear, political warfare specialists helped shape 
postwar American foreign policy.  The fear of a Soviet first strike or worse a Soviet 
backed coup d’état became the basis for five decades worth of U.S. national security 
policy decisions. 25  Harold Lasswell, a leading American political scientist, who 
understood the use of fear to gain political advantage, explored how those who 
“specialized in violence” manipulated the state.  Lasswell examined the rise of various 
military dictatorships—Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Mussolini’s Italy, and Imperial 
Japan.  He came to believe the “specialists on violence would become the most powerful 
group in society.”  Lasswell’s research showed that those who specialized in violence 
militarized society.  They created laws requiring universal military training, they 
mobilized the scientific and industrial community, and they increased taxes to pay for the 
vast military-industrial complex that came to dominate the state.  Eventually, the 
“garrison state” would control the lives of its citizens.  After the Second World War, 
Lasswell stressed that even a democratic power, such as the United States, might 
                                                 
  24 See Evan Thomas, Ike’s Bluff: President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World, (New York: 
Little Brown and Company, 2012). 
  25 For a detailed account of America’s reaction to the atomic bomb, see Paul Boyer, By the Bombs Early 
Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985). 
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transform into a garrison state.  The American political scientist theorized that feeling of 
continual political danger might compel U.S. policy makers to embrace militarism or risk 
destroying the republic.26  
On March 28, 1947, George Kennan warned students at the U.S. National War 
College that feelings of fear and insecurity could lead to the rise of totalitarian régimes.  
It was possible that even Western democracies might suppress any trace of loyal 
opposition.  Fear of internal and external sabotage might compel politicians to undermine 
the parliamentarian social contract that provided governmental legitimacy.  Socio-
political unrest might cause the Western democracies to turn against their citizenry in the 
name of national security.  Kennan cautioned, “The fact of the matter is that there is a 
little bit of the totalitarian buried somewhere, way down deep, in each and everyone one 
of us.  It is only the cheerful light of confidence and security which keeps this evil genius 
down.”27 
Hanson Baldwin, the Pulitzer Prizing winning military analyst for the New York 
Times, noticing a shift in American foreign policy, proposed a disturbing question. “How 
can we prepare for total war without becoming a ‘garrison state’ and destroying the very 
qualities and virtues and principles we originally set about to save?  This…is the grand 
                                                 
  26 “The Garrison State,” The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 46, no. 4 (January 1941): 455; For more 
on the garrison state see Lasswell’s other articles “The Garrison State and the Specialist on Violence,” The 
Analysis of Political Behavior: An Empirical Approach,(New York: Oxford University Press, 1947): 146-
157; “The Universal Peril: Perpetual Crisis and the Garrison-Prison State,” Perspectives on a Troubled 
Decade: Science, Philosophy, and Religion, 1939-1949: Tenth Symposium, New York: Conference on 
Science, Philosophy, and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life; (New York: Harper  
1950), 323-328. 
  27 George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), 336-337.  
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dilemma…of our age.”28  Baldwin, like Kennan and Lasswell, realized the United States, 
faced with the growing Soviet threat, might allow those who specialized in violence to 
gain political control, which could rapidly transform the United States into a despotic 
régime.29  In the two years following the end of World War II, the New York Times 
journalist reported on the U.S. government’s hard-line anticommunist foreign policy.  
The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the passage of the National Security Act of 
1947 demonstrated America’s commitment to check communist aggression around the 
world.  These programs also ensured access to free markets, which would avoid another 
postwar Great Depression.30   
Politicians, military commanders, journalists, and foreign intelligence agents 
exploited this postwar fear of atomic annihilation to ensure that personal and ideological 
agendas received the federal funding needed to keep American safe.  These arbitrary 
political policy decisions caused a rift first in the Truman administration and then along 
political party lines.  Should the United States uphold its Eurocentric diplomatic approach 
or should U.S. policymakers shift their focus to the Far East?  The partisan struggle 
between the Republicans and Democrats eventually pitted the agents of the British 
Empire against the members of the China Lobby as representatives from both nations 
tried to influence American politics during the late 1940s and 1950s.31  British agents and 
                                                 
  28 Hanson Baldwin, The Price of Power (New York: Harper, 1947), 20. 
  29 Harold Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” 455-468. 
  30 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the 
Cold War, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 16.  
  31  Wilson D. Miscamble, in George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950, 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 212-246, explains why the policy followed in Europe 
would not work in China. 
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China lobbyists exploited Kennan’s call to contain Soviet expansion.  These agents of 
influence contributed to some of America’s most important Cold War decisions.  
America’s postwar decision to support the Greeks, to intervene in Korean, to orchestrate 
the removal of the Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, and the Guatemalan 
President, Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, and the American decision to intervene in French 
Indochina, which led to the military buildup in South Vietnam.32 
During the first two decades of the Cold War, foreign agents of influence and 
their domestic allies used the American fear of the bomb, their apprehension of the 
future, and their growing irrationality of Communisms to orchestrate a campaign of 
whispers, rumors, and innuendo to shape American public opinion.  Most Cold War 
manuscripts fail to address these internal pressures.  Instead, most of these monographs 
present a subjective account of the times.  Each volume can be classified as an orthodox, 
revisionist, or post-revisionist view of the conflict.   Historians, such as Herbert Feis, 
Thomas A. Bailey, John Lewis Gaddis, Walter LaFeber, Gar Alperovitz, Melvyn Leffler, 
and Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, present the chaotic post-World War II years as nothing 
more than America’s rapid transformation from a welfare state to a warfare state. Some 
of these Cold War scholars suggest U.S. policymakers, guided by a conspiratorial plan to 
alter the nature of the republic, transferred the citizenry’s fear of totalitarian 
expansionism (such as the recently defeated Thousand Year Reich) into a fear of Stalinist 
                                                 
  32 Kennan’s concept of containment mirrors Georges Clemenceau’s use of the term cordon sanitaire, 
which described the French Foreign Minister’s establishment of a system of alliances designed to keep 
Germany and Soviet Russia isolated from the rest of Europe. 
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Russia. 33  These Cold War scholars fail to explore the use of “soft power” by British 
intelligence, Chinese lobbyists, and American policy makers to alter the course of the 
nation.  Soft power—as opposed to the “hard” power represented by all-out war—is the 
state’s use of overt, covert, and clandestine measures that use “all the means at a nation’s 
command, short of war.”  Propaganda, régime change, financial support of client states, 
funding counterinsurgencies, and political assassination are just some of the tools used by 
political warfare specialists.  The use of soft power, by foreign agents of influence, 
transformed American domestic attitudes from isolationist to interventionist.  Soft power 
helped convince a reluctant American populace to join the fight first against Imperial  
 
                                                 
  33 The orthodox, revisionist or post revisionist views comprise the three schools of historical thought 
concerning the origins of the Cold War.  The orthodox view follows the official U.S. version of the origins 
of the Cold War.  The United States acted in the best interest of the world by thwarting Soviet expansionist 
tendencies. Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950, (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 1970) and Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia: Russian-American 
Relations from Early Times to Our Day, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950).  The 
traditional view of the Cold War lasted until the early 1960s but American disillusionment with the 
Vietnam War led to the rise of the revisionist accounts of the Cold War.  The revisionist view blamed the 
United States for the ensuing conflict.  Joyce and Gabriel Kolko’s The Limits of Power: The World and 
United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) and William Appleman 
William, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1958) represent 
just some of the literature concerning the revisionist view of the conflict.  The post-revisionist views 
attribute responsibility for the conflict to both sides.  John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins 
of the Cold War, 1941-1947, (New York; Columbia University Press, 2000) and Walter LaFeber’s Russia, 
the United States and the Cold War (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1977) both represent the post-
revisionist view which argues that through a series of diplomatic blunders and strategic miscalculations the 
United States and the Soviet Union found themselves to be on opposite sides of an ideological feud that 
could have been avoided.  Gaddis believes that through a series of diplomatic misunderstandings the Soviet 
Union and the United States fell into the Cold War while LaFeber argues that the origins of the Cold War 
can be traced back to the eighteenth century when Russian and American trading interests first collided in 
Asia. Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s,” The American Historical Review, vol. 75, 
no. 4 (April 1970): 1046-1064. 
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Germany, and then Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and finally against Stalinist 
Russia.34  
A propagandist blending fact and fiction intertwines morality with policy to craft 
a grandiose political rhetoric justifying national security decisions.  In the United States, 
agents of influence, more often than not, referred to America’s “unique” sense of mission 
to rally public support.  The religious justification for American expansionism 
transformed, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, into a secular 
nationalistic rhetoric that, in part, provided the impetus for the rise of the American 
national security state.  Foreign and domestic agents of influence exploited the idea that 
America is unique to rationalize the nation’s rise to global dominance.  This can be seen 
in the rhetoric surrounding the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.35 
Fear provided a strong motivator for change but fear was not enough.  The British 
understood that as a nation most American were “still unsure of themselves individually, 
still basically on the defensive and still striving, as yet unavailingly but very defiantly, 
after national unity.”  The republic struggled to “achieve a genuine nationalism.”  A 
                                                 
  34 Codevilla and Seabury, War, 151; Smith, On Political War, 3.  My definition of soft power defers from 
Joseph S. Nye’s.  According to Nye, soft power is the ability to get what one wants through cooperation by 
attracting likeminded individuals or nation states to your cause.  An individual or a nation state can increase 
its influence and achieve geopolitical gain without resorting to the use of hard power defined by Nye as the 
use of coercion or force to achieve one’s ends.  My definition of soft power stems from the Cold War 
bipolarization of the war and as such soft power follows Kennan’s definition as utilizing “all the means at a 
nation's command, short of war;” thus, hard power becomes synonymous with total war or in the case of 
the Cold War with a nuclear exchange between the two competing superpowers.  For more information on 
Nye’s contemporary view of soft power, see Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 
American Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1991); Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in 
World Politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 2005); and Joseph Nye, The Future of Power, (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2011). 
  35 John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity, 1630.  Winthrop based his sermon on Mathew 5:14, 
which states, “You are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hidden.”  Also see Henry 
Luce, “The American Century,” Life, 17 February 1941. 
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nationalism expressed in their belief that as Americans they were fundamentally 
different.  Liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, republicanism, democracy and a laissez-
faire approach to governing helped reinforce this idea; but if history has taught us 
anything, it is that people, like nation states, act out of self-interest.  The British, and later 
the Chinese, realized the best way to motivate the American public was by using fear of 
an internal or external threats while appealing to what the French referred to as nobles 
oblige and to what Americans called exceptionalism.  The British and the Chinese used 
the fear of the hyphenated American, the fear of the treasonous fifth columnists, the fear 
of communist subversion, and finally the fear of the atomic bomb to help motivate the 
American public to support their diplomatic goals.  Underlying this fear of the other was 
the idea that the United States had a special relationship with both Great Britain and with 
China.  This myth of the special relationship helped justify American support.36 
America’s shift from an isolationist to interventionist world view is so complex 
that it far exceeds the “standard” reading, which largely focuses on Truman’s decision to 
drop “the Bomb” and the immediate postwar diplomatic misunderstandings between the 
Soviet Union and the United States that lead to the Cold War.  Some of these Cold War 
scholars suggest that the United States navigated these hectic years guided by a massive 
conspiratorial plan to alter the very nature of the republic, in part, by transferring the 
citizenry’s fear of aggressive totalitarian states (such as the recently defeated Thousand 
                                                 
  36 The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945, (New York: Fromm 
International, 1998), 66. 
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Year Reich) into a fear of Stalinist Russia in order to establish a national security state.37  
This study does not suggest that the standard reading fails to provide a logical assessment 
of the origins of the Cold War but it does suggest that maybe friendly persuasion 
employed by agents of influence and their domestic allies might have helped frame the 
debate surrounding the rise of the American national security state. 
Many recent scholarly works take on a more nuanced approach to this period—
but there are still holes in the literature.   The role of intelligence in shaping twentieth-
century domestic and foreign policy continues to pose a problem.  The “missing 
dimension” remains elusive as most scholars tend to avoid intelligence studies.  The field 
is still in its infancy.  The first official inquiry into the role of intelligence occurred in 
1975—a year that has become known as the “Year of Intelligence” or more callously as 
the “Intelligence Wars.”38  In January 1970, Christopher Pyle, a former U.S. military 
intelligence officer, stated that Army intelligence spied on U.S. dissident demonstrations, 
which lead to a Senator Samuel James Ervin, Jr.’s (D-North Carolina), senatorial inquiry 
into the alleged U.S. Army’s domestic spying.39  Four years later, Seymour Hersh, a New 
York Times journalist, reported the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) engaged in 
domestic intelligence work.  Members of the U.S. Congress diligently worked to find out 
                                                 
37 Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in 
the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s,” The American Historical Review, vol. 75, no. 4 
(April 1970): 1046-1064. 
  38 John Prados, The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power, (Austin, Texas: University 
of Texas Press, 2013), 9.  Scholars usually refer to this intelligence windfall as the “Year of Intelligence” 
while members of the intelligence community continue to refer to 1975 as the “Intelligence Wars.” 
  39 Military Surveillance: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee 
Judiciary, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, Second Session, April 9 & 10, 1974, (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1974). 
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the truth behind the New York Times allegations. 40  The reports produced by the United 
States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee), led by Frank Church (D-Idaho), the 
United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee), 
led by Otis Pike (D-New York) and the United States President's Commission on CIA 
Activities within the United States (the Rockefeller Commission) led by Vice President 
Nelson Rockefeller, provided scholars with a cache of archival material.  The Church 
Committee published fourteen reports.  Congressional opposition prevented the official 
publication of the Pike Committee’s final report; although portions leaked to the press.  
The Rockefeller Commission only published one report about CIA domestic intelligence 
work.  Following the revelations contained in these reports, scholars tentatively began to 
explore the impact of intelligence on history.41  The literature on intelligence is broad 
(but superficial) covering such diverse topics as intelligence theory, reform, management 
and accountability; exposés on the shape and organization of the IC; detailed accounts of  
intelligence operations; as well as memoirs written by intelligence professionals.42 
                                                 
  40Seymour Hersh, “Huge CIA Operation Reported in U.S. against Anti-War Forces, Other Dissidents in 
Nixon Years,” New York Times, December 22, 1974.  
  41 F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993).  John Lewis Gaddis, “Intelligence, Espionage, and Cold War Origins,” Diplomatic 
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  42 For intelligence theory see Arthur S. Hulnick, “The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage: A 
Theoretical Approach,” Intelligence and National Security, (May 1986): 212-233; Philip H.J. Davies, 
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(Autumn, 2002): 62-66; and Loch K. Johnson, “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” 
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the Spy Machine, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); and Loch K. Johnson, “The Failures of U.S. Intelligence 
and What Can be done about Them,” Yale Journal of International Affairs (February 2006).  For 
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The literature on political warfare campaigns, like the other subfields in 
intelligence studies, is growing.  Harold Lasswell’s Propaganda Techniques in the World 
War provided the foundational work on the subject.  George Bruntz’s Allied Propaganda 
and the Collapse of the German Empire explores the political warfare efforts conducted 
by the Triple Entente against Germany. J.D Squires’ British Propaganda at Home and in 
the United States from 1914-1917 examines the role of literature in the production of 
propaganda.  M.L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor’s British Propaganda during the First 
World War, 1914-1918 deals with the struggle between the British Foreign Office and the 
Home Office over control of propaganda during the war.  On American propaganda 
efforts during the Great War see James R. Mock and Cedric Larson’s Words that Won the 
War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, George Creel’s How We 
Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public 
Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe, 
Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the 
Committee on Public Information, and George T. Blakey’s Historians on the Homefront: 
American Propagandist for the Great War.43 
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Friendly intelligence operations provide yet another area of scholarly inquiry that 
most historians overlook.  Using the subtlest of language, Martin S. Alexander, Knowing 
Your Friends: Intelligence inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War, in 
his groundbreaking study, referred to these types of operations as being a mixture of 
cooperation and competition.  Intelligence collection relied on the incidental transfer of 
information gathered by close contact between liaison officers during their daily 
assignments.  Knowing Your Friends ignores operations, that might be deemed hostile, 
that occurred between allies.  For example, during the First and Second World Wars, the 
British broke and read U.S. communications.  The British officials used the information 
gained to develop plans to help drag the United States into the war.  Ernest Cuneo, the 
liaison between U.S. and British Intelligence during the Second World War, stated 
“friendly and neutral powers are quaint and laughable terms unrecognized in the world of 
intelligence.  Every major nation taps every other major nation, none more than its 
Allies.” Cuneo understood that “who is talking to whom” is often “as important as what 
is said.”  The aging spy knew that political correctness is a liability. Allies are fleeting.  
Self-interest governs diplomatic relations as today’s friend might become tomorrow’s 
enemy.44 
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  44 Martin S. Alexander, Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to 
the Cold War, (New York: Routledge, 1998).  Ernest Cuneo, a letter to J. Edgar Hoover, 14 March 1969 
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The literature on British efforts to convince the United States to join the First 
World War include Barbara Tuchman’s, The Zimmermann Telegram, Patrick Beesly’s 
Room 40: British naval Intelligence, 1914-1918, Wilton B. Fowler’s, British-American 
Relations, 1917-1918: The Role of Sir William Wiseman, Friedrich Katz’s, The Secret 
War in Mexico: Europe, The United States, and the Mexican Revolution, Jules 
Witcover’s, Sabotage at Black Tom: Imperial Germany’s Secret War in America, 1914-
1917, and Howard Blum’s, Dark Invasion: 1915: Germany’s Secret War and the Hunt 
for the First Terrorist Cell in America.45  Several memoirs, such as Guy Gaunt, The Yield 
of Years: A Story of Adventure Afloat and Ashore, Norman Thwaites, Velvet and Vinegar, 
Emanuel Voska and Will Irwin, Spy and Counter-Spy, and Franz Rintelen, Dark Invader: 
Wartime Reminiscences of a German Naval Intelligence Officer, provide detailed 
accounts of German intelligence operations in the United States and the British response 
to these political warfare campaigns.  While these monographs provide a snapshot of the 
times, they fail to link British political warfare campaigns (1914-1919) to British efforts, 
two decades later, to compel the United States to join the fight against Nazi Germany 
(1939-1940).46 
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 In 1998, British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence 
in the Americas, 1940-1945, the organization’s official history, was finally published.  
The BSC, charged with conducting political warfare operations during the Second World 
War,  provided the single most important source on British intelligence in the Americas 
in the years leading up to the World War II.  The secondary literature about the BSC, all 
quote extensively from the pages of this official history.  Thomas F. Troy, the CIA 
Historian, stated the BSC papers were “often quoted, highly publicized, but still hidden 
from public view—a sort of forbidden fruit.”47 
Two biographies of William Stephenson, H. Montgomery Hyde’s The Quiet 
Canadian: The Secret Service of Sir William Stephenson and William Stevenson’s A Man 
Called Intrepid provide a history full of errors.  Those flaws, however, are mitigated 
when the two texts are used with a third biography—Bill Macdonald’s The True 
‘Intrepid’: Sir William Stephenson and the Unknown Agents and with the BSC papers.48  
Jennet Conant’s The Irregulars: Roald Dahl and the British Spy Ring in Wartime 
Washington, Nicholas John Cull’s Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign 
against American “Neutrality” in World War II, and Thomas E. Mahl’s Desperate 
Deception: British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-1944 explore the British 
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use of propaganda to influence U.S. domestic policy in the years leading up to World 
War II.49 
 The literature fails to explore the similarity between 1914 and 1940.  These 
manuscripts, also, fail to examine the unintended consequences of friendly political 
warfare operations on U.S. domestic and foreign policy.  More importantly, none of these 
monographs examine how British active measures led to the rise of the China Lobby in 
American politics.  These intelligence operations, viewed within the context of nearly a 
century of perpetual war, will show how political warfare, from World War I through the 
early Cold War period, directly relates to the U.S. development and implantation of its 
own political warfare program, which was instrumental in shaping U.S. Cold War 
domestic and foreign policy. 
The literature on the China lobby is almost nonexistent. Max Ascoli’s account 
“The China Lobby” is the starting point for scholarly inquiry into this undefined 
organization.  Ross Koen’s The China Lobby in American Politics and Stanley 
Bachrack’s The Committee of One Million: “China Lobby” Politics, 1953-1971, provides 
the foundational literature on the China Lobby’s efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy.  
These studies briefly examine the influence of the China Lobby on American politics; 
however, they date back to the early 1960s and 1970s.  Ascoli, Koen, and Bachrack did 
not have access to any of the recently opened archival resources.  A memo, in T.V. 
Soong’s archival records, strongly suggests the China Lobby deliberately and consciously 
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targeted certain influential U.S. congressional representatives and senators in their efforts 
to secure U.S. aid to China.50  Other documents found in T.V. Soong’s archival records 
also suggest the China Lobby worked behind the scenes in the U.S. to gain control of all 
the disparate organizations working on their behalf.  This strategy mirrors British 
Intelligence’s use of front organizations during the First and Second World War.51 
These documents suggest the China Lobby held more power than previously 
recognized; thus, making the China Lobby a major player in shaping U.S. domestic and 
foreign policy.  Recent manuscripts dealing with major China lobby figures, such as Alan 
Brinkley’s The Publisher: Henry Luce and His American Century, fail to mention the 
China lobby in any detail.  Even Hannah Pakula’s The Last Empress: Madame Chiang 
Kai-Shek and the Birth of Modern China and Jay Taylor’s The Generalissimo: Chiang 
Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China only give passing reference to these 
lobbyists.52  
Unfortunately, there is no single archival file with all the answers.  The problem 
with intelligence history is the material is often “scattered to the winds—a sentence here 
a paragraph there” forcing the historian to search for answers across a vast field of 
scholarly inquiry.53  During the Second World War, Ernest Cuneo worked as the liaison 
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between British and American intelligence.  The aging intelligence officer revealed the 
historical difficulty with intelligence studies.  As the British worked to influence U.S. 
prewar policy, Cuneo described his normal daily routine. “I saw Berle at State, Eddie 
Tamm, J. Edgar and more often the Attorney General, on various other matters Dave 
Niles at the White House and Ed Foley at Treasury, but so far as I know [there] wasn’t a 
sentence recorded.”54  This lack of written documents makes the historian’s job tougher 
but does not negate the importance these types of studies.  Exactly how much sway did 
these friendly political warfare campaigns have in shaping twentieth century U.S. foreign 
and domestic policy can be difficult to pinpoint as there is no smoking gun, no large X 
marking the spot in the archives saying here are all the answers.  Instead, the answers are 
found in small scraps of .information found in personal memoirs and in official papers.  
The declassification system means that every day more and more information is being 
released to the public.  In piecing together this story, I have broken the research into six 
chapters. 
Chapter One, “Saboteurs, Subversives, and Spies,” examines British and German 
World War I political warfare operations conducted in the United States.  Chapter Two, 
“Patriotic Fervor,” looks at the blowback of these intelligence operations on U.S. 
domestic policy.  Chapter Three, “Neutrality and War,” evaluates British efforts to drag 
the United States into the Second World War.  Chapter Four, “Empire and War,” traces 
the origin and influence of the China lobby on American politics as well as examining 
                                                 
  54 Ernest Cuneo Letter to Dick Ellis, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, the Papers of Ernest 
Cuneo, Box 51, Unidentified File. 
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how the British, Chinese, and Americans clashed over Asia.  Chapter Five, “Architects of 
Empire,” will explore the post-World War II competition between China and Britain for 
U.S. postwar support as well as examining the effect of perpetual war on American 
domestic policy. 
A small caveat, historians continue to struggle to make sense of our convoluted 
past.  Scholars, often, look for mono-causal explanations of complex historical trends.  
“You can’t ascribe our fall from grace to any single event or set of circumstances.” As 
James Ellroy pointed out, “You can’t lose what you lacked at conception.” And yet, 
nostalgia continues to drive some scholars to produce a hagiographic view of our past 
where political platitudes and clichés replace documented fact while other historians 
prefer to demonize our past.  It’s time to “demythologize” our past and examine how 
diplomatic hubris, political realism, foreign interference and the growing realization the 
atomic bomb made the entire world a hostage to fortune, convinced U.S. politicians to 
develop and carry out an aggressive interventionist postwar foreign policy.  The 
blowback from these policy decisions unintentionally resulted in the American national 
security state.  This is the story of how those early foreign agents of influence and their 
domestic allies worked to change the course of a nation.55 
                                                 
  55 James Ellroy, American Tabloid, (New York: Vintage, 2001), no page number. 
 30 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Saboteurs, Subversives, and Spies 
 
 
Figure 21 
... .- -... --- - . ..- .-. ... --..--   ... ..- -... ...- . .-. ... .. ...- . ... --..--   .- -. -..   ... .--. .. . ... 
On March 5, 1946 Winston Churchill, former British Prime Minister, gave one of 
his most important post-World War II speeches at Westminster College in Fulton, 
Missouri.  The speech electrified a nation as Churchill provided the rhetoric for the Cold 
War.  The former prime minister talked of the “sinews of peace,” discussed the vast iron 
curtain that had fallen across Eastern Europe, and most importantly he talked about the 
special relationship between the United States and the British Empire.  A relationship 
based on the “fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples.”2  Many scholars 
contend that this special relationship has existed since the early nineteenth century; while 
                                                 
  1 Figure 2: “Mrs. Edith Cavell Murdered,” French Postcard, Laureys-Paris, 1915. 
  2 Winston Churchill, The Sinews of Peace: Post-War Speeches by Winston Churchill, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1949), 93-105.  According to W. Averell Harriman, Churchill, during an August 14, 1943 
dinner with FDR, at Hyde Park, the British prime minister first suggested this idea of a “fraternal 
relationship.”  Churchill liked the idea of a “loose association” between the two countries since an 
association would be “flexible enough to adjust itself to historical developments.  See W. Averell Harriman 
and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, (New York: Random House, 1975), 222. 
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others, Dean Acheson, secretary of state for Harry S. Truman, denied its very existence.  
By the late 1950s, Acheson came to believe that the British had “lost an Empire” and had 
as of yet failed to “find a role.”  Acheson was mistaken.  The British did find a role.  As 
their Empire crumbled, the British worked to ensure that their national interests 
intertwined with the global rise of the United States; thus, ensuring their ability to 
influence world events.3 
As Churchill suggested, this “fraternal association” required a “growing 
friendship and mutual understanding” as well as continuing “the intimate relationship” 
between military advisers (and intelligence professionals).  Churchill, also, suggested 
mutual security backed up by the strength of British and U.S. Naval and Air Force bases, 
which would extend the reach of both nations.  Left unsaid was the British would remain 
safe behind America’s nuclear arsenal.  The myth of the special relationship, like 
American exceptionalism, has come to permeate how many Americans view the 
diplomatic relationship between the United States and Great Britain.  Historically, the 
special relationship did not really exist before the Second World War and it became a 
mainstay of U.S. foreign policy only after the beginning of the Cold War.  Two factors 
are essential to understanding how the British shaped American public opinion.  How did 
they develop their political warfare program?  And how did this program influence the 
United States in the years leading up to the American declaration of war against Germany 
during World War I?4 
                                                 
3 Douglas Brinkley, “Dean Acheson and the ‘Special Relationship’: The West Point Speech of December 
1962,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1990): 599-608. 
4 Churchill, The Sinews of Peace, 93-105. 
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On June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip, an obscure Serbian nationalist, ambushed and 
murdered the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, 
Sophie Chotek, the Duchess of Hohenberg, in Sarajevo, the capital of the Austrian 
province of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Assassination, as a tool of statecraft, was not an 
unusual event; thus, the first reaction by most Europeans, who would have been hard 
pressed to find Sarajevo on a map, was subdued.  And yet, Ferdinand and his wife’s 
murder provided the final nudge needed to push the world toward the first global conflict 
of the twentieth century.  No one, at the time, believed the events in Sarajevo might lead 
to a general European war. 
England, embroiled in the Irish Home Rule Crisis, paid little attention to the news 
of the archduke’s murder.  David Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (later 
Prime Minister), recalled that he felt that it might be a “grave matter” but Kaiser Wilhelm 
II’s departure, for his annual North Sea cruise, lessened his fears that events might spiral 
out of control.5  As the July Crisis continued, European leaders, however, secretly 
discussed the geopolitical advantage to a limited conflict in the Balkans.  A Third Balkan 
War might not be that bad; especially, since most European heads of state thought that 
war was all but certain.6  On a European fact-finding mission, in the spring of 1914, 
Colonel Edward M. House, President Woodrow Wilson’s chief adviser, reported the 
situation in Europe amounted to “militarism run stark mad” and that eventually there 
would be “an awful cataclysm.”7 
                                                 
  5 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 
1933), 1:50.  
  6 Ruth Henig, The Origins of the First World War, (Florence, KY: Routledge, 1993), 53.  
  7 “Report from House to Wilson, 29 May 1914,” Edward M. House and Charles Seymour, 1:235.  For a 
detailed look at House’s spring 1914 trip to Europe, referred to as “The Great Adventure” by Colonel 
House, see Edward Mandell House Papers (MS 466), Series II, Diaries, Volume I, Manuscripts and 
Archives, Yale University Library, Box 299. 
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As diplomacy failed, nation after nation began to consider the benefits of a limited 
war.  The British believed war might blunt German imperial ambitions as well as 
decrease German militarism on the continent.  Kaiser Wilhelm II, fearing political 
isolation, believed that “the question for Germany is to be or not to be” and that war 
would decide the “existence or nonexistence for the German race.”8  The events in 
Sarajevo provided Austria with the “golden opportunity to declare war.”  A war might 
solve the Serbian question.  A war, Germany hoped, would help change the status quo on 
the continent.9  In an era defined by Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power 
upon History, Russia’s lack of a warm water port relegated the Eurasian empire to the 
ranks of a second-class power.10  Czar Nicholas II saw ports along the Mediterranean Sea 
as the key to his imperial ambitions and the Hapsburg Empire as the only obstacle to his 
dreams of empire.  After almost three decades of political isolation, the French wanted 
revenge for the loss of the coal rich regions of Alsace and Lorraine following their defeat 
in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871).  The Austrian dual monarchy, led by an ailing 
Emperor, Franz Josef, wanted to absorb the Serbs into the Hapsburg’s multicultural 
empire.  Serbian nationalists, with the promise of Russian support, continued to grow 
bolder and bolder in their resistance to Austrian political pressure.  War came not because 
of the loss of hope or because of the inevitability of a general European conflict.  War 
                                                 
  8 Kaiser Wilhelm II quoted in Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914, (New 
York: Norton, 1975), 161; Kaiser Wilhelm II quoted in Wayne C. Thompson, In the Eye of the Storm: Kurt 
Riezler and the Crisis of Modern Germany, (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1980), 42. 
  9 Albertini, 1:538; Fritz Fischer, World Power or Decline: The Controversy over German Aims in the 
First World War, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1974), 95. 
   10 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783, (Boston: Little Brown, 
1918). 
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came because each nation believed that when diplomacy failed war was the logical next 
step.11   
European diplomats gambled and a generation lost.12  But at the time, everyone 
believed the war would be over by Christmas.  The Kaiser told his troops that they would 
“be home before the leaves had fallen from the trees.” 13  As soldiers, on both sides, died 
in a war of attrition, British intelligence, with an eye on public opinion, turned 
intelligence failures into effective anti-German propaganda campaigns.  The British 
discovered world opinion not only mattered but that it also provided a “new front” in the 
expanding global conflict.  Nascent British political warfare experts, working for Captain 
(later Admiral Sir) Reginald “Blinker” Hall’s NID25, commonly referred to as Room 40, 
                                                 
  11 Henig, 54. 
  12 The historiography of World War I is tied directly to Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, which 
states that “Germany accepts responsibility…for causing all the loss and damage…as a consequence of the 
war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.”  The traditional view of the war 
espoused by the victors determined that Germany was solely responsible for starting the conflict.  
Revisionist historians like Sidney Bradshaw Fay’s The Origins of the World War, (New York: the 
Macmillan Company, 1928) written shortly after the war blamed incompetent leadership on all sides.  Anti-
Revisionist historians like Luigi Albertini, Origins of the War of 1914, (Enigma Books: New York, 2005), 
Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1968) and 
A.J.P. Taylor, War by Timetable: How the First War Began, (New York: American Heritage, 1969) 
reverted back to the traditional view that Germany was responsible for the war.  Modern historians like 
Samuel R. Williamson, Austria-Hungry and the Origins of the First World War, (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1991) suggests that Austria was equally to blame for starting the war; while, Sean McMeekin, The 
Russian Origins of the First World War, (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011) and July 
1914, (New York: Basic Books, 2013), lays responsibility at the feet of Tsarist Russia and France.  Niall 
Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I, (London: Basic Books, 2000), on the other hand, lays 
the lion share of the blame on the British.  Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, (New York: Scribner’s 
Sons, 1951), believed that romantic notions of war coupled with the general mood that war was all but 
inevitable led European heads of state to choose war in the summer of 1914.  Thus, the world slipped into 
war and historians, ever since, have attempted to explore the complex origins of the conflict in an effort to 
explain what happened to the generation of 1914.  No one wants to believe that wars begin by accident but 
David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, might have had the final word when he confessed in his 
War Memoirs, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933) that “We muddled into war.” 
  13 Kaiser Wilhelm II quoted in Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, (New York: Dell, 1963), 142.  The 
over confidence of the German military can best be summed up by General Von Loebell who predicted that 
the “German army would sweep through Europe like a buss full of tourists.” Fischer, War of Illusions, 543. 
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shrewdly exploited America’s rising xenophobia to compel the United States to enter the 
war.14  
It might seem strange the British Admiralty and not  MI6, Britain’s foreign 
intelligence service made famous by Ian Flemings’ James Bond, strove to convince the 
United States to help fight the Germans, but at the time, MI6 was in fledgling state.15  At 
the turn of the century, British secret service agents only worked throughout the empire 
in popular fiction.  Rudyard Kipling’s Kim convinced many readers the British 
intelligence agents stationed in India played the “Great Game” against Czarist and French 
agents with consummate skill.16  William Le Queux, a prolific writer of adventure stories, 
openly stated the British Secret Service worked in “secrecy and silence” to keep the 
empire safe from “the machinations of England’s enemies.”17  And yet, the British 
government realized what their enemies did not—their all-powerful, all-seeing secret 
service did not exist. 18 
By the early twentieth century, events on the continent—the rise of nationalism, 
imperialism, and militarism—contributed to an increase in British war hysteria.  An 
increase in reports of German agents’ infiltration of the English countryside further 
intensified British fears of German subversion.19  Rising public fear over German 
penetration of the British Isles coincided with the development of a British literary style 
                                                 
  14 NID25 occupied room 40 O.B. (old building) of the Admiralty, hence the name Room 40.  
  15 For a detailed account of the exploits of Room 40 see Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval 
Intelligence 1914-1918, (London: Hamilton, 1982). 
  16Rudyard Kipling, Kim, (New York: Bantam Books, 2007). 
  17 William Le Queux, England’s Peril: A Story of the Secret Service, (London: George Newnes, 1903), 
42. 
  18 Le Queux’s efforts helped the British hide their intelligence weakness. F. H. Hinsey, British Intelligence 
in the Second World War, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1:16. 
  19 “Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense Appointed by the 
Prime Minister to Consider the Question of Foreign Espionage in the United Kingdom: First Meeting, 
Tuesday, 30th March 1909”, October 1909, The National Archives (Kew, UK), CAB 16/8 and CAB 38/15. 
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known as “invasion literature.”  Popular during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, invasion literature began with a short story by Lieutenant Colonel George 
Tomkyns Chesney called “The Battle of Dorking,” first published in 1871, in 
Blackwood’s Magazine.20  This short story documented the fictional invasion of England 
by shadowy forces, referred to in the text as the enemy.  And even though, Chesney did 
not specifically name the invaders, they strongly resembled the Prussian military.  The 
Prussian army, in 1870, defeated the French army considered at the time to be one of the 
best in the world.21  Chesney’s story provoked a strong response, not only from the 
British populace but also from various members of Parliament, who feared the British 
Army was ill-equipped to defend the British Isles.22 
 Forty years later, the British fear of Germanic invasion continued to grow as the 
industrial and military strength of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Imperial Germany increased.   
William Le Queux, Chesney’s literary heir, heightened the citizenry’s fear of invasion 
with every book he wrote.  Le Queux was far less shy than Chesney about identifying the 
enemy: in 1906, he published The Invasion of 1910, which documented a fictional 
                                                 
  20 Blackwood’s magazine operated from 1817-1980.  Popular throughout the British Empire, the most 
famous publication in Blackwood’s history was Joseph Conrad’s “Heart of Darkness.”  For a detailed look 
at how “The Battle of Dorking” influenced public debate see Patrick M. Kirkwood, “The Impact of Fiction 
on Public Debate in Late Victorian Britain: The Battle of Dorking and the “Lost Career” of Sir George 
Tomkyns Chesney, The Graduate History Review, (Fall 2012): 1-16. 
  21 George Tomkyns Chesney, The Battle of Dorking, (London: G. Richards Ltd., 1914).  By the early 
twentieth century, with the publication of H.G. Wells’ War of the World, invasion literature extended to 
outer space. 
  22 Mr. Philip Henry Muntz, the Liberal MP for Birmingham, and Hugh Seymour, the Conservative 6th 
Marquess of Hertford, both from opposite sides of the political spectrum.  Both referred to Chesney’s short 
story in parliamentary debate.  Seymour warned that “God grant that we might not require a Battle of 
Dorking to bring us to our senses” Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser., vol. 208 [1 August 1870], col. 
636-639.  While Muntz referred to the panic caused by the stories publication and a general belief that the 
British army “was in an inefficient state.”  Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser., vol. 209 [4 March 
1872], col. 1337-1341. 
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account of a German invasion of the British Isles.23  Le Queux’s account of a future 
invasion captivated the British public.  He suggested that German agents, who were, even 
at the time of publication, scouring the countryside looking for the best invasion routes 
from the coast to London, had infiltrated the British Isles.  Le Queux’s premise seemed 
too sensible not to be true.24  The popularity of The Invasion of 1910 and the 
accompanying fear the novel instilled in the British populace had roots in the tension over 
the Anglo-German naval arms race and Germany’s rising colonial ambitions.     
Fear, nationalism, imperial ambitions, entangling alliances and German 
militarization led members of the parliament to question the effectiveness of a 
decentralized British Intelligence Service.25  On March 25, 1909, Prime Minister H.H. 
Asquith appointed a Sub-Committee to the Committee for Imperial Defense (CID) to 
look into the “nature and extent of foreign espionage…taking place” in England.26  This 
sub-committee debated whether it was “desirable that the Admiralty and the War Office 
should integrate their investigations into alleged spying by working with the “Police, 
Postal and Customs authorities” to monitor the movements of “aliens suspected of being 
                                                 
  23 Le Queux’s 1910 invasion tale, however, provided an interesting literary device as the publisher tailored 
the ending of the book to a particular audience—in the English edition, for example, the British overcome 
the German invaders while in the German edition the invaders successful subdue the British.  John Buchan 
followed this formula in The Thirty-Nine Steps. 
  24William Le Queux, Spies for the Kaiser: Plotting the Downfall of England, (London: Hurst & Blackett, 
1909).  
  25 “Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense Appointed by the 
Prime Minister to Consider the Question of Foreign Espionage in the United Kingdom: First Meeting, 
Tuesday, 30th March 1909”, October 1909, The National Archives (Kew, UK), CAB 16/8. 
  26 Sub-Committee members attending this meeting included Mr. Haldane (Chairman), Mr. R. McKenna 
(First Lord of the Admiralty), Mr. H.J. Gladstone (Home Secretary), Mr. S. Buxton (Postmaster-General), 
Lord Esher, Sir Charles Hardinge (permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office), Sir G. H. Murray 
(permanent secretary to the Treasury), Rear Admiral A. E. Bethell (Director of Naval Intelligence), General 
Ewart (Director of Military Intelligence—War Office), General Murray, and Sir. E. Henry. “Report and 
Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense Appointed by the Prime Minister 
to Consider the Question of Foreign Espionage in the United Kingdom: First Meeting, Tuesday, 30th 
March 1909”, October 1909, The National Archives (Kew, UK), Cabinet Office 16/8 and Cabinet Office 
38/15. 
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spies.”  The sub-committee members determined there was “no regular system or 
organization to detect and report suspicious cases” and the British were “entirely 
dependent on casual information” and “unless a Secret Service system is prepared” 
Britain “shall enter on a war fatally handicapped.” 27  
During the sub-committee’s inquiry into German espionage, Lieutenant Colonel 
(later Brigadier General Sir) James Edward Edmonds, the head of Military Operations 
Directorate 5 (MO5) testified about alleged German espionage conducted in England.  
According to Edmonds, the number of reports of German Agents had drastically 
increased over the course of three years.  In 1907, there had been only five cases 
reported.  The following year a startling forty-seven cases and for the first three months 
of 1909 there had already been twenty-four cases of suspected espionage.  Edmonds’ 
firmly believed the Germans had set up an extensive network of spies to ensure their 
successful invasion of the British Isles.28  Edmond’s audience viewed his report with 
contempt.  “These revelations were received with incredulity and regarded almost as the 
aberrations of minds suffering under hallucinations.”  Edmonds, realizing that he was 
losing his audience, quickly produced a map of England.  This map highlighted, in red 
ink, “all the positions where reasonably suspected cases of espionage by Germany have 
been reported.”  The bright red marks on Edmond’s map convinced members of the Sub-
committee on Foreign Espionage that the danger was real.  MO5’s map of German 
                                                 
  27 “Organisation of Secret Service”, 4th October 1908, The National Archives (Kew, UK), KV 1/1. 
  28 “Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense Appointed by the 
Prime Minister to Consider the Question of Foreign Espionage in the United Kingdom: First Meeting, 
Tuesday, 30th March 1909,” October 1909, The National Archives (Kew, UK), CAB 16/8 and CAB 38/15.  
For a well-reasoned and well-argued account of James Edward Edmond’s biases regarding Imperial 
Germany see Nicolas Hiley, “The Failure of British Counter-Intelligence against Germany, 1907-1914,” 
The Historical Journal, Vol. 4, (December 1985): 835-862. 
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infiltration recorded 103 suspicious incidents; however, by March 1909, there had only 
been 76 individual incident reports.29 
Edmonds’ presentation helped convinced the sub-committee to set up the Secret 
Service Bureau.  The Secret Service Bureau, according to the committee report, would 
work separate of the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Foreign Office while keeping 
close ties to those organizations.  The Committee appointed Captain (later Major General 
Sir) Vernon George Waldegrave  Kell, described as an “exceptionally good linguist,” and 
Commander (later Captain Sir) George Mansfield Smith-Cumming, “who possess special 
qualifications for the appointment,” to head this new agency.30  One of the first decisions 
facing the newly created bureau was a jurisdictional one.  Kell and Cumming divided the 
intelligence work.  Kell decided to take responsibility for “counter-espionage with in the 
British Isles;” while, Cumming had “the duty of espionage abroad.”31 
As World War I began, the better-funded, better-staffed, and longer-lived naval 
intelligence, the traditional “eyes” of the Royal Navy, continued to do what they always 
had—provide information to the Admiralty.  On August 5, 1914, the British Royal Navy 
conducted the first offensive military ploy of the war.  Using military plans drawn up on 
June 1, 1912, the British Admiralty ordered the cable ship Telconia, into the English 
                                                 
  29 “Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense Appointed by the 
Prime Minister to Consider the Question of Foreign Espionage in the United Kingdom: First Meeting, 
Tuesday, 30th March 1909”, October 1909, The National Archives (Kew, UK), CAB 16/8.  Lord Hankey, 
The Supreme Command 1914-1918, (London: George Allen & Unwin. 1961), 1:116.  Hiley, “The Failure 
of British Counter-Intelligence against Germany, 1907-1914,”846.  
  30 “Memorandum RE: Formation of SS Bureau”, 26th August 1909, The National Archives (Kew, UK), 
KV 1/3.  Kell could speak German, Italian, French, Polish, Chinese and Russian. 
  31 “General Report: On the Work done during the 6 Months ending October 1910”, Undated Document, 
The National Archives (Kew, UK), KV 1/9.  Kell explained that Captain Cumming and he divided the 
intelligence work being conducted by the Secret Service Bureau. 
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Channel.32  The ship’s crew found, dredged up, and severed the five German telegraphic 
undersea cables linking Imperial Germany with the outside world.33  The British 
destruction of these cables forced all German diplomatic, naval, and military messages to 
be rerouted and sent through the ether by the Nauen radio station, located outside Berlin.  
The inherent vulnerability of wireless traffic (W/T) to enemy interception forced the 
Germans to rely on encryption to safeguard their communications.  As expected, it was 
only a matter of time before encrypted German wireless traffic “began to pour into the 
Admiralty.”34 
The Telconia’s successful disruption of German cable traffic proved to be one of 
the most important offensive operations of the war.  As these enemy intercepts arrived, 
Admiral Sir Henry Francis Oliver, the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), realized the 
Admiralty needed a dedicated team to decipher German wireless traffic.  Oliver turned to 
his friend, Sir Alfred Ewing, the Director of Naval Education.  Knowing that ciphers 
fascinated Ewing, the DNI asked him to select a team and work on decoding these 
German intercepts.  Ewing selected a small group of men, composed predominately of 
academics and linguists, who possessed two qualifications: “a good knowledge of 
                                                 
  32 There seems to be some confusion regarding whether it was His Majesty’s Ship the Telconia or the 
Alert.  Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence 
Community, (London: Penguin Books, 1987); Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914-
18, (London: Hamilton, 1982); Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmerman Telegram, (New York: Viking Press, 
1958) all mention the Telconia as the ship in question; while, Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: 
Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); 
and Jonathan Reed Winkler, Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008) state that the ship in question was the Alert.  For 
continuity, I have chosen to list the ship as the Telconia. 
  33 “Submarine Cables in Time of War:  Note of Action Taken on Report of the Standing Sub-Committee, 
1 June 1912,” The National Archives (Kew, UK), CAB 38/21/21. 
  34 John Bulloch, MIS: The Origins and History of the British Counter-Espionage Service (London: Arthur 
Baker, Ltd., 1962), 144-145.  David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing, (New York: 
MacMillan Publishing Company, 1967), 266.  Liam Nolan and John E. Nolan, Silent Victory: Ireland and 
the War at Sea 1914-1918, (Dublin: Mercier Press, 2009), 26. 
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German and a reputation for discretion.”35  Having no other office space assigned to this 
cryptographic section, Ewing’s team worked out his cramped office.36  Not to be left out, 
the British Army’s Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) began running a similar 
decoding operation with Brigadier General Anderson in command. 37 
During the first few months of the war, NID and MID sorted, filed, and identified 
the intercepted German wireless traffic.  The cryptanalysts learned to distinguish between 
naval and military messages as well as identify various German call stations, but they 
struggled (and failed) to break the German military and diplomatic codes.  The term 
cryptanalyst is used very loosely here as the art of cryptography was almost unknown in 
England and yet day after day, these men examined intercepted German message traffic 
looking for the patterns needed to decipher these codes but the answers eluded them.38  
And if not for three fortuitous (for the British) events during the first three months of the 
war, these men might have struggled on indefinitely.39 
On August 11, 1914, members of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), led by 
Captain J. T. Richardson, pretending to be part of a quarantine inspection team boarded 
                                                 
  35 “The History of Room 40,” Churchill Achieves Centre, The Papers of Alexander Guthrie Denniston, 
DENN 1. In order to be effective, Ewing brushed up on his knowledge of cryptography by studying the 
British Museum’s collection of antiquated codebooks. 
  36 Notable members of Room 40 included Frank Ezra Adcock (classical historian), John Beazley (classical 
archaeologist and art historian), Francis Birch (cryptographer), Walter Horace Bruford (German literature), 
William Clarke (cryptographer), Alastair Denniston (cryptographer), and Alfred Dillwyn “Dilly” Knox 
(classics professor). 
 37 “The History of Room 40,” Churchill Achieves Centre, The Papers of Alexander Guthrie Denniston, 
DENN 1. 
  38 “Winston Churchill’s Original Charter for Room 40,” National Archives (Kew, UK), HW 3/4.  A 
supporting document to Room 40’s charter acknowledges the “solving of this kind of secret writing was 
almost unknown in England and there were no experts to help.”  A note on terminology, David Kahn 
describes decoding and deciphering as being conducted by someone who legitimately possesses “the key or 
system to reverse the transformations and bare the original message.”  Cryptanalyzing a message implies 
that the person does not have a key or system to system “break down or solve the cryptogram.” Kahn, The 
Codebreakers, xv. 
  39 John Johnson, The Evolution of British SIGINT: 1653-1939, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1977), 27. 
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the Hobart, a German merchant ship, as she entered Melbourne’s Port Philip.  The 
Hobart had yet to receive news that a state of war existed between Germany and 
England, but the German captain must have suspected something was wrong.  Under the 
cover of darkness, he tried to destroy all the secret papers in his safe.  Richardson, at 
gunpoint, “pinched” the general merchant marine naval codes, Handelsverkehrsbuch 
(HVB), which German warships used to communicate with merchant vessels.  Richardson 
sent the codebook to England.40  Members of Ewing’s team discovered that German 
outposts, submarines and airships used a form of HVB, which only increased the value of 
the pinch.41 
A few months before the merchant marine codes arrived in England, on August 
20, 1914, the German Imperial Navy cruiser, Magdeburg, tried to flee from Russian 
warships in the Gulf of Finland, but entered a fog bank and ran aground.  Captain Richard 
Habenicht, not wanting his ship to fall into enemy hands, blew up his vessel, which for 
obvious reasons did not sink.  The Russians recovered two codebooks, the Signalbuch 
der Kaiserliche Marine (SKM), which were used for important fleet operations.  The 
Russians found the first codebook at the bottom of a footlocker where it had been 
forgotten (or badly hidden); the Germans threw the second codebook overboard, but 
Russian divers found it.  The Russian Admiralty realized they held a “priceless 
                                                 
  40 PINCH, noun 1.  Action of obtaining by covert or any available methods secret official documents, esp. 
cryptographic documents, of another state or of any organization. 2.  Any Secret document or collection of 
secret documents so obtained, esp. when of cryptographic value.  “A Cryptographic Dictionary,” National 
Archives and Records Administration, RG 457, Historic Cryptographic Collection, Pre-World War I 
through World War II.  The British placed a £100 bounty on any secret material recovered from sunken 
German vessels. Ian Rankin, Ian Fleming’s Commandos: The Story of the Legendary 30 Assault Unit, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2011), 57.  
  41 Room 40, DENN 1. The code book Handelsverkehrsbuch (HVB) is located at Handelsverkehrsbuch 
(HVB), The National Archives (Kew, UK), ADM 137/4388-4389. 
 43 
 
acquisition.”42  After scuttling what remained of the Magdeburg, the Russians sent one of 
the codebooks to the British and kept the waterlogged codebook for themselves.43 
The HVB and SKM codebooks provided half of the information the British 
needed to break all the important German naval codes.  In October 1914, only a few 
weeks before the Hobart’s codes arrived in England, the captain of a German destroyer 
sinking in the North Sea, after the Battle of Heligoland Bight, ordered a leaden box 
tossed overboard.  The box, dredged up a month later by a British trawler, held a 
remarkably well-preserved copy of the Verkehrsbuch (VB), the codes and ciphers used 
for secret communication between the German army and the navy.44 
By November 11, 1914, Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and 
Admiral Jack Fisher, the First Sea Lord, put in motion a plan that officially established a 
naval cryptographic section.  Churchill and Fisher wanted Sir Alfred Ewing to continue 
leading his team but they decided that Ewing would report to Captain William Reginald 
“Blinker” Hall, who replaced Admiral Oliver as DNI.45  A few weeks later, Churchill 
officially chartered Room 40 for cryptographic work.  Ewing’s team moved out of his 
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office and into Room 40, located in the Admiralty Old Building.46  Shortly after moving 
into Room 40, Hall ordered Commander Herbert Hope to keep the Admiralty’s 
Operations and Intelligence Divisions advised of the movement of the German Fleet.  
Hope passed all intercepted and decoded messages to the Admiralty’s Chief of Staff, who 
showed the information to the First Sea Lord.47  These cryptanalysts, commanded by 
Ewing, became obsessed with secrecy.  Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) provided a trump 
card that should only be played “for a really great occasion.”48 
On a tactical level, members of Room 40 began to experiment with direction 
finding equipment.  A new section started to track German shipping and U-boat 
positions.  “Fixes,” obtained by direction finding stations built in Ireland, and wireless 
intercepts, from German vessels reporting their positions to Berlin, provided Room 40 
with an accurate picture of the German fleet’s location.  Secrecy surrounding Room 40 
hampered the transmission actionable intelligence to the Admiralty’s Operations 
Division.  At first, Room 40’s analysts give regular intelligence reports to all British flag 
officers, but eventually this practice ended and they these only handed these reports to 
Admiral John Rushworth Jellicoe, the Admiral of the Fleet.  This need for secrecy would 
have dire consequences for British merchant shipping.49   
While the members of Room 40 worked to keep the Admiralty informed, the 
Kaiser’s troops marched through Belgium, Luxembourg and the Ardennes.  Once Great 
Britain declared war, Imperial Germany began spreading its version of the “true” causes 
                                                 
  46 “Winston Churchill’s Original Charter for Room 40,” HW 3/4. 
  47 Room 40, DENN 1. 
  48 “History of Room 40,” HW 3/3. 
  49 Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-1918, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982), 69-
70. 
 45 
 
of the war while expounding on the hostile plans of its enemies.  Knowing the Germans 
had set up their own propaganda organization— the Erzberger Office, named after its 
director Matthias Erzberger—the British Foreign Office, worked to create its own 
political warfare organization.50 
On September 5, 1914, the British Foreign Office established the War Propaganda 
Bureau (WPB), commonly referred to as Wellington House. 51  The WPB, like Room 40, 
worked in complete secrecy.  “All public mention of it [Wellington House] was 
sedulously avoided.” 52  Known for doing “good by stealth,” most members of parliament 
were not aware of the bureau’s existence.  The British Foreign Office hoped that 
Wellington House would not only influence public opinion but would also counter 
German dissemination of “mis-statements and sophistries.”53 David Lloyd George, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, appointed Charles Masterman, a close friend, to head 
British propaganda operations.  In the fall of 1914, Masterman, looking to develop some 
rules on which to build his organization, met with novelists, playwrights, critics, 
publicists and members of the press.  In what has been described as “an impressive 
exercise in improvisation,” Masterman enlisted the aid of these prominent literary figures 
as well as their publishers.  Masterman realized that pamphlets and books published by 
Hodder & Stoughton, Methuen, Oxford University Press, and Macmillan would lend an 
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air of legitimacy to their efforts.  The government might lie, but Oxford University Press 
would not print an untruth.54  
The War Office tasked Masterman with keeping morale up, vilifying the enemy, 
reducing pacifism at home, and bringing the neutral powers into the conflict.  To 
accomplish these goals, Masterman employed novelists, poets, writers, critics, and artists 
such as John Buchan, Rudyard Kipling, Gilbert Parker, G. K. Chesterton, Thomas 
Harding, Ford Madox Ford, Arthur Conan Doyle, and Louis Raemaekers to work for 
him.55  In total, the War Propaganda Bureau published almost 1200 books, pamphlets, 
and other miscellaneous publications with such titles as “The Battle of Jutland” and “The 
Battle of the Somme” (John Buchan), “To Arms!” (Sir Arthur Conan Doyle), “The New 
Army” (Rudyard Kipling), “The Barbarism in Berlin” (G.K. Chesterton), and “When 
Blood is Their Argument” (Ford Madox Ford).56  
To shape the story about the Great War, members of parliament realized that they 
needed to control the flow of information.  Fortunately, spy mania continued to grip the 
country.  As soon as Britain declared war, Reginald McKenna, the British Home 
Secretary, announced that Scotland Yard arrested twenty-one German spies, which 
instead of lessening the populaces’ fear only worked to intensify the hysteria.  The frenzy 
surrounding German agents lurking in the countryside convinced many that if twenty-one 
spies had been caught that there had to be at least twice that many still running through 
the English countryside.57  William Le Queux’s German Spies in England, published 
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shortly after the war started, warned that German spies continued to operate in England.  
Le Queux’s new novel heightened British war hysteria.  According to Le Queux, the 
British public had been “officially deluded, reassured and lulled to sleep.”  Le Queux, 
ever the patriot, sounded the alarm. 58 
The fear of German infiltration allowed members of parliament to pass the Alien 
Registration Act and the Defense of the Realm Act (DORA). The Alien Registration Act 
required foreigners, over the age of 16, to register with the local police while DORA 
made it a crime for a person to “make false statements likely to…prejudice His Majesty’s 
relations with foreign powers.”  These new laws demanded the Admiralty and the Army 
Council, the supreme governing body of the British Army, to not only enforced these new 
laws but also granted these military agencies the power to allow trial by court-martial for 
those accused of violating DORA.  For minor offenses, the military, without the benefit 
of a trial, could pass summary judgments and dispense punishment.59 
As these laws began to take effect, the government set up a comprehensive system 
of censorship.  In an effort to catch spies and control the dissemination of military 
information, parliament authorized the War Office to monitor and censor all incoming 
and outgoing correspondence. 60  The Parliamentary War Aims Committee set up the War 
Office Press Bureau, which Frederick Edwin (F.E.) Smith managed.  Lord Kitchener, the 
Secretary of War, appointed Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Swinton to be the British Army’s 
official correspondent covering the Western Front.  Kitchener order Swinton to report to 
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G.H.Q., report to the Commander in Chief and begin writing articles about the British 
Army fighting in France.  G.H.Q. censored Swinton’s reports and then sent them to 
Kitchener, who personally approved every article for publication. 61  British 
propagandists sent this sanitized version of the news to the United States.62 
As the guns of August roared, the United States, the most powerful industrial 
power, pledged neutrality.  America’s potential to tip the balance provided the German 
and British with a reason to carry out political warfare campaigns targeting the United 
States.  These two nations tried to sway public opinion to support either their cause.  The 
organization of these services could not have been more different.  The Germans took a 
decentralized approach.  They had roughly twenty-seven different agencies working 
independently to sway public opinion.  These organizations rarely shared information.  
They competed for budgetary concessions from the Reichstag.  As the war continued, 
civilian and military agencies disagreed on how to fight the war.  The military wanted 
nothing less than victory; while, the civilian agencies began sending out peace feelers.63  
The British, on the other hand, chose a centralized organization that at least during the 
first few years of the war used private organizations—such as The Oxford Faculty, The 
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, the Golden Club, Overseas Club, Victoria League, 
and the Fight for Right Movement—to help spread their message.64  British intelligence 
would also use this strategy of creating a buffer, by using front organizations, to distance 
and disguise British political influence during the Second World War. 
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To sway American opinion toward the British, Charles Masterman appointed Sir 
Gilbert Parker, a Canadian novelist and Member of Parliament, to head Wellington 
House’s America political warfare efforts. 65 Sir Parker used a “gentle courtship” to woo 
the American public to the British cause.66  None of Gilbert’s propaganda campaigns 
referred to either the British government or to Wellington House. There was nothing 
linking Gilbert to official British policy.  Gilbert, using Who’s Who in America, created a 
large mailing list consisting of 13,000 influential Americans, libraries, Universities, and 
newspapers.67  Working to stem the flow of pro-German news to outlets operating in the 
United States, Parker’s propagandists “supplied three hundred and sixty newspapers in 
the smaller cities…with an English newspaper…established contact with the man in the 
street through interviews, articles, pamphlets…established association, by personal 
correspondence with influential and eminent people of every profession in the United 
States.”68 
German military operations—the destruction of the Lusitania, the Rape of 
Belgium, the execution of Edith Cavell, and the covert actions taken by German spies and 
saboteurs operating in the United States—provided a precise visceral framework of 
“Hunnish” barbarism, which Gilbert exploited in his efforts to convince the Americans to 
support the Triple Entente.  In a short period, Gilbert set up “an extraordinary widespread 
organization in the United States…it worked entirely by personal association and inspired 
by voluntary effort.”  Parker applied the personal touch.  When reaching out to American 
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lawyers, doctors, scholars, businessmen and politicians, the former novelist crafted a 
personal letter that he attached to each book or pamphlet that he mailed from London.  
The quiet nature of his work ensured that most American’s believed the illusion that the 
shift in U.S. public opinion occurred because of “private patriotism and enterprise” and 
not because of British manipulation. 69  
Even though the Hague Convention of 1907 did not specifically cover 
submarines, the Triple Entente believed U-boats should follow the Cruiser Rules 
governing the conduct between surface vessels.  Before sinking a merchant ship or naval 
vessel, according to the prize rules, surface vessels were required to place passengers and 
crew in a place of safety.  For U-boats, this meant surfacing, hailing the ship and then 
waiting for the passengers and crew to be evacuated—usually to the ship’s lifeboats.70  
The British, struggling to find a countermeasure against German U-boats, developed the 
Q-ship—a heavily armed merchant ship designed to lure submarines to the surface.  Once 
the submarine surfaced, these armed merchants would open fire sinking the U-boat.71  
The Admiralty, also, ordered unarmed British ship to ram any German U-boat foolish 
enough to surface.  In 1915, Captain Charles Algernon Fryatt, the captain of the Great 
Eastern Railway steamship the Brussels, tried to ram a German U-boat.  When the 
German navy captured Fryatt in 1916, he was court-martial and then executed.72  And 
finally, arms shipments made any vessel a lawful target under the rules of warfare.  The 
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Lusitania reportedly transported munitions to Great Britain in violation of the same 
international articles of war the Germans violated by destroying the passenger liner 
making the British, under international law, just a culpable.73 
In an attempt to break the British naval blockade, the German Imperial Navy 
decided to carry out unrestricted submarine warfare against allied shipping.  Targeting 
civilians violated the 1908 London Agreement; and yet, expediency trumped morality as 
the British tried to starve Germany into submission.  Great Britain declared the North Sea 
a war zone and British ships “held up neutral ships carrying non-contraband goods” to 
include food.74  A confidential War Cabinet memorandum, dated January 1, 1917, stated 
“practically no goods coming from overseas are getting through to Germany.”75  The only 
hope for Germany to break this stranglehold was through unrestricted submarine warfare.  
The German Embassy on April 22, 1915 posted a travel warning in various American 
newspapers advising American travelers that “a state of war exists between Germany and 
her allies and Great Britain and her allies.”  Like the British before them, the Germans 
declared that “the waters adjacent to the British Isles” were now considered a war zone 
and that any ship “flying a British flag or an allied flag was subject to destruction.”76 
On May 7, 1915, Kapitanleutnant Walther Schwieger, the thirty-year-old 
commanding officer of U-20, waited off the Queenstown Banks in search of British 
merchant traffic.  The U-boat commander scanned the horizon for targets of 
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opportunity.77  At roughly 2:20 p.m., Schwieger sighted the “four funnels and two masts” 
of what could only be a large passenger steamer.78   
Schwieger immediately ordered the U-20 to submerge to periscope depth.  
Submerging meant losing speed; he could not use his diesel engines under water and had 
to rely on the slower 600 horsepower electric engines.  Now only able to make about 
eight knots, but almost invisible to the passenger ship, Schwieger’s U-20 gave chase.  He 
ordered the helmsman to “proceed at high speed” on a course heading designed to 
intercept the civilian ship before it made landfall.  Forty minutes later, Schwieger fired a 
single torpedo striking the starboard side of the luxury liner RMS Lusitania’s “close abaft 
the bridge.”  Schwieger noted, in his logbook that shortly after His torpedo struck the 
ship there “followed a very unusually large explosion with a violent emission of smoke 
(far above the foremost funnel)  The explosions caused the boat to stop immediately, list 
heavily to starboard, and to start sinking by the bow.  The U-boat commander noticed the 
luxury liner looked “as if she will quickly capsize.”79 
Schwieger, peering through the periscope, watched the chaos for a few moments 
more and then ordered his vessel to leave the area.  The German sinking of the RMS 
Lusitania represented the weakness inherent in Room 40’s transmission of time-sensitive 
material to the Admiralty.  The British passenger ship struck by a single torpedo sank in 
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only eighteen minutes with almost 1200 lives lost, including 128 Americans.80  Room 
40’s inability to keep the Lusitania safe was an intelligence failure, but the British 
exploitation of this tragedy made it a propagandist’s dream; Schwieger’s sinking of the 
Lusitania became one of the most iconic images of the war. 
As the Admiralty publicly struggled to find a scapegoat for the loss of the 
Lusitania, the British government began searching for a way to turn military misfortune 
into political triumph.  The propagandists working for the British government began 
churning out copy to vilify the German decision to sink a passenger liner, which at least 
reduced British culpability.  The propagandists, working for Wellington House, shrewdly 
linked the disastrous sinking of the White Star passenger liner, the Titanic, on April 14, 
1912, which remained a vivid memory for most people in 1915, with the willful 
destruction of the Lusitania.   The British, astutely, pointed out the loss of the Titanic was 
an act of God while the loss of the Lusitania was the result of the German navy’s 
decision to flout the civilized rules of naval warfare and willfully and maliciously destroy 
a passenger liner killing men, women and children.81 
The outpouring of grief and rage over the German decision to sink the Lusitania 
obscured British culpability in the passenger ship’s destruction.  Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, 
the head of Germany’s propaganda efforts in America, tried to spin the Lusitania disaster 
by claiming the vessel was a legitimate military target.  The German justification for 
destroying of the Cunard ship fell on deaf ears.  Most Americans believed The New York 
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Times, which stated the “Lusitania was Unarmed,” and nothing the Germans said to the 
contrary would convince the Americas the ship was a legitimate target.82  On May 17, 
1915, Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States, wrote to the 
German Imperial Chancellor stating “our propaganda in this country has, as the result of 
the Lusitania incident, completely collapsed.”  Bernstorff went on to say “another event 
like the present one would certainly mean war with the United States.”83 
In a series of unfortunate events surrounding the Lusitania, Karl X. Goetz, a 
German artist, production of a satirical medal depicting the German destruction of the 
Cunard ship hurt the German’s the most.  The failure of both the British government and 
the Cunard line to heed Germany’s warnings became the subject of Goetz’s bronze 
medal.  One side of the coin stated “No Contraband” while the other exclaimed “Business 
First.”84  Unfortunately, Goetz printed May 5th on his medal instead of May 7th, the date 
of the sinking.  British propagandists took advantage of this mistake.  They made cheap 
copies of Goetz’s medal and handed them out.  The British explained the error in dates 
proved the German attack was premeditated, and the medal was cast to commemorate the 
event.  Photographs of Goetz’s medal were sent to the United States claiming the German 
government awarded the medal to the heroic crew of U-20.85 
A young mother clutching a small child to her breast slowly drowns in a 
recruitment poster, designed by Fred Spears entitled Enlist.  These types of posters 
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convinced young men to rush off to war.86  Conspiracy and culpability continue to 
surround the sinking of the Lusitania.  Captain William Thomas Turner decided not to 
maintain full speed—the Lusitania, having set transatlantic speed records could have 
easily rushed past a waiting U-boat.  The captain also ordered the helmsman to keep a 
normal heading instead of sailing in a zigzag pattern. Turner knew that standard counter 
submarine tactics required sailing in a weaving pattern.  The lack of a military escort has 
also been called into question.  The British often used military ships to ensure these 
transports and the supplies they carried safely arrived in England.  The inconsistencies 
surrounding RMS Lusitania have convinced some scholars that other, more sinister 
forces, were at work.  Perhaps, on that faithful May day, a nation sacrificed a ship to 
draw the United States into the conflict.87 
On February 12, 1915, Winston Churchill, in a letter to Walter Runciman, the 
president of the English Broad of Trade, explained that it was important to attract 
merchant shipping to the British Isles “in the hope of especially embroiling the United 
States with Germany…For our part we want the traffic; and if some of it gets into 
trouble, better still.”88  Churchill’s letter to Runciman suggested the First Lord of the 
Admiralty sacrificed the vessel trying to draw the United States into the war.  A decision 
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Churchill rationalized as being for the good of the country.  In 1937, the former First 
Lord of the Admiralty stated 
In spite of its horror, we must regard the sinking of the Lusitania as an 
event most important and favorable to the Allies…The poor babies that 
perished in the ocean struck a blow at German power more deadly than 
could have been achieved by the sacrifice of 100,000 fighting men.89 
 
Churchill’s eloquence summarized the horror of woman and children drowning in the cold 
sea but the loss of the Lusitania failed to immediately drag the United States into the war.  
It would take another two years to convince President Wilson to send U.S. soldiers to 
France but the Lusitania became a constant reminder of German brutality.  At the time, the 
president’s response to the loss of the Cunard ship amounted to nothing more than a 
strongly worded warning to the Germans. 90  
Wilson’s handling of the Lusitania crisis caused a division in American politics.  
Former President Theodore “T.R.” Roosevelt, a fervent interventionist, stated “the 
murder of the thousand men, women, and children on the Lusitania is due, solely, to 
Wilson’s abject cowardice.”91  While, William Jennings Bryan, the Secretary of State, 
believed that Germany had “a right to prevent contraband from going to the Allies, and a 
ship carrying contraband should not rely upon passengers to protect her from attack.”  
Bryan reminded Wilson that America had already proposed a simple compromise to 
Germany’s use of unrestricted submarine warfare—Germany would stop all submarine 
attacks against merchant ships if Britain would loosen its blockade to allow food into 
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Germany.  The Kaiser quickly agreed but Whitehall rejected it.  In disgust Bryan stated, 
“Why be shocked by the drowning of a few people, if there is to be no objection to 
starving a nation.”  Starving Germans did not make the news because the decentralized 
German propaganda agencies failed to exploit the effect the British blockade had on 
German women and children.  The British propagandist, however, continued to shape the 
story of the conflict by repeatedly vilifying the Germans in the American press.  In the 
end, Bryan resigned.  The secretary of state believed the anglophiles leading the nation 
would eventually find the excuse needed to bring the United States into the war. 92 
Trying to compel the United States to join the British war effort, foreign agents of 
influence fed the American populace a steady diet of atrocity propaganda.  The most lurid 
tales surrounded the German “rape” of Belgium.93  German soldiers, during the first few 
months of the war, committed a series of war crimes.  The German fear of the French use 
of asymmetric warfare conducted by francs-tireurs, the name for the irregular forces used 
by the French during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), led German commanders to 
overreact, which resulted in the death of at least 5,500 civilians.94  Any perceived 
insubordination, aggression, or hint of noncompliance to German authority resulted in 
swift reprisals carried out by the German army.  German brutality became legendary.  
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The willful murder of Belgium civilians—men, women and children—became the basis 
for early British anti-German propaganda.  Atrocity stories quickly became the most 
popular form of propaganda.  As one British political activist put it, “no war can be won 
without them.”95 
Eyewitness accounts asserted that as the German army crossed the Belgium 
border, German soldiers began a systematic campaign of pillage, murder, rape, and arson.  
Wellington Houses’ authors, critics, poets, and playwrights recounted these tales of 
German atrocities to feed an insatiable public appetite for more and more stories of 
German barbarity.  On August 27, 1914, a reporter for The Times wrote that a German 
soldier chopped off “the arms of a baby which clung to its mother’s skirts.”  By 
September 2, 1914, the Times’ proclaimed that German soldiers “cut the hands off the 
little boys so that there shall be no more soldiers in France.”96  By December 4, 1914, 
Viscount James Bryce, the former Ambassador to the United States, began examining 
German atrocities.  The Committee on Alleged German Outrages spent almost five 
months examining 1,200 eyewitness depositions made by refugees fleeing Belgium as 
well as looking at captured German diaries to discover the extent of German war crimes 
in the region.97 
On May 12, 1915, just five days after the sinking of the Lusitania, the Committee 
on Alleged German Outrages, referred to as the Bryce Committee, published its infamous 
320-page report.98  The Bryce Report, essentially nothing more than anti-German 
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propaganda disguised as a legitimate investigation into alleged war crimes, helped 
convince many Americans the Germans were a cruel and barbarous nation.  The decision 
to appoint Lord Bryce to head the committee looking into German war crimes was 
genius.  From the beginning of the July Crisis, Bryce had been against the war and it was 
only Germany’s decision to violate Belgium neutrality that changed his mind; so Bryce 
appeared unbiased.99  As the former Ambassador to the United States, most Americans 
still held Bryce in high regard.  America’s predisposition toward Bryce guaranteed the 
report would receive serious consideration.  Masterman, in a letter to Bryce, wrote “Your 
report has swept America.  As you probably know even the most skeptical declare 
themselves converted, just because it is signed by you!”100  A May 13, 1915, New York 
Times headline proclaimed “German Atrocities Are Proved.”101 
British propagandists understood that any account of evil is “best understood on a 
personal level.  Tales of the humiliation, degradation, and mutilation of a single 
individual will haunt us long after we hear them…empathizing with their pain, we 
understand these acts as being intrinsically evil. ”102  Arthur Ponsonby, the author of 
Falsehood in War-time, viewed propaganda as the “defilement of the human soul.”   The 
British pacifist, however, understood that tales of brutality and depravity, if crafted just 
right, can shift public opinion.  Ponsonby stated, “War is fought in [a] fog of 
falsehood…any attempt to doubt the most fantastic story has to be condemned at once as 
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unpatriotic, if not traitorous.”103 The passage of the Defense against the Realm Act 
ensured that any protest against the war would be met with the most severe of 
punishments as loyal opposition fell to the wayside.   
The Bryce Report stated that on August 21, 1914, while the city of Liege burned 
German soldiers killed thirty-two civilians in the Place de l’Universite.  After the 
summary execution, German soldiers publicly raped fifteen to twenty women.  At 
Aerschot, German soldiers killed men and women trying to flee from burning buildings.  
At Malines and Hofstade, witnesses reported seeing German soldiers cutting off the 
breast of Belgium women; while tales of children being shot in Capelle-Au-Bois, 
bayoneted in Weerde, and crucified in Haecht, all showed the depravity at the core of the 
German army.104 
Stories of German atrocities continued even after the British published the Bryce 
Report.  On August 5, 1915, the German military police arrested thirty-five people for 
allegedly helping to smuggle allied POWs out of Belgium and into neutral Holland.  
German authorities sent Edith Louisa Cavell, a 49-year old British nurse working at the 
Berkendael Medical Institute in Belgium, to the military prison at St. Gilles. 105  The 
Germans charged Cavell with espionage.106  On October 7, 1915, Cavell plead guilty to 
hiding allied soldiers in her home, to providing these men with money, clothes, and maps, 
and to helping them in their escape from German occupied Belgium.107  The trial lasted 
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two days—the verdict death by firing squad.108  Brand Whitlock, the United States 
Minister in Brussels, plead with Baron von Bissing, the governor-general in Belgium, to 
have the nurse’s sentence deferred until the military governor could consider an appeal 
for clemency.  Whitlock pointed out that “the horror of executing a woman, no matter 
what her offense” and reiterated that Cavell’s sentence was harsher than those already 
handed out to the other members of her network.109  Mr. Hugh S. Gibson, First Secretary 
of the United States Legation in Brussels, and the Spanish Minister, met with Baron von 
der Lancken to plead for clemency on Cavell’s behalf.  Lancken told Gibson that only 
General von Sauberzweig, German military-governor could commute Cavell’s sentence.  
After conferring with the Military Governor, Lancken told Whitlock that von 
Sauberzweig stated that “he had acted in the case of Miss Cavell only after mature 
deliberation; that the circumstances in her case were such that he considered the infliction 
of the death penalty imperative” and so must decline any plea for clemency.110 
On October 12, 1915, eyewitness accounts stated that an eight-man firing squad 
shot Cavell.  These eyewitnesses reported that Cavell stated, “That patriotism was not 
enough” and even though she “had seen death so often that it was not strange or fearful” 
she was still thankful for the time spent in prison because she now had “no hatred or 
bitterness toward anyone.”  In the end, British propagandists would have you believe that 
she gladly died for her country.111  In death, she became the perfect hero.  Her execution 
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showed the depravity of German justice.  Ironically, Cavell worked for SIS.  A fact that 
remained secret for almost sixty years.  M.R.D. Foot, a British historian, admitted to her 
SIS lineage when describing the rivalry that existed between various British intelligence 
organizations working during the Great War.  Foot noted that Cavell decided to “turn 
aside her duty as a spy to perform a work of mercy,” which led to her arrest, trial, and 
execution.112 
The public outcry over the death of Edith Cavell, like the British portrayal of the 
Rape of Belgium or the German torpedoing of the Lusitania, helped convince the United 
States to enter the war.  The New York Times published a grisly account of Cavell’s death, 
which twisted the historical account to suit the propagandistic needs of the British 
Empire:  
 The execution ground was a garden, or yard, in Brussels, surrounded 
by a wall. The German firing party of six men and an officer were 
drawn up in the garden and awaited their victim.  She was led in by 
soldiers from the house nearby, blindfolded with a black scarf.  Up to 
this minute the woman, though deadly white, had stepped out bravely 
to meet her fate, but before the rifle party her strength at last gave out 
and she tottered and fell to the ground, thirty yards or more from the 
spot where she was to have been shot.  The officer in charge of the 
execution walked to her as she lay prone on the ground motionless.  
The officer then drew a large service revolver from his belt, took 
steady aim from his knee and shot the woman through the head. The 
firing party looked on as the officer quietly returned his revolver to its 
case.113 
 
Once the United States entered the war on April 6, 1917, various newspapers 
dredged up the story of Cavell’s execution.  The New York Times reported on September 
                                                 
  112 See M.R.D. Foot and J.M. Langley, MI9: Escape and Evasion, 1939-1945, (London: The Bodley Head 
Ltd., 1979); Foot quoted in Nicholas Rankin, A Genius for Deception: How Cunning Helped the British 
Win Two World War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 36-37. 
   113 “Miss Cavell shot by German Officer,” New York Times, 18 October 1915. 
 63 
 
26, 1917 the “Germans gloried in Cavell murder.”114  The article discussed in detail the 
behind the scenes political maneuvering conducted by Hugh S. Gibson, the First 
Secretary of the American legation in Belgium under Brand Whitlock, on behalf of 
Cavell.  While Gibson told Baron von der Lancken, the German civil governor of 
Belgium, that “the civilized world would be stricken with horror at the shooting of a 
woman,” the German governor simply replied “excellent.” A colleague of Lancken, 
Count Harrach, sneered and reportedly uttered that he regretted there were not “three or 
four old Englishwomen to shoot.” 115 
The Germans refused to grant clemency and as Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, German 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated, “It was a pity that Miss Cavell had to be executed 
but it was necessary.”  The German secretary added “it is undoubtedly a terrible thing 
that the woman has been executed; but consider what would happen to a state, 
particularly in war, if it let crimes aimed at the safety of its armies to go unpunished 
because committed by a woman.”  According to Zimmerman, “men and woman are equal 
before the law.”116  Unfortunately, for Germany, in 1915, the world did not agree.  
Killing a woman, even for treason seemed an abomination.  Or did it? 
 The French execution of Margaretha Geertruida Zelle, better known by her stage 
name, Mata Hari, for espionage echoes the German decision to kill Cavell.  On February 
10, 1917, the French war minister signed her arrest warrant; three days later, 
Commissioner Albert Priolet arrested Zelle at her Parisian hotel.  The French imprisoned 
her at Saint-Lazare, a woman’s prison, where she awaited trial.  Zelle believed someone 
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was playing a cruel joke on her since she was working for French Intelligence.117  Zelle, 
known for her open sexuality, came to the attention of German, French and British 
Intelligence.  MI5’s Captain Stephen Dillon, at Folkestone, detained Zelle, who was 
traveling to the Netherlands.  Dillon felt that something was not right—Zelle could speak 
French, English, Italian, Dutch and German, was obviously wealthy and was traveling 
alone—but after questioning Zelle, he failed to come up with a single reason to detain 
her.118 
Interrogated on multiple occasions, Zelle refused to admit that she was a German 
agent.  She did admit to passing some information to the Germans but only while trying 
to gain information for French intelligence.  Zelle explained that she had to give the 
Germans something so they would trust her and she was, of course, more than happy to 
take their money.119  According to French transcripts of her arrest, detainment, and trial, 
the exotic dancer, who was sleeping with officers of several nations, agreed to work for 
both countries.120  French intelligence, disappointed with the quality of information 
provided by Zelle, did not fully trust her.  When members of Room 40 intercepted and 
deciphered several messages seeking payment for agent H-21 (Mata Hari) the French 
decided the exotic dancer was also working for the Germans.121 
On July 24, 1917, the French tried Zelle for espionage.  Fighting nearly 
impossible odds Zelle lost her case.  The jury found her guilty on all eight charges in less 
than an hour—the verdict death by firing squad.  Zelle tried to appeal her sentence and 
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lost.122  On October 19, 1917, the French shot the exotic dancer.  Henry G. Wales, an 
American reporter, witnessed Mata Hari’s death.  Wales’s account of her execution 
lacked the dramatic flair used to describe Edith Cavell’s; and yet, his account resonates.   
Refusing a blindfold and facing her executioners, Mata Hari died after first blowing a 
kiss to the priest, who escorted her to her death, and then to her lawyer. 
She did not die as actors and moving-picture stars would have us 
believe that people die when they are shot.  She did not throw up her 
hands nor did she plunge straight forward or straight back. 
 
Instead she seemed to collapse.  Slowly, inertly, she settled to her 
knees, her head up always and without the slightest change of 
expression on her face.  For the fraction of a second it seemed she 
tottered there, on her knees, gazing directly at those who had taken 
her life.  Then she fell backward, bending at the waist, with her legs 
doubled up beneath her.  She lay prone, motionless, with her face 
turned towards the sky. 
 
A noncommissioned officer, who accompanied a lieutenant, drew 
his revolver from the big, black holster strapped about his waist.  
Bending over, he placed the muzzle of the revolver almost—but not 
quite—against the left temple of the spy.  He pulled the trigger and 
the bullet tore into the brain of the woman. 
 
Mata Hair was surely dead.123 
 
Her death, because she was a German spy and because Germany propagandists 
failed to take advantage of her execution, did not cause a public outcry against the French 
as the slaying of a British nurse did.  The British shrewdly painted Cavell as a saint and 
Mata Hari as the whore.  The juxtaposition of the Madonna and the Whore has long been 
a literary trope and in this case one that British propaganda used to lessen the death of 
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Zelle.  The British quick to capitalize on the willful murder of Cavell immortalized her 
execution in post cards, postage stamps, and posters.  A French postcard depicted a 
virginal nurse dressed in white dead at the feet of her villainous executioners dressed in 
gray.  During the war, no one printed post cards depicting the death of Mata Hari.  After 
the war Mata Hari became synonymous with the femme fatal and her skills as a courtesan 
and master spy have become the stuff of legends; while Cavell is all but forgotten.124   
By the fall of 1915, the success of Wellington House’s political warfare 
campaigns began to tilt U.S. public opinion toward the British cause.  Only, the American 
president’s need to play the role of a neutral mediator kept him from violating the 
nation’s commitment to neutrality.  Wilson realized that “The United States must remain 
neutral, because otherwise the fact that her population is drawn from so many European 
countries would give rise to serious domestic difficulties.”125  Words, images and ideas 
without fear proved inadequate.  Far removed from the battlefield, most Americans felt 
safe.  Most, but not all, Americans wanted to avoid sending American troops to Europe.  
Theodore Roosevelt, ever the imperialist, continually mocked Wilson for his pacifism 
and cowardice.  T.R. wanted the United States to get into the conflict and strongly 
favored for U.S. intervention in Europe.126 
Theodore Roosevelt’s voice carried.  T.R., who stated “speak softly and carry a 
big stick,” had successfully led his Rough Riders into combat during the Spanish-
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American War—America’s most popular war.  The former president of the United States 
understood war and he was not afraid to call for American troops to be sent to Europe. 127  
Roosevelt, horrified by the events in Belgium, spoke out against those who would 
apologize for Germany.  T.R. believed that “we have less to fear from foes without than 
from foes within.”128  Roosevelt realized that nearly one third of all emigrants could trace 
their lineage back to the Central Powers.129  The former president claimed that those 
“foes within” were not American 
On October 13, 1915, former President Theodore Roosevelt, speaking to the 
Knights of Columbus, equated dual citizenship with dual loyalty.  Roosevelt stated that 
he “scored as traitors those who were not whole-heartedly for their country first, last and 
all the time.”  He went on to say that “There is no room in this country for hyphenated 
Americans.”  Content to preserve their ethnic ties to Europe, these “false” Americans 
have failed to assimilate, which questioned their loyalties.  Roosevelt stated, what many 
Americans believed, the influx these hyphenated Americans posed a clear threat to the 
American way of life. 130 
Roosevelt’s words took root.  On December 7, 1915, in his annual State of the 
Union address to Congress, Wilson praised the nation for remaining “studiously neutral.” 
The American president stated 
There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other 
flags but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to full freedom 
and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty in 
the very arteries of our national life; who have sought to bring the authority 
and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries 
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wherever they thought effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at 
them, and to debase our politics to the use of foreign intrigue…A little while 
ago such a thing would have seemed incredible.  Because it was incredible 
we made no preparation for it.  We would have been ashamed to prepare for 
it, as if we were suspicious of ourselves, our own comrades and neighbors!  
But the ugly and incredible thing has actually come about and we are 
without adequate federal laws to deal with it.  I urge you to enact such laws 
at the earliest possible moment and feel that doing so I am urging you to do 
nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation.  Such 
creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out.131 
 
Even during the height of the Cold War, no president ever had the nerve to speak 
so bluntly about possible sedition stemming from what Roosevelt referred to as 
hyphenated Americans; but Wilson did.  The president’s speech showed just how 
intensely the fear of internal subversion gripped the nation. 
Exploiting America’s xenophobia, British intelligence began conducting a 
clandestine political war against Germany within the United States—a neutral country.  
These covert operations proved problematic.  British agents had to contend with the 
Germans and work without offending the host country.  The War Office, the Foreign 
Office, and the Admiralty, all had agents working on American soil.  These competing 
agents quickly learned to settle their jurisdictional disputes in a private and sensible 
manner.  Commander Mansfield “C” Cunningham, head of SIS, sent Sir William 
Wiseman to set up the Secret Service Bureau’s Section V in New York City.132  C 
ordered Wiseman to obstruct German intelligence efforts.  C wanted Wiseman not only to 
block American economic aid to the Triple Alliance but also to stop Germany’s efforts to 
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enlist the aid of Irish and Hindu seditionists.  The British feared, with German support, 
that these seditionists might try to take advantage of the current conflict to overthrow 
British colonial rule.133  
On October 28, 1915, Wiseman arrived in New York and quickly ran a fowl of 
Captain Guy Gaunt, the Admiralty’s man in New York, who had been in New York since 
1914.  Gaunt, working as the British naval attaché, decided to “strike out in the 
Intelligence-cum-propaganda line—independently in case trouble arose.”  This British 
naval attaché suggested to the Sir Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, the British Ambassador, that 
his work should be shrouded in mystery.  If questioned, the ambassador could truthfully 
tell the Americans that he “didn’t know what the fool [Gaunt] was doing.”134  After 
explaining his plan to Sir Rice, this amateur spy quickly set up a network of agents 
throughout New York City.  Gaunt’s network began collecting information on German 
sabotage and propaganda efforts as well as looking into German backed plots against the 
British Empire.  With the help of Emanuel Viktor Voska, a Czechoslovakian national and 
intelligence operative, Gaunt’s agents infiltrated most of the key Central Power’s offices 
including the German Embassy.135  Gaunt viewed Wiseman’s arrival as intrusive and 
complained to the British Ambassador, which lead to Wiseman’s removal from New 
York.136   
Three months later, C sent Wiseman back to New York.  The War Office feared 
that Gaunt’s intelligence operations would be exposed embarrassing the British; so, 
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Wiseman, who was not a high ranking British official, began working at the British 
Consulate, located at 44 Whitehall Street.  Wiseman selected Captain Norman Thwaites, 
a wounded soldier, to be his assistant.  Wiseman knew that before the war, Thwaites, who 
spoke fluent German, had spent eight years working as Joseph Pulitzer’s private 
secretary.  Thwaites prewar work allowed him to develop contacts throughout New York 
City to include the New York City Police Department (NYPD).  Thwaites good friend, 
Captain Thomas J. Tunney, became the head of the New York City Bomb Squad.  
Tunney would be instrumental in helping the British uncover German intelligence 
strategies in the United States.137  Wiseman and Gaunt were not with influence. Gaunt 
cultivated a relationship with House.  House once confided to President Wilson that 
“British intelligence Service is marvelously good.” 138  Not to be out done, Wiseman, 
also, developed a relationship with the presidential advisor whom he met for the first time 
on December 1916.  Wiseman, who did not seem to reflect the pro-Republican leanings 
of the British embassy staff, made a favorable impression on House.   MI6’s man in 
Washington began to exert more and more influence over both Wilson and House making 
him “the most successful ‘agent of influence’ the British ever had.”139 
Captain Franz von Rintelen, a German spy, arrived in New York about the same 
time as Sir William Wiseman.  On arriving in the United States, Rintelen quickly realized 
just how effective British anti-German propaganda was on the American public.  “With 
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this kind of journalism it was inevitable that not only the mass of newspaper readers, but 
gradually also official circles in America, would assume an anti-German attitude.”  
Something had to be done, as “the Americans were being given a completely false picture 
of the real situation in Europe.”140  Rintelen’s mission was not counterpropaganda but 
industrial espionage.  Wilhelmstrasse ordered the German spy to impede the flow of 
munitions from America to the England.141  Rintelen, like Wiseman, ran into 
jurisdictional jealously.  Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the 
United States, Captain Franz von Papen (who would one day be Chancellor of Germany), 
the military attaché, Captain Karl Boy-Ed, the naval attaché, and Dr. Heinrich Albert, the 
commercial attaché, also conducted intelligence operations out of the German Embassy.  
Bernstorff started out trying to influence U.S. policymakers.  As the British blockade 
tightened, the German diplomat began to plan German covert action against Britain.  The 
German team plotted to destroy the Welland Canal, they devised the Hindu German 
Conspiracy, and engaged in gunrunning, which led to the seizure of the Annie Larsen.  
Bernstorff, Papen and Boy-Ed viewed Rintelen as an amateur meddler.  Shortly after his 
arrival, they began to work to have the interloper sent home.142 
Unlike most German spies, Rintelen did not work out of the German Embassy; 
instead, the thirty-eight year old intelligence officer worked as an illegal resident spy 
living in New York City.143  Wilhelmstrasse told the German embassy of Rintelen’s 
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arrival but did not disclose the nature of his work.144  Unfortunately, Gaunt’s network had 
already infiltrated the German embassy.  British intelligence and American law 
enforcement officials immediately began to hunt the elusive spy.  Rintelen, unaware of 
British efforts to find him, set up his own network of agents and saboteurs.  In an effort 
prevent the British and the French from receiving American made munitions, the German 
spy began buying arms.  This program proved successful but Rintelen thought it 
inadequate.  He believed U.S. manufacturing could tip the balance in Europe and he must 
stop the flow of munitions to the Triple Entente.  Rintelen stated “I’ll buy up what I can, 
and blow up what I can’t.”  The German spy decided to sabotage merchant shipping 
carrying American munitions to England as well as attacking U.S. munition 
manufacturing plants.145 
Rintelen needed a plan.  How do you build improvised explosive devices without 
getting caught?  Dr. Walter T. Scheele, a German chemist, discovered a way.  Scheele 
devised a small “cigar” bomb by using a lead tube holding two distinctive types of acid.  
When the timer went off, the acid combined creating a small but effective incendiary 
device. These explosives produced an intense fire designed to force the ship’s crew to 
choose between throwing the entire consignment of munitions overbroad or risk 
destroying the ship.  Rintelen needed a secure place to build his bombs.  The SS 
Friedrich Der Grosse, a Norddeutscher Lloyd liner, interned for the duration in New 
York Harbor, provided the perfect place to work.  Rintelen convinced the German sailors 
that their war was not over and that they could still help the Fatherland.  These sailors’ 
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cut the lead tubes needed to house the cigar bombs and then smuggled them to Dr. 
Scheele’s laboratory, located at 1133 Clinton Street, Hoboken, New Jersey, where the 
German chemist made his bombs.146  German saboteurs, working under Rintelen’s 
direction, planted these bombs on merchant ships carrying arms bound for England.147  In 
just over two years, German agents sabotaged forty-seven ships and attacked forty-three 
munitions plants.148 
Of the forty-three munitions plants sabotaged by German agents, the most 
devastating German attack occurred on July 30, 1916. Under the cover of darkness, 
Lothar Witzke and Kurt Jahnke, two German agents, aided by Michael Kristoff, a Slovak 
emigrant, blew up the Black Tom Island munitions dump, located on a small island in 
New York Harbor.149  The explosion “shook the houses along the marshy New Jersey 
shores, rattled skyscrapers on the rock foundation of Manhattan…shrapnel from the 
explosion pierced the Statue of Liberty…,” destroyed the Black Tom terminal.150  Even 
though this attack occurred almost a year after Rintelen’s imprisonment, the German spy 
still took credit.151  In Dark Invader: Wartime Reminiscences of a German Naval 
Intelligence Officer, Rintelen’s account of his war time exploits, the former German 
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intelligence officer recounted his reconnaissance of the island, noting the island’s 
weaknesses and suggesting the island made the perfect target for sabotage.  It has long 
been suspected that Rintelen’s organization carried out this daring attack.152 
The destruction of the Black Tom munitions depot convinced Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt that an extensive network of German agents aided by 
American collaborators operated in the United States.153  Romanticizing his war time 
experience, Roosevelt imagined these unseen German agents wanted to assassinate him.  
He believed the threat to his life to be so credible that while commuting to and from work 
he began wearing a revolver in a shoulder holster.  Members of the U.S. Secret Service 
acquired a secret “hit” list from the German Consul’s safe listing all the Americans to be 
killed in the event of war.  The head of the State Department’s intelligence efforts, Frank 
Polk, was number one on the list but FDR was second. According to Roosevelt, due to 
the threat of assassination, the Secret Service asked both men, for their protection, to 
carry a revolver.154 
During this time of heightened fear, FDR, the future president of the United 
States, developed a close relationship with Captain Roger Wells, the Director of Naval 
Intelligence (DNI).  The assistant secretary of the navy, sent several requests to Wells to 
provide him with information regarding alleged German plots.155  Roosevelt learned 
about the collaboration between British intelligence and members of the Wilson 
administration.  He learned about Captain Guy Gaunt and Sir William Wiseman’s close 
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friendship with Colonel Edward M. House, a key presidential advisor.  FDR’s glimpse 
into the great game played between Britain and Germany, during the Great War, 
influenced his handling of the British during the Second World War. 
Rintelen believed that German sabotage was effective but not effective enough; 
so, he decided to stop the flow of munitions by fomenting work stoppages and strikes.  
He met with German-American and Irish-American trade union leaders; after which, 
Rintelen established the Labor’s National Peace Council.  The German spy intended this 
trade union to coordinate strikes and work stoppages among munitions workers.  
Working through an intermediary named David Lamar, Rintelen insulated Germany’s 
financial backing from the seditious activities undertaken by members of the Labor’s 
National Peace Council.156  Those hyphenated Americans that Teddy Roosevelt despised 
worked to impede the British war effort.  And when the unavoidable strike occurred, the 
Labor’s National Peace Council offered to pay the wages for any man who stopped work 
on munitions transports.  Von Rintelen’s strike briefly brought work to a standstill.157  By 
November 1915, the federal government began looking into ties between German 
agitators and the Labor’s National Peace Council’s strike.158 
More than just a political agitator, Rintelen’s most ambitious plan involved his 
efforts to entangle the United States in a shooting war with Mexico.  The German spy 
wanted to take advantage of the political instability caused by the 1910 Mexican 
Revolution.  The civil unrest in Mexico might provide a unique opportunity for an 
industrious saboteur to divert America’s attention from Europe to its southern border 
                                                 
  156 French Strother, Fighting Germany’s Spies, (New York: Doubleday Page & Company, 1918), 161. 
  157 Rintelen, 173-174. 
  158 “After Labor Men for German Plots,” New York Times, 24 November 1916; “Funds Came From 
German Sources,” The Lewiston Daily Sun, 9 February 1915. 
 76 
 
since Rintelen knew that “the only country she [America] had to fear was Mexico.”  
Rintelen firmly believed that if Mexico attacked the United States the Wilson 
administration would stop all munition exports to Europe. 159  
In 1915, Rintelen met with Victoriano Huerta, who was living in exile in New 
York after Venustiano Carranza overthrew his government, at a suite at the Manhattan 
Hotel.160  Rintelen offered to supply arms to Huerta and his men.  The German spy 
wanted to sow strife and mayhem south of the border by helping the exiled leader 
takeover the Carranza government.  A civil war in Mexico was sure to foster unrest along 
the Mexican-American border and possibly pull the United States into the conflict.  The 
German spy hoped that by fostering a Mexican civil war that American policy makers 
would shift their focus from helping the British to quelling the unrest caused by a 
possible uprising.  Huerta, a bit cautious, believed that Rintelen might be an American 
agent; so he remained silent throughout most of the conversation.  The more the 
charismatic German intelligence officer spoke the more intensely Huerta listened.  Huerta 
suspected that Rintelen might just be able to help him regain control of Mexico. Huerta, 
motivated predominately by the need for revenge, came to believe the German might 
represent Berlin.  Huerta stated that if “German U-boats were to land weapons along the 
Mexican coast; abundant funds were to be provided for the purchase of armaments; and 
Germany should agree to furnish Mexico with moral support” then it might just be 
possible for him to regain political control. 161 
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According to Rintelen’s account, German officials agreed to all of Huerta’s 
demands.  Wilhelmstrasse was prepared to invest $10,000,000 to support the former 
Mexican dictator’s attempt to overthrow the Carranza government.  Before Rintelen 
could set his plan in motion, Berlin recalled him.162  Papen and Boy-Ed sent coded 
telegrams back to Berlin complaining about Rintelen, which resulted in the young agents 
return to Germany.  Members of Room 40 decoded these messages and British 
intelligence used the information to track him to Southampton, England where Scotland 
Yard police captured him.  The charismatic German spy talked his way passed the British 
police but failed to convince Admiral Hall to whom he confessed.  Rintelen spent two 
years in a British prison.  Shortly after the U.S. Congress declared war, the British sent 
him to the United States.  The Germany saboteur spent the next three years in a U.S. 
prison outside Atlanta, Georgia.   In 1920, President Wilson commuted his sentence with 
the stipulation that Rintelen agreed to leave the country.163   
Even after Rintelen’s capture, Papen and Boy-Ed continued to meddle in 
Mexico’s domestic politics trying to shift America’s focus away from the Atlantic and 
toward its Southern border.164  The German political objectives in the fall of 1915 
included interrupting the flow of munitions to the Triple Entente and diverting America’s 
attention away from Europe.  Some scholars have suggested that as Huerta’s plan seemed 
unlikely to succeed, Felix Sommerfeld, Francisco “Pancho” Villa’s American arms 
                                                 
  162 Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Poncho Villa, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1998), 554. 
  163 Rintelen, xxiv.  Tuchman, 77-78. 
  164 Michael C. Meyer, “Felix Sommerfeld and the Columbus Raid of 1916,” Arizona and the West 25, no. 
3, (autumn 1983): 226.  By December 1916, Berlin recalled Papen and Boy-Ed because of their 
involvement with Huerta and the plan to overthrow the Carranza government.  See “Statements Made by 
Boy-Ed and Von Papen: Both say They Have Merely Done Their Duty: Other Important Dismissals May 
Follow,” New York Times, 4 December 1915. 
 78 
 
procurer and German agent, offered to use his influence with Villa to convince the 
Mexican revolutionary to attack the United States.165 
Pancho Villa, like Huerta, was motivated by revenge.  In 1915, at the battle of 
Celaya and the battle of Agua Prieta, Carranza’s Constitutionalists defeated Villa’s 
División del Norte.  After these two military defeats, the Wilson administration withdrew 
their support and recognized the Carranza government.  Angered by the U.S. decision to 
withdrawal support, the Mexican revolutionary attacked the United States.  During the 
early morning hours of March 9, 1916, Pancho Villa crossed into U.S. territory and with 
roughly 600 Mexican revolutionaries launched a surprise attack against Camp Furlong, a 
U.S. Army post near Columbus, New Mexico.  The battle, which lasted less than three 
hours, did not turn out well for Villa who lost sixty-five men while only killing seven 
American soldiers.  During the predawn raid, Villa’s men rode through the streets of the 
tiny border town firing wildly into the homes of Columbus’s residents killing eight 
American civilians.  The U.S. Army gave chase killing an estimated eighteen more of 
Villa’s men.166 
Even with Sommerfeld’s involvement, there was no real proof that Villa’s 
decision to attack Columbus, New Mexico, was anything more than a well-conceived 
gambit on Villa’s part to fill his dwindling ranks with recruits.  In fact, while the 
Germans encouraged Villa’s attack and even cheered the resulting U.S. intervention, they 
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seemed genuinely surprised by the Columbus Raid.  Villa hoped that another American 
intervention, even one provoked by him, might help him refill his “anti-Americanist” 
ranks just as the Wilson administration’s 1914 decision to occupy Vera Cruz had done. 167 
Villa failed to find the political support he so desperately sought; instead, Wilson 
announced, “An adequate force will be sent in pursuit of Villa with the single objective of 
capturing him and putting a stop to his forays.  This can and will be done…with 
scrupulous respect for the sovereignty of that Republic.”  In reality, Wilson, without 
contacting Carranza, ordered a 4,000  man expeditionary force, led by General John J. 
“Blackjack” Pershing and comprised mostly of members of the U.S. Cavalry with some 
artillery support, into Mexico to hunt the down the Mexican bandit. 168  While the 
Mexican revolutionary spent the next year hiding from Pershing’s Punitive Expedition, 
Wilson struggled to maintain diplomatic relations with Carranza.  By denying Pershing’s 
men the right to cross into Mexico, Carranza resisted U.S. efforts to catch Villa.169 
In the spring of 1916, it looked like the Germans might get their wish, as the 
threat of a full-scale war between the United States and Mexico seemed likely, even after 
Carranza agreed to Wilson’s demands.170  Members of Congress felt that Wilson was not 
acting forcefully enough.  Senator Albert B. Fall (R-NM) wanted Congress to recruit 
500,000 men to intervene in Mexico; but Wilson refused.  The president stated “no matter 
how loud the gentlemen on the hill yell for and demand it” he would not order a full-scale 
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intervention.  Wilson did not want a war with Mexico; he did not want to send “some 
poor farmer’s son” to fight along the Mexican-American border. 171 
Pushing deeper and deeper into Mexico, American troops risked starting a 
skirmish with Carranza’s troops.  A prospect that seemed more and more likely, as 
Mexicans began to believe the United States was seeking conquest and not merely 
hunting Villa and his followers.  The eleven month hunt, for what many Americans 
considered to be nothing more than a wily Mexican bandit, turned into a comedy of 
errors.  As one Wilson biographer stated, “An American force that eventually numbered 
more than 7,000—equipped with the latest in military technology, including motor 
vehicles and airplanes—chased Villa through northern Mexico for months and never 
caught him.”172  By January 1917, Pershing and his men began marching northward 
toward the U.S. border as the Punitive Expedition came to an abrupt end.  Pershing’s hunt 
ended in failure as Ville eluded him at every turn.  The Punitive Expedition, however, did 
provide Pershing’s men with valuable field experience.173  
Just as the U.S. foray into Mexico ended, Germany’s continual plots along the 
Mexican-American border led to Room 40’s greatest intelligence coup—the interception, 
decryption, and transmission to the United States of the infamous Zimmermann 
Telegram—which finally brought the Americans into the war.  In an age when gentlemen 
did not read other men’s mail, to spy on a friendly or neutral nation would have been 
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loathsome.  War, however, is not a sporting match.  National interests often supersede 
political niceties.  Hall realized that in war there are friendly (or neutral) states but there 
are no friendly intelligence agencies.  And sometimes, the ends justify the means. 
German diplomats and intelligence professionals used neutral Sweden to send 
coded messages to the Americas.  The Swedes, in defiance of the rules governing neutral 
states during times of hostilities, hid German diplomatic communications by pretending 
the messages were sent from Sweden.  Since these communications had to traverse 
Britain, the Swedes enciphered their messages.  Members of Room 40, not fooled by 
Swedish diplomatic duplicity, quickly uncovered the “Swedish Roundabout.”  Hall 
ordered his men to decipher all the message traffic between Sweden and the Americas, 
which uncovered important but often mundane pieces of information.174 
Using an American diplomatic channel set up by President Woodrow Wilson, 
Zimmermann sent Bernstorff his infamous message. Hoping to further his peace 
proposals with the Triple Entente, President Wilson allowed the Germans to send 
diplomatic communication from the U.S. Embassy in Berlin to their ambassador in 
Washington.  The German’s used this secure communication channel to wage political 
warfare against the United States.  What Zimmermann, German intelligence, and 
American military leaders failed to realize was that under the pretext of keeping Britain 
safe, Hall’s men, began intercepting and deciphering these diplomatic communications 
between Germany and the United States. 175 
On January 16, 1917, cryptographers working in Room 40 intercepted and 
decrypted a telegram from Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, German Secretary for Foreign 
                                                 
  174 Gannon, 18. 
  175 Beesly, 213. 
 82 
 
Affairs to Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States 
and Mexico.  This telegraph outlined the German plot to help Mexico invade the 
Southern United States.  The decoded text speaks for itself:  
We intend to begin unrestricted submarine warfare on the 
first of February. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep 
the United States neutral.  In the event of this not succeeding, 
we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following 
basis: 
 
Make war together, make peace together, generous financial 
support, and consent on our part for Mexico to reconquer the 
lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The 
settlement in detail is left to you. 
 
Your Excellency will inform the president [of Mexico] of the 
above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the 
United States is certain and add the suggestion that he 
should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate 
adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and 
ourselves. 
 
Please call the president’s attention to the fact that the 
unrestricted employment of our submarines now offers the 
prospect of compelling England to make peace within a few 
months. 
 
                                                                      
Zimmermann.176 
 
The decryption of the Zimmermann telegram is often viewed as a minor historical 
footnote.  Most monographs discuss the political maneuvering between Britain, 
Germany, and the United States but these accounts neglect the role played by the men 
who intercepted and deciphered the message.  The Zimmerman Telegram altered the 
course of two nations.  The message compelled the United States to join one of the 
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bloodiest confrontations in human history.  Men who worked in secret have little time for 
thoughts of glory and recognition as the work becomes all consuming.  The excitement 
surrounding the young cryptographers working on the Zimmerman Note can be seen in 
the historical records.  Nigel de Grey explained that once he got the gist of the contents of 
the telegram he approached Blinker, as he referred to Hall, and asked “Do you want 
America in the war Sir?”  Hall, who at this point could see the childlike delight in Nigel 
and Dilly Knox’s faces, simply replied “Yes, why?”  And with all the arrogance that 
comes from secret work, Nigel stated confidently, “I’ve got a telegram that will bring 
them in if you give it to them.”  Then Nigel and Dilly Knox began to explain to Blinker, 
who could not read German, exactly what the half deciphered text said and what it 
implied for the British war effort.177 
 Once Hall held the deciphered text, he knew its political warfare value but how 
could he reveal the telegram’s secrets without disclosing the methods used to obtain the 
information.178  He told Nigel and Knox that “for the present not a soul outside this room 
is to be told anything at all” as Hall needed time to think and plan.179  There was never 
any thought of not turning the information over to the Americans but Hall did not want to 
risk compromising the technical means and sources used to intercept and decipher the 
German telegram.180  From the contents of the telegram, Hall realized the German 
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Embassy would have to send the message to Mexico and so Hall deduced that Mexico 
City provided the perfect location to pick up the document.  A British agent, only referred 
to as T, worked in Mexico City, and he went to the telegraph office and stole a copy of 
the Western Union message sent to Heinrich von Eckardt, the German Ambassador to 
Mexico.  The members of Room 40 worked to decipher Eckardt’s copy of the 
Zimmermann telegram to see if there were any differences between the two documents.  
This extra precaution confirmed Hall’s fears.  There were differences between the texts.  
If Hall had immediately gone public, he would have unintentionally revealed that British 
intelligence had broken the German diplomatic codes.181 
Hall and his men worked to piece together a copy of the Zimmermann Telegram 
that matched the one sent to Eckardt.  Many historians believe Hall waited to see if the 
Americans were going to join the war without having to disclose the contents of the 
telegram.  The time delay between intercepting the telegram and its release encompassed 
the time it took to steal the Mexican copy of the telegram, decipher and compare the two 
documents, and then prepare a copy the British gave to the Americans.  During that time, 
the Germans renewed their policy of unrestricted submarine warfare and a steadfast 
Wilson continued to refuse to fight. 182 
 With no end in sight, the British war effort threatened to unravel.  The Liberal 
government, headed by H.H. Asquith, fell and a coalition government headed by David 
Lloyd George replaced it.  The new British prime minister realized the wealth of an 
empire could not indefinitely supply the funds needed to buy the materiel used to fight an 
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open-ended conflict.  The British mortgaged their empire to fight Germany.  American 
businesses, the main beneficiaries, reaped the financial rewards.  So as the empire tittered 
on the brink of financial ruin, British bankers and politicians realized that something had 
change. 183 
By 1916, David Lloyd George, the newly appointed Prime Minister centralized 
political warfare efforts by reorganizing the War Propaganda Bureau.  This 
reorganization set up three separate propaganda agencies working within Wellington 
House—the Ministry of Information, the National War Aims Committee, and the British 
Military.  The Ministry of Information, led by Lord Beaverbrook, conducted civilian 
psychological warfare outside Britain.  The National War Aims Committee, led by 
Colonel John Buchan, the author of The Thirty-Nine Steps who worked as the Director of 
Intelligence, conducted psychological operations within Britain.  Buchan’s team worked 
to stamp out British pacifism.184  The British military worked out of Crewe House, which 
the British government created in February 1918.  The Director of Propaganda in Enemy 
Countries, led by Alfred Charles William Harmsworth the Viscount of Northcliffe, 
orchestrated political warfare operations against Germany.185 
The British hoped the German decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare 
would bring the United States into the war.  Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, told 
Robert Lansing the U.S. Secretary of State, of German plans to resume targeting British 
vessels.  Wilson, who won reelection in 1916 as “the man who kept us out of the war,” 
                                                 
  183 Kennedy, Over There, 8. 
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refused to commit his nation to the conflict.  Edward M. House noted that Germany’s 
resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare made the president “sad and depressed.”  A 
deeply disappointed Wilson still refused to enter the conflict since he believed that it 
would “be a crime for this Government to involve itself in the war.”186  The president 
responded by severing diplomatic ties, he declared that an armed state of neutrality 
existed between the United States and Germany, and he armed U.S. merchant shipping.  
The president’s declaration fell short of war.  A declaration David Lloyd George’s island 
nation so desperately needed.187  German U-boats began sinking over half a million tons 
of allied shipping monthly, and the British were starting to feel the strain.  By February 9, 
the New York Times reported that “Germany’s ruthless submarine warfare, continued 
with the success of the last three days, would destroy, within a short time a great part of 
the world’s merchant tonnage.”188  As the supplies desperately needed by the British sunk 
to the bottom of the Atlantic bankrupting the empire, Wilson’s reluctance to commit 
American troops enraged the British Prime Minister who reportedly shouted, “And so he 
[Wilson] is not going to fight after all!  He is awaiting another insult before he draws the 
sword.”189 
By February 22, 1917, the copy of the Zimmermann telegram was ready.  Hall 
realized the explosive nature of the message he held in his hands but the nature of the job 
convinced Hall that he needed protect the sources used to gain the information.  Blinker 
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knew that once the British released the contents of the telegram the German intelligence 
community would immediately begin searching for the method used by Hall and his men 
to decipher the German message.  A naval intelligence officer showed the telegram to 
Edward Bell, a secretary of the American Embassy in London who established a close 
relationship with Admiral Hall and his staff.  Blinker had on occasion passed information 
about German espionage in the United States to Bell, who in turn passed the information 
on to the State Department.190 
At first, Bell believed the telegram to be a forgery, nothing more than British 
propaganda, but Hall quickly convinced Bell of the letter’s authenticity and the two men 
approached the American Ambassador Walter Hines Page.  Page, also, needed 
convincing, and the charismatic Hall quickly won him over.  Page writing to President 
Wilson described the head of Room 40 as the “one genius that the war has developed.”  
The U.S. ambassador went on to state “neither in fiction nor in fact can you find any such 
man to match him.”191  Page, like Bell, realized the telegram meant war.  During this 
informal meeting, members of the British government decided that Arthur Belfour, the 
man who had succeeded Winston Churchill as the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1915, 
should officially present the contents of the telegram to Page who would then relay the 
information to Washington.192 
As members of the U.S. Congress and American journalists struggled with the 
authenticity of the Zimmermann telegram, the German government frantically searched 
                                                 
  190 Kahn, “Edward Bell and his Zimmerman Telegram Memoranda,” 147. 
  191 Confidential Letter from Walter Hines Page to President Woodrow Wilson, 17 March 1917, quoted in 
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for any information about how the contents of a coded message could have fallen into the 
hands of the British.  Hall’s meticulous planning led the Germans to deduce the coded 
message had been stolen in Mexico, which safely hid Room 40’s cryptographic efforts 
for the rest of the war.  Hall realized that he could not reveal the methods used to 
decipher the text, nor that members of Room 40 had intercepted coded German 
diplomatic messages using a secret network set up by the president of the United States.  
As the crisis developed, Germany, Mexico, and Japan refused to admit any wrongdoing.  
Dr. Arthur Zimmermann publicly announced the contents of the telegram were genuine 
and on April 6, 1917 the United States declared war on Germany.193 
The long propaganda campaign, conducted by Admiral Hall and the members of 
Room 40, to compel the United States to enter the war, took almost three years to 
convince President Wilson to “draw his sword.”  No single event drove the United States 
to declare war on Germany in the spring of 1917.  Building on the growing anti-German 
sentiment in the United States, British agents of influence exploited tragedy to 
manufacture consent.  The sinking of the Lusitania, the Rape of Belgium, and execution 
of Edith Cavell combined with the contents of the Zimmermann telegram ensured the 
German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare left the president of the United 
States with limited options.  Finally, Wilson decided the only way to “make the world 
safe for democracy” was by force.  
On April 2, 1917, Wilson asked the members of Congress to declare war on 
Germany, which after some deliberation they did on April 6, 1917.194  The congressional 
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decision to declare war on Germany and her allies propelled the United States into a 
conflict that had already claimed almost five million lives.  A stagnant defensive 
perimeter, composed of an elaborate system of trenches, stretched from the Straits of 
Dover along the coast of Belgium southeasterly through France to the Swiss border.  
Almost four million soldiers huddled in the mud waiting for the call to go over the top. In 
the winter of 1917, after nearly three years of horrific fighting, most soldiers (on both 
sides) prayed for peace.  In the United States, young men, with no thought of peace, 
began to rush off to war. 195
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Patriotic Fervor 
 
 
Figure 31 
.--. .- - .-. .. --- - .. -.-.  ..-. . .-. ...- --- .-. 
President Woodrow Wilson knew the average Joe did not want to risk his life in a 
war where the best result would be to come back in one piece.  The American president, 
better than most, understood the deep ethnic and sectional sentiments that surrounded the 
issue of military intervention in Europe.  “Socialists, radical labor leaders, German 
Americans, Irish Americans, southern and western farmers” as well as others opposed 
any declaration of war.2  Wilson realized that his administration, like the British, would 
have to manufacture popular support for the war.  Propagandists would need to not only 
                                                 
  1 Figure 3: Herblock, “It’s Okay…We’re Hunting Communists,” 31 October 1947, Library of Congress. 
  2 Arthur Link, “That Cobb Interview,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 72, No. 1, (June, 1985): 12. 
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control the flow of information but also use the fear of domestic sedition to garner 
support for the war.  The key to ensuring American support hinged on Wilson’s ability to 
criminalize dissent.  The president and his advisers sent the nation down a dark and 
twisted path as they worked to convince members of Congress to pass legislation 
designed to destroy any vestige of a loyal opposition.  Wilson, eventually, ensured that 
only his administration’s views were heard; but, in the days leading up to the U.S. 
declaration of war, the president anguished over the need to sacrifice security for liberty.  
Wilson knew the ends might fail to justify the means and that his decision to bring the 
nation into a predominately European war might alter the course of the nation. 
In Cobb and “The World,” Frank Irving Cobb, the chief editor of Joseph 
Pulitzer’s New York World, provided a candid portrait of a president on the brink of 
sending his nation to war.  According to Cobb’s account, on April 1, 1917, Wilson called 
him to the White House.  The New York World editor stated that he did not arrive at the 
residence until well past midnight—making it just a few hours before Wilson asked 
Congress to declare war on Germany.3  The American President appeared “worn down.”  
Cobb asked what was wrong, and Wilson admitted to not sleeping; he confided to Cobb 
that he spent his nights trying to figure out some way to avoid war, but war was coming.4  
The British political warfare campaign led by Charles Masterman, Sir Gilbert Parker, 
                                                 
  3 Frank Irving Cobb and John Langdon Heaton, Cobb and “The World,” (Hallandale, Florida:  New 
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Guy Gaunt, Sir William Wiseman, and members of Admiral Hall’s Room 40 helped 
convince a reluctant president the only course left was war. 5 
Wilson assumed that war would cause the United States to lose its head “along 
with the rest.”  He predicted that Americans would soon “stop weighing right and 
wrong.”  The president understood that modern warfare needed “illiberalism at home to 
reinforce the men at the front.”  America could not preserve its high ideals and fight a 
bloody campaign against tyranny.  By curtailing American civil liberties, Wilson 
sacrificed freedom for security.  The American president  realized that “to fight you must 
be brutal and ruthless, and the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into every fiber of our 
national life, infecting Congress, the courts, the policeman on the beat, the man on the 
street.”  Wilson went on to add “Conformity would be the only virtue and any man who 
refused to conform would have to pay the penalty.”  According to Cobb, Wilson feared 
the U.S. Constitution might not survive the ordeal and in anguish cried “If there is any 
alternative, for God’s sake, let’s take it!”  Cobb, like the president, could not see any 
alternative.6 
Failing to find an alternative, the American president embarked on his crusade to 
“make the world safe for democracy” by limiting those constitutional freedoms that 
formed the foundation of the republic.  In eleven short weeks, the Wilson administration 
ushered in one of the most repressive periods in American history.  On April 7, 1917, a 
confidential executive order established loyalty oaths for all federal workers.  The threat 
                                                 
  5 Cobb and Heaton, 42.  In an effort to avoid foreign entanglements and in part to preserver “her unique 
mission as savior to a decrepit old order,” the United States joined the war as an associate power instead of 
as a formal ally. 
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of unemployment coupled with the reality of a long prison term removed the voice of a 
loyal opposition.  Under Wilson, all federal employees had to “support government 
policy, both in conduct and in sympathy.”  Calling a federal employee’s loyalty into 
question allowed employers to confidentially remove any employee they considered 
“inimical to the public welfare.”7 
On April 13, 1917, Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, Newton D. Baker, 
Secretary of War, and Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, wrote a letter to 
Woodrow Wilson expressing their belief that there existed a “need for some authoritative 
agency to assume the publication of all vital facts” about the war.8  These men, like their 
British counterparts, understood that modern warfare called for more than creating an 
army.  The president needed to mobilize American support by “selling” the war to the 
American people.9  The following day, Wilson signed Executive Order 2594 setting up 
the Committee on Public Information (CPI), headed by George Creel, a muckraking 
journalist, editor, and an enthusiastic Wilson supporter.10  Creel, like Charles Masterman, 
employed writers, lecturers, artists, actors, and scholars to help shape American views of 
the war.   
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In the spring of 1917, the task of rallying American support for the war seemed all 
but impossible.  The long tradition of sectionalism and nonintervention in European 
affairs provided formidable obstacles to national unity.  A fact recognized by Creel who 
wrote  
During the three and a half years of our neutrality the United States had 
been torn by a thousand divisive prejudices, with public opinion stunned 
and muddled by the pull and haul of Allied and German propaganda.  The 
sentiment in the West was still isolationist; the Northwest buzzed with talk 
of a ‘rich man’s war,’ waged to salvage Wall Street loans; men and women 
of Irish stock were ‘neutral,’ not caring who whipped England, and in every 
state demagogues raved against ‘war mongers,’ although the Du Ponts and 
other so-called ‘merchants of death’ did not have enough powder on hand 
to arm squirrel hunters.11 
 
And yet, Creel’s CPI marshaled a whole generation of “opinion shapers, 
interpretive geniuses, and storytellers” to shape America’s view of the war.12  CPI fought 
for “the minds of men, for the conquest of their convictions.”13  And, Creel’s 
propagandists surpassed anyone’s highest expectations as CPI overcame 150 years of 
sectionalism to sharpen America’s sense of nationalism.  Creel’s rhetoric went hand in 
hand with Wilson’s idealistic views of the nation and the committee running CPI soon 
gave way to just one man—Creel.14  CPI’s motto summed up this Creel’s view of 
propaganda—“faith in democracy…faith in fact” and so he directed his propagandists to 
rely on facts and avoid the “hymn of hate.”  Creel found democracy to be a religion and 
spent his life preaching “America as the hope of the World.”15 
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According to Josephus Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, the President and all 
the members of his cabinet agreed the United States “should not fall into the stupid 
censorship that had marked the action of some countries dealing with war news.”  The 
Wilson administration believed that journalistic self-censorship would ensure that 
reporters would avoid publishing anything that might compromise national security or 
might “embarrass war operations.”  The need to “scoop” the competition, however, 
guaranteed that patriotism quickly fell by the wayside as correspondents rushed to sell 
more and more papers and Creel had to work to control the flow of information.16 
The former muckraking journalist believed that CPI’s mission was nothing short 
of a great “adventure in advertising.”  Creel stated years later that his organization had no 
authority and “yet the American idea worked.  And it worked better than any European 
Law.”  Creel believed that since CPI deliberately made propaganda using positive 
publicity to gain the support of the American people that this distinguished his 
propaganda campaign from those being conducted by both British and German 
intelligence agencies.  Creel would never admit that his organization was similar to those 
employed by the European powers. 17 
The Committee for Public Information, like Wellington House, used radio, 
newspapers, movies, the telegraph, posters, and pamphlets to get their message to 
the American people.  Wilson believed “the spoken word may light the fires of 
passion and unreason or it may inspire to highest action and noblest sacrifice.”  
On June 16, 1917, President Wilson personally approved creating the Four 
                                                 
  16 Letter from Josephus Daniels to Cedric Larson, 30 June 1938, quoted in Cedric Larson and James R. 
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Minute Men Division of the Committee of Public Information.18  Wilson 
appointed William McCormick Blair, an American businessman, as the director 
of this new division.19  At a grass roots level, Creel used his “Four Minute Men” 
to carry the administration’s message to the American people.  These men spoke 
at movie theaters, schools, labor organizations, fraternal organizations, churches, 
and synagogues.  The subjects of these talks were considered “matters of national 
importance connected with the war plans of the Government.”  Topics covered by 
these men included “Universal Service by Selective Draft,” “The Liberty Loan,” 
and “Why We Are Fighting,”20 
The Four Minute Men Bulletin became the instrument by which CPI 
disseminated information to its 75,000 volunteers.  These men and women 
conducted thirty-seven speaking campaigns and delivered over 750,000 speeches 
in 7,448 cities to over 315 million people.21  The Bulletin explained that each 
“speech should not be longer than four minutes, which means there is no time for 
a single wasted word.”  Samuel Hopkins Adams, a former Muckraker, set down 
the rules for the four minute men.  They must stick to their time table because 
“five minutes means a guess; four minutes makes a promise.”  Hopkins directed 
these men to “talk to the simplest intelligence” in the audience that way they 
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could “hit everything higher up.”  He went on to coach these men to be “natural 
and direct” as “sincerity wears no frills.”  Clichés such as “Doing your bit,” 
“Business as usual,” and “Your country needs you” were to be avoided as they no 
longer had any meaning.  And finally, Hopkins bluntly stated “finish strong and 
sharp.  The butterfly is forgotten as soon as he departs, but you recall the hornet 
because he ends with a point.”22 
While Creel avoided atrocity style propaganda, he was not above using 
fear in his campaigns.  Taking a page for the British, Creel’s four minute men 
invoked the fear of an elusive but ever present German spy to stimulate support 
for the war.  As one Four Minute Man stated, “I have just received information 
that there is a German spy among us—a German spy watching us.”  The speaker 
declared, “Do not let the German spy hear and report that you are a slacker” since 
“money means everything now; it means quicker victory and, therefore, less 
bloodshed” so invest in the war.  Invest in your country buy a liberty loan.23  
Eventually, Creel’s organization extended to 153 colleges and universities as 
junior minute men jockeyed to see who could help “put the message across.”  
These students studied the propaganda material then gave at least one four-minute 
lecture to the student body always mindful to stay on point.24 
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The key to mobilizing public support hinged on Creel’s agents getting CPI’s 
message to those hyphenated Americans that Theodore Roosevelt feared and that German 
agents of influence, such as Franz von Rintelen and Franz von Papen, were targeting.  To 
ensure the Wilson administration’s message reached as many ethnic groups as possible, 
CPI propagandist, like British agents of influence, either openly or secretly supported 
front organizations like Friends of German Democracy, the John Ericsson League of 
Patriotic Service and the American-Hungarian Loyalty League.  The most important of 
these front organizations, Friends of German Democracy, became a focal point of CPI’s 
efforts to shape German-American support of the war. 25 
In the years leading up to the U.S. declaration of war, British Intelligence’s 
exploitation of German sabotage efforts in the United States had heightened American 
hatred of the German which quickly expanded to all foreign-born immigrants.  In reality, 
as far as the German community went, American citizenship did not shield the 
hyphenated American from scrutiny.  Senator William H. King (D-UT), echoing 
Woodrow Wilson’s 1915 State of the Union Address, explained there was “a feeling 
throughout the country that there are some Prussian spies in this country who have their 
citizenship papers—and who should be loyal Americans” but that he knew for a fact that 
there were “some disloyalists among those who have sworn allegiance to the flag.” 26 
The idea of the disloyal American is best illustrated by the German-language 
press that continued, even after the U.S. declaration of war, to publish articles 
sympathetic to the German cause.  So Creel appointed Julius Koettgen, a German-born 
British citizen, the director of the German Bureau working with the foreign born. 
                                                 
  25 James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War, 213-233. 
  26 Ibid., 214-215. 
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Koettgen, also, happened to be the assistant secretary in the Friends of German 
Democracy.  Even though Friends of German Democracy preserved the illusion of being 
a citizen backed organization, the truth was that CPI, through Koettgen, controlled and 
shaped the message being presented to the public.  CPI’s unique relationship with Friends 
of German Democracy allowed Creel some influence within the German-American 
community. 27 
The Germans, however, represented one of the twenty-three ethnic groups that 
CPI wanted to Americanize.  In an effort to Americanize these hyphenated Americans, 
Creel ordered Josephine Roche, an idealistic social worker, to create “loyalty leagues” in 
urban ethnic communities.  Roche set up a close working relationship with fourteen 
different racial groups, which she did by using existing organizations and local personnel.  
Roche used “their own speakers, their own writers, and their own news-papers” to 
reached “down from the cities to the hamlets.”  Roche and her team went into homes to 
aid these families, who failed to understand how federal laws applied to them.  Roche 
explained the new draft laws, helped with the new income tax rules, and addressed 
individual problems as they were presented to her. Roche was only one woman, and her 
loyalty groups could only reach so many people.28 
Not everyone agreed with CPI’s loyalty leagues.  The National Security League 
(NSL), for example, did not approve of Roche’s work.   During the opening months of the 
Great War, a climate of fear and anger besieged the United States; Solomon Stanwood 
Menken, a Wall Street Lawyer, established the National Security League, a preparedness 
                                                 
  27 Even though Koettgen proved indispensable, the U.S. government still required him to register as an 
enemy alien.  James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War, 216-217. 
  28 Creel, Rebel at Large: Recollections of Fifty Crowded Years, 193. 
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organization.  Stanwood believed in increasing America’s military strength against all 
enemies.  The NSL worked to counter foreign efforts to drag the nation into a European 
war.  If war came, the NSL wanted the United States would win it.  While other patriotic 
groups formed around specific ideals, such as being pro-German, pro-British, or 
pacifistic, the NSL had one purpose—the defense of the nation.  According to NSL 
literature, the best way to defend the country from hyphenated Americans was through 
Americanization.29 
As war hysteria took root, the NSL’s fervent attacks against minority groups fell 
on fertile ground.  Often men and women spoke of America being a great melting pot but 
during the early twentieth century the pot had not been stirred.  These hyphenated 
Americans struggled to survive in ethnic ghettos.  Most of these men and women worked 
long brutal hours.  Trying to fit in, these men and women studied English at night.  And 
English became the cornerstone of the NSL push for the Americanization of these ethnic 
groups. 30  The NSL wanted English to be the only language used for academic and 
religious instruction as well as insisting that all public announcements should be made in 
English.  The NSL called on teachers to teach a patriotic version of history with good 
citizenship being at the forefront of all classroom instruction.  This new curriculum 
would help students achieve a “deeper understanding and meaning of the aims of 
                                                 
  29 See Solomon Stanwood Menken’s testimony before congress in National Security League: Hearings 
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democracy.”  Ironically, the NSL did not understand that they were trampling on the 
freedoms they held sacred.31 
The battle against U.S. civil liberties moved from the classroom to the home as 
legislators argued over the legality of conscription.  On May 18, 1917, members of 
Congress passed the Selective Service and Training Act giving the U.S. president the 
power to draft soldiers.  The Selective Service Act required all men between the age of 
eighteen and thirty-one to register for the draft.  The American army, in the spring of 
1917, was not prepared to fight in a global conflict.  Wilson’s decision to enter the global 
conflict, however, quickly showed the army needed to increase its ranks rapidly if it 
hoped to make a difference on the Western Front.  Wilson compelled Congress to pass 
and set up the controversial Selective Service and Training Act, which required over 24 
million men, regardless of citizenship—natural born, naturalized, or alien—to register.32  
The Espionage Act of 1917 replaced the Defense Secrets Act of 1911 making it illegal to 
interfere with the war effort or with war time recruitment by imposing a $10,000 fine and 
up to twenty years in prison for those convicted of breaking the law. 
 The decision to force men to fight in a foreign war led to a rise in antiwar 
sentiment compelling U.S. lawmakers to consider expanding the power of the Espionage 
Act of 1917.  Lawmakers began to debate the merits of passing the Sedition bill.  Not 
everyone supported this controversial bill.  Senator William Gordon (D-OH) noted the 
Sedition bill plainly violated the “Federal Constitution guaranteeing free speech” but his 
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warnings were not heeded.  Senator Hiram W. Johnson (R-CA) argued the removal of 
Senator Joseph I. France’s (R-MD) amendment to the Sedition bill, which allowed honest 
criticism of the government, meant the end of one of the “privileges that have been ours 
since we became a republic.”  John Lord O’Brien, a lawyer from Buffalo, defended the 
bill stating the danger of pro-German propaganda outweighed the loss of free speech.  
O’Brien explained most pro-German rhetoric was not seditious.  The “most dangerous 
type of propaganda in this country is religious pacifism: i.e., opposition to the war on the 
grounds that it is opposed to the word of God.”33 
Under the Sedition Act of 1918, America citizens were forbidden to utter or print 
“any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, contemptuous, or abusive language about the United 
States government, or the form of government, or the flag.”  As in Britain, the United 
States Postal service began to censor the mail.  Congress, under the Sedition Act, directed 
the U.S. Postmaster General, Albert Sidney Burleson, “to refuse the service of the mails 
to any person or concern using the mails in violation of the act.”  Members of the U.S. 
postal service returned mail that violated the law.  Over the next two years, those 
Americans who broke this law received their returned parcels stamped with an ominous 
warning—Mail to this address, undeliverable under the Espionage Act.34 
The Committee on Public Information began to compete with other national 
organizations on how the United States should fight.  By the winter of 1914, many 
Americans began to demand an increase in defense spending just in case the United 
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States had to defend itself.  The National Security League (NSL), an ultrapatriotic 
society, and a thorn in the side of Creel’s CPI, lobbied to create an aggressive defense 
policy.  Creel believed the NSL, a nationalistic and militaristic organization and the 
American Defense Society (ADS), a splinter group once affiliated with the NSL, 
represented the worst of these ultrapatriotic organizations.  Both organizations supported 
American intervention in World War I and the members of both groups feed on the most 
lurid stories.  Making their patriotism “a thing of screams, violence and extremes.”  NSL 
and ADS members “outjingoed the worst of the jingoes, and their constant practice of 
extreme statement left a trail of anger, irritation, and resentment.”   
Shortly after the United States declared war on Germany, atrocity propaganda, 
used to stir up patriotic fervor, began to rise.  Winsor McCay, a famous American artist, 
created an early black and white animated film depicting U-20’s torpedoing of the 
Lusitania.35  Like Fred Spear’s recruiting poster, Enlist, McCay’s film convinced many 
Americans to join those battalions being sent to France.  This black and white film spoke 
to a primal feeling in American society.  A feeling CPI used to whip up war hysteria.  
CPI propagandists, like their British counterparts, produced a form of invasion literature.  
Pamphlets like Why America Fights Germany portrayed the fictional advance of the 
Kaiser’s army through the New Jersey countryside on its way to New York City.  The 
CPI pamphlet entitled The German Whisper reported that German spies worked in almost 
every American community.  U.S. citizens needed to be ever vigilant.  Fear became the 
key to population control.  Creel just refused to engage in the bloodthirsty cry of the 
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jingoist to get his message across.36 Creel believed that positive publicity and not the 
pandering to humanity’s baser instincts would provide the stimulus needed to convince 
Americans to support the war.37 
The jingoists took to the streets forming vigilant groups.  The American 
Protective League (APL) founded by Albert M. Briggs, a Chicago advertising executive, 
to supplement the increase in staffing needed by both the Bureau of Investigation (BOI) 
and military intelligence, represented the largest of these vigilant groups.   The Secret 
Service opposed the use of civilians.  Secretary of the Treasury, William McAdoo, 
wanted to create a centralized domestic intelligence organization, which would have 
invalidated the use of auxiliary forces to combat domestic subversion.  Bielaski, the head 
of the Bureau of Investigation, and Thomas Gregory, the U.S. Attorney General, opposed 
McAdoo’s suggestion and rejected creating a centralized intelligence organization.38 
According to an internal FBI report on the history of domestic security 
investigation, the American Protective League, an organization of two hundred and fifty 
thousand well-meaning volunteers, with offices across the country, “formed a citizens 
auxiliary to ‘assist’ the Bureau of Investigation.” Sanctioned by the U.S. Attorney 
General, Thomas Watt Gregory, and run by the head of the Justice Department’s Bureau 
of Investigation (BOI), Alexander Bruce Bielaski, APL agents carried badges bought for 
$.75 which they used to help give them legitimacy while they “investigated what they felt 
                                                 
  36 Francis MacDonnell, Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 24. 
  37 Creel, How We Advertised America, 181. 
  38 Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans: Book III, 
(Washington:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 382.  The six volumes and six books that compose 
the U.S. Senate’s inquiry into U.S. intelligence activities known as the Church Committee will be 
abbreviated in the footnotes as Church Committee Report. 
 105 
 
were un-American activities.”39  The ever-vigilant APL comprised of businessmen and 
professionals, who were ineligible for the draft, became bounty hunters receiving $50 for 
every draft dodgers brought to justice.  When not searching for “slackers” avoiding the 
war, the APL agents looked for subversives working in their communities.  These 
vigilantes found an ordinary workingman’s complaints about his job, his boss, or a local 
politician to be treasonous speech.  With just a quiet word spoken so the right person 
would overhear ensured that a difficult neighbor became a disloyal scoundrel.  This 
created a secret army of informants that scoured the land.  Constantly watching, 
searching, and listening for signs of treasonous behavior.40  The fear of foreign 
subversion resulted in such a huge public outcry that agents working for the Justice 
Department, the Treasury Department’s Secret Service, Military Intelligence, and Naval 
Intelligence set up a comprehensive human counterintelligence network without any sign 
of public protest.  According to Creel, “Not a pin dropped in the home of any one with a 
foreign name but that it rang like thunder on the inner ear of some listening sleuth!” Creel 
went on to say, “Never was a country so contra-espionaged!”41 
Congress passed legislation designed to “use criminal sanctions to help the war 
effort,” should have streamlined domestic counterintelligence operations but Congress 
forgot to clarify the jurisdictional responsibilities of the various competing intelligence 
agencies.  Professional law enforcement agents, intelligence professionals, and civilian 
vigilantes discovered that more often than not there was an “enormous overlapping of 
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investigative activities among the various agencies charged with winning the war.”  And 
yet, on occasion these agencies worked well together.  For example, the 1918 selective 
service violator raids, conducted in New York and New Jersey which was perhaps the 
most egregious deprivation of the civil liberties of  poor unban working class citizens to 
occur during this period of xenophobic hysteria.  These warrantless raids conducted by 35 
BOI agents, several 100 local police officers, 2,000 APL vigilantes, and almost 2,500 
military personnel arrested 50,000 men for allegedly failing to register for the draft.  Of 
these 50,000 men detained in the raid, the U.S. army immediately inducted 1,500 while 
15,000 “were referred to their draft boards.”42 
While the Bureau of Investigation hunted draft dodgers, a young J. Edgar Hoover 
joined the Justice Department.  Hoover spent the war compiling information on enemy 
aliens.43  In total, this registration process revealed that approximately 500,000 Germans 
and three to four million Austrian-Hungarians resided in the United States.  Only 6,000 
out of four and a half million resident aliens were incarcerated for posing a threat to the 
government of the United States.  A little over 1,500 people were arrested and prosecuted 
under the Espionage and Sedition Acts.44  In the end, the Wilson helped pass laws that 
ensured there would be no domestic dissention and no wavering of purpose.  Wilson 
committed the nation to war and, now, by law, those who opposed the war in word or 
deed could be fined, imprisoned, or deported.  As he predicted, Wilson willingly 
sacrificed liberty on the altar of national security.  Wilson believed once the national 
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crisis had passed the laws would be repealed.  The American president never meant these 
changes to American civil liberties to become permanent.  Unfortunately, Wilson’s 
executive order, due in part to bureaucratic inertia, was not rescinded until the early 
1920s and the Sedition Act just like its late eighteenth century counterpart was eventually 
allowed to expire but once again not until the early 1920s.45  The Espionage Act and the 
Trading with the Enemy Act, on the other hand, remain the bedrock of the national 
security state and the provisions of these two acts are still in existence today. 
With his eye firmly on how the war would transform America, Wilson, also, 
predicted how the war would end.  The peace would be dictated to the conquered.  This 
Wilson suggested would cause the process to fail “as an attempt to reconstruct a 
peacetime civilization with war standards” was not the way to ensure a lasting peace. 
Wilson understood that after four years of brutal warfare in the end “there will be no 
bystanders with sufficient power to influence the terms” of peace as the major powers 
would all need something tangible to justify the cost. 46  The victors’ need for revenge 
hampered the prospect of achieving a lasting peace.  It would take another six months 
before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended the war.  During those six 
months, the British continuously blockade the German coast, causing millions of German 
men, women, and children to starve, forcing the Germans to accept whatever dictated 
peace was presented at Versailles.47 
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By the winter of 1918, an optimistic Wilson traveled to Paris hoping to achieve 
“peace without victory” by convincing the victorious allies to impose his Fourteen Point 
plan for peace, which formed the basis of Germany’s willingness to sign the armistice.48  
The Germans sued for peace believing they would be treated fairly and according to 
Wilson’s plan but as Wilson predicted a militarist state of mind dominated the Paris 
Peace Conference of 1919.  
With the British, French, and Russians all deeply in debt, the U.S. economy 
emerged from the war as one of the strongest in the world, which should have allowed 
Wilson to negotiate from a position of strength—a new role for the United States. 
Traditionally, the United States found itself in the role of junior partner.  Wilson went to 
Paris to convince David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, to renegotiate the 
terms of the Monroe Doctrine.  Wilson wanted to establish a mutual defense pact with the 
British, which would have both nations acting as equal partners.  Wilson, also, wanted to 
ensure freedom of the seas, which would allow American businessmen to compete in the 
growing global market.  American’s participation in the League of Nations became the 
key, in Wilson’s mind, to a sustainable peace.49  The League of Nations would end all 
wars for all-time.  Looking back, it is easy to see Wilson’s naivety as being synonymous 
with America’s first tentative steps toward becoming a world power.  Wilson, an 
academic, sought to create a utopian paradise based on self-determination, free trade, and 
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a global organization where nations could resolve their differences in a peaceful manner 
ensuring that war never again consumed the world. 
The French and the British, also, wanted to guarantee the Great War would be the 
last global conflict.  George Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, and David Lloyd 
George, the British Prime Minister, believed that Germany should pay for starting World 
War I.  George Clemenceau wanted a militarily weak Germany since the German’s had 
invaded France twice in last half century.  David Lloyd George, the leader of a financial 
bankrupt nation, wanted to squeeze the German economy of every last mark to pay war 
reparation which would help England expand its overseas colonies while increasing the 
British global trading empire.  The Treaty of Versailles, the result of six months of 
diplomatic maneuvering, blamed the Germans for starting the war, stripped the Germans 
of their military, returned the coal rich German provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to the 
French, required the Germans to pay war reparations, and created the League of 
Nations.50  David Lloyd George summed up the six months of diplomatic haggling by 
stating that he believed he had done his best for England considering that he was seated 
between “Jesus Christ and Napoleon.”51 
Wilson’s dreams of the United States taking an active role in world affairs was 
shattered by the backlash over Wilson’s handling of not only the war but also the peace.  
The U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles dealing a blow to Wilson’s 
postwar plans.  It seems incredible that a nation that so ready to embraced Wilson’s war, 
so eager to subvert its constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties to suppress a possible 
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German infiltration, and so willing to send its sons off to war, would so quickly turn its 
back on the only rational part of the Paris Peace Conference—the League of Nations. 
By the winter of 1919, however, with no one controlling the media and keeping 
the American populace on message, the result of the Senate’s debate on the Treaty of 
Versailles was a forgone conclusion—a complete rejection of Wilson’s postwar dreams.  
The Creel Committee, Wilson’s wartime propaganda organization, though not officially 
abolished until August 1919, had stopped, shortly after the armistice was signed, to work 
domestically.  British political warfare operations in the Americas, also, stopped shortly 
after the signing of the armistice; so, those sections of the loyal opposition that had 
remained quiet during the war took their revenge during the peace—America turned 
inward.52 
America’s return to its unilateralist foreign policy objectives, which marked the 
end of the Great War, should have signaled the end of U.S. domestic intelligence 
operations but the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Investigation simply “shifted 
its attention from critics of the war to the activities of radical and anarchist groups.”53  
Since the rise of V.I. Lenin’s Soviet Russia, fear gripped the United States about a 
possible Bolshevik uprising in America.  During the war, Eugene V. Debs and the 
members of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), known as “Wobblies,” attracted 
the ire of the federal government.  The IWW not only wanted to create a classless society 
but also publicly declared its opposition to the war.  The Wilson administration viewed 
pacifism as treasonous and so on September 5, 1917, the federal government, using the 
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war as an excuse, raided IWW offices in twenty-four cities.54  Almost a week before the 
raid on IWW offices, law enforcement officials arrested Charles T. Schenck, a socialist 
antiwar pamphleteer, for violating the Espionage Act.  Ten months later, on June 30, 
1918, Eugene Debs was arrested and sentenced to ten years in prison for breaking the 
same law.  Both men held high-ranking positions within the Socialist Party of America 
and Debs was a founding member of the IWW. 
In January 1919, as the war in Europe ended, the U.S. Supreme Court, in two 
landmark cases, Debs v. United States and Schenck v. United States, determined the 
Espionage Act did not violate the First Amendment right to free speech.  Chief Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., described the difference between constitutionally protect and 
unprotected speech: 
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in 
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and 
degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in 
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance 
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could 
regard them as protected by any constitutional right.55 
 
Based on Holmes’ precedent setting decision in the Schenck case, the nation’s highest 
court ruled against Eugene Debs.56  Judicial review failed.  Members of the Supreme 
Court provided the key component of the American national security state—the clear and 
present danger clause.  This ruling allowed the executive branch, during times of 
heightened security, to limit the populace’s civil liberties by citing the needs of the many 
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over the needs of the few.  A philosophical point understood all too clearly by Niccolo 
Machiavelli, a fifteenth century Italian philosopher, who realized that politics was 
amoral.  Explaining, for the first time, the raison d’état was to ensure the state survived.  
Machiavelli reiterated an ancient principle of governing—“the end excuses any evil.”57  
All men are amoral, selfish, cowardly, dishonest, and violent; the only way to control the 
masses was through coercion, deception and fear—with fear being a primary motivator of 
men and a key component to the rise of the American national security state. 
American policy makers, vacillating between American exceptionalism and 
Machiavelli’s realist view of both the state and man, faced their first real test of a wide 
scale coordinated terrorist attack during the spring and summer of 1919, which marked 
the beginning of the First Red Scare (1919-1920).  While the victors argued over the 
nature of a dictated peace with the defeated Central Powers, the Reds, a pejorative term 
used to describe anarchist, socialist, and communist sympathizers, carried out two daring 
bombings.  A series of brown paper wrapped packages mailed from West Manhattan to 
government officials all across the country contained explosives.  The attack, allegedly 
carried out by followers of Luigi Galleani, an anarchist with communist leanings, 
coincided with the May Day celebrations.58  Between April 22 and April 26, Galleanists 
mailed thirty-six packages—only six reached their destination.  Postal workers, alerted to 
the danger, seized the rest of the packages before they could be delivered. Each parcel 
contained a small bomb set to explode on opening.  This terrorist attack only wounded 
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two people, the wife of the former Georgian Senator, Thomas J. Hardwick, and their 
housekeeper.59 
The second attack occurred on June 2, 1919.  Once again several parcels, this time 
containing twenty pounds of explosives and metal shrapnel, simultaneously exploded in 
eight American cities.60  The U.S. Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer, heard a thump 
against his front door followed by a large explosion.  The Galleanists bomber, Carlo 
Valdinoci, died in the blast.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
who lived across the street, rushed out to make sure that his neighbors uninjured.  A 
corpse and fifty copies of Plain Words, an anarchist pamphlet, provided the only clues to 
whom orchestrated these attacks.  The pressure on Palmer and members of the 
Department of Justice to identify and capture these terrorist bombers led to further abuses 
of American civil liberties.  Palmer, exploiting American feelings of fear and anxiety, 
used the threat of further terrorist attacks to reorganize the Department of Justice.  The 
attorney general removed any appointees, mainly made by his predecessor John Lord 
O’Brian, that he viewed as being ill suited (too liberal), to conduct the types of operations 
Palmer viewed as necessary to bring these men to justice.  The attorney general appointed 
Francis P. Garvan, former New York district attorney, to be the assistant attorney general 
tasked with investigating and prosecuting these radicals;  Palmer, also, hired William J. 
Flynn, the former head of the Secret Service, to run the BOI. 61  
Using the fear of subversive activity, Palmer asked members of Congress to 
increase his yearly appropriations to help combat this new threat.  When members of 
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Congress balked at his fiscal demands, he told these senators that he believed these 
bombings comprised a vast conspiracy to overthrow the United States government and 
that he believed, based on information he had received, the next major attack on the 
United States would coincide with the nation’s 4th of July celebrations.  The Department 
of Justice received its increase in funding; most of this money went to form a new 
Department of Justice Intelligence Division headed by J. Edgar Hoover.62 
On August 1, 1919, Palmer officially established the General Intelligence 
Division (GID).  Hoover, who gathered information on enemy aliens during World War I, 
set up a similar collection operation while managing the GID.63  The former librarian 
began, once again, to catalog people.  Using index cards, Hoover compiled a complex 
reference system listing information on every radical leader, leftist organization, and 
subversive publication but the bombings remained unsolved. 64  The public pressure 
brought to bear on Palmer to solve these bombings cannot be overstated.  The attorney 
general decided the Bill of Rights was expendable. 65 
The attorney general convinced William B. Wilson, the Secretary of Labor, to 
allow the BOI to act under the Immigration Act of 1918, which allowed the Department 
of Labor to arrest and deport those  
Aliens who are anarchist; aliens who believe in or advocated the overthrow 
by force or violence of the Government of the United States or all forms of 
laws; aliens who disbelieve in or are opposed to all organized government; 
aliens who advocate or teach the assassination of public officials; aliens who 
advocate or teach the unlawful destruction of property; aliens who are 
members of or affiliated with any organization that entertains a belief in, 
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teaches, or advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the Government 
of the United States or of all forms of law, or that entertains or teaches [the 
same].66 
 
Based on the laws of the Immigration Act of 1918 allowing for alien deportation, Palmer, 
Garvan, and Hoover began planning multicity raids to detain and deport suspected 
radicals.  The Supreme Court, in 1893, determined that due process did not apply to 
deportation cases since deportation was not a punishment but an administrative process 
resulting in the return of illegal immigrants to their own countries.67 
On the second anniversary of the Russian Revolution, November 7, 1919, BOI 
agents, working with local law enforcement, conducted raids in twelve American cities.  
In preparation for these raids, the BOI ran warrantless wiretaps while Hoover worked to 
suppress Rule 22 of the Immigration Act of 1918, which allowed detained aliens access 
to legal counsel.  Hoover explained that allowing immigrants arrested for seditious 
behavior access to legal counsel “defeats the ends of justice.”  The purpose of these raids 
was to suppress radicalism that it made very little sense to allow those out on bail to 
continue spreading their antisocial propaganda.68  The violent raids resulted in mass 
roundups and deportation of suspected leftists (to include Luigi Galleani) many of which, 
because of Hoover’s efforts, were denied access to a lawyer.69 
On December 21, 1919, the Department of Labor deported 249 subversives to 
include Emma Goldman—the infamous anarchist philosopher.  A “cordon of soldiers” 
prevented anyone from approaching the U.S.S. Buford’s pier located on Ellis Island and 
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an armed detachment of marines were added to the ship’s crew to act as guards for these 
involuntary passengers who would be mostly confined to their quarters during the 
transatlantic voyage.  The passengers, arrested during the November raids, came from all 
over the United States to include “33 from Pittsburgh, 36 from Cleveland, 26 from 
Youngstown, Ohio, 10 from Baltimore…and forty-three Reds convicted in New 
England.”  Without incident, the Buford, dubbed the “Soviet Ark” by the American press, 
quietly headed for Russia.70 
On January 2, 1920, the attorney general ordered the largest of the so-called 
“Palmer Raids.”  BOI and Immigration agents, working in thirty-three cities, rounded up 
nearly 10,000 alleged subversives affiliated with communist and socialist organizations.  
Unfortunately, many of those arrested and detained in these raids were ordinary 
American citizens who had no ties to these “radical” organizations.  “Indiscriminate 
arrests of the innocent with the guilty, unlawful seizures by federal detectives, 
intimidating preliminary interrogations of aliens held incommunicado, highhanded 
levying of excessive bail and denial of counsel” comprise the usual litany of abuses 
perpetrated by members of the BOI during this multicity raid. 71 
Eminent lawyers and legal scholars, in the months following these federal raids, 
denounced the Department of Justice’s violation of the Bill of Rights.  These lawyers 
reported, 
We do not question the right of the Department of Justice to use its agents 
in the Bureau of Investigation ascertain when the law is being violated.  But 
the American people have never tolerated the use of undercover provocative 
agents or “agents provocateurs” such as have been familiar in Old Russian 
or Spain.  Such agents have been introduced by the Department of Justice 
into radical movements, have reached positions of influence therein, have 
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occupied themselves with informing upon or instigating acts which might 
be declared criminal, and at the express direction of Washington have 
brought about meetings of radicals in order to make possible wholesale 
arrests at such meetings.72 
  
Hoover reacted, to this report’s findings, by searching his vast files on American 
subversives to see if anyone of the GID’s critics had radical inclinations.  Otherwise the 
head of the GID ignored the complaints—a decision that would come back to haunt the 
Department of Justice.73 
On May 1, 1920, Attorney General Palmer stated that according to information 
gained by Hoover’s GID agents the Red’s planned to assassinate federal and state 
officials to coincide with their radical May Day demonstrations.  Palmer claimed to have 
the list of those marked for death.  He issued a warning to those named, supplied 
protection for these men and their families, and he assured the public that these measure 
would be effective against any would be assassins.  The memory of the bombings of 1919 
further stirred up public hysteria about terrorists living in the United States even as May 
Day passed without incident.74  These hysteric xenophobic days resulted in the arrest of 
Ferdinando Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti.  Two anarchists held for allegedly 
murdering two men during a daylight robbery in the small suburban town of Braintree, 
Massachusetts.  The evidence linking the two men to the murders was mostly 
circumstantial but the evidence linking them to the Galleanists was a bit more 
substantial.75  The trial, with its sensational racial implications and its shameful abuse of 
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American civil liberties, divided a nation but the trial would not even start for another 
three years.  Yet, a mere five days after the arrest of Sacco and Vanzetti, on September 
16, 1920, a bomb exploded in the heart of New York’s financial district killing thirty-
eight people and wounding hundreds.  Someone parked a horse drawn wagon, containing 
100 pounds of dynamite and 500 pounds of cast iron sash weights, across the street from 
the J.P. Morgan Bank located at 23 Wall Street.  The bomb, timed to detonate during the 
noontime lunch rush, caused more than two million dollars in damage making it the 
deadliest terrorist attack on American soil.76  
A mailman working at New York City’s Broadway and Cedar Streets found an 
unwrapped package containing a few handmade fliers stating “Remember, we will not 
tolerate any longer.  Free the political prisoners or it will be sure death for you.”  Shortly 
after picking up the fliers, the mailman heard the loud explosion from Wall Street and ran 
to investigate.  He gave the fliers to his supervisor who passed them along until they 
eventually reach William Flynn.  Similar to earlier bombings, the only clue left behind 
was subversive literature and contrary to public assurances, the crime remained 
unsolved.77 
Race, political ideology, and social standing all played a role in the Palmer raids 
and in the arrest, conviction, and execution of Sacco and Vanzetti, whose trial became 
intertwined with the deadly Wall Street bombings.  Palmer, a U.S. attorney general, who 
dreamed of one-day becoming president of the United States, tried to justify his actions, 
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after the fact, as he explained, “like a prairie-fire, the blaze of revolution was sweeping 
over every American institution of law and order.”  Palmer believed anarchy, socialism, 
and communist ideology “was eating its way into the homes of the American workman, 
its sharp tongues of revolutionary heat were licking the alters of churches, leaping into 
the belfry of the school bell, crawling into the sacred corners of American homes, seeking 
to replace marriage vows with libertine laws, burning up the foundation of society.”  The 
American government had to act even if it meant violating the civil liberties of a few 
radicals.  America had to be protected as communism was “the creed of the criminal 
mind” and the “American Government must prevent crime.”  The political backlash over 
the Department of Justice’s violation of American civil liberties during the First Red 
Scare led to Palmer’s removal from office.78 
As Palmer left office, a new presidential administration entered the White House.  
Harding ushered in a period of lawlessness as bootlegged whiskey and bathtub gin 
flowed through the hidden byways of America’s underground nightclubs where flappers 
danced and mobsters built their empires.  Prohibition brought with it corruption, scandal, 
and violence.  President Warren Harding’s administration represented the corruption of a 
nation as the president appointed friends and benefactors to public office.  Harding’s 
scandalous administration came to an abrupt end as the twenty-ninth president of the 
United States suddenly collapsed and died.79 
Calvin Coolidge, Harding’s vice president, became the thirtieth President of the 
United States.  President Coolidge tried to restore faith in the White House by removing 
Harding’s political cronies.  This political reorganization led to the appointment of a 
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former Columbia Law School Dean, Harlan Fiske Stone, who Coolidge ordered to clean 
up a “scandal ridden Department of Justice.”  Stone, believing the BOI engaged in 
“maintaining many activities which were without any authority in federal statutes” and 
engaged in “many practices which were brutal and tyrannical in the extreme,” 
immediately asked for William J. Burn’s resignation as Director of the Bureau of 
Investigation.  The attorney general ordered a thorough review of the BOI personnel files 
removing the “incompetent and unreliable.”  Stone then turned his attention to the BOI’s 
domestic intelligence operations investigating the legality of the Palmer Raids while 
examining the alleged political surveillance of U.S. senators viewed as potential threats to 
the American way of life. 80  BOI agents collected information of Senator William E. 
Borah (D-ID), the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Thomas J. Walsh (D- 
MT) who helped expose the Teapot Dome Scandal, and Burton Wheeler (D-MT) who the 
former attorney general, Harry Daugherty, viewed as “the communist leader in the 
Senate.”81 
By May 9, 1924, Harlan Fiske Stone stopped the BOI’s domestic intelligence 
activities.  He stated: 
There is always the possibility that a secret police may become a menace to 
free government and free institutions, because it carries with it the 
possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended 
or understood. … It is important that its activities be strictly limited to the 
performance of those functions for which it was created and that its agents 
themselves be not above the law or beyond its reach. … The Bureau of 
Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of 
individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct and then only with such 
conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. When a police 
system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the proper 
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administration of justice and to human liberty, which it should be our first 
concern to cherish.82 
 
Stone sent for J. Edgar Hoover.  When Hoover arrived at his office, the attorney general 
explained the Bureau was no longer an instrument of domestic intelligence; thus ending, 
the BOI’s infiltration of radical groups, political espionage, and strikebreaking.  The BOI 
would confine itself to investigating federal crimes.  Hoover agreed with Stone, who 
made him the “acting” Director of the Bureau of Investigation which seemingly ended 
the Bureau’s domestic intelligence operations for the next decade.83 
 Hoover, ever the politician, realized the General Intelligence Division’s secret 
files provided his agency with the political protection to survive the vulgarities of 
American politics; so, Hoover while disbanding the GID decided to set up a new record 
keeping system.  The BOI director ordered his agents to file those politically sensitive 
documents in the “Official and Confidential” files, which allowed Hoover, for the next 
five decades, to maintain control of his personal cache of secrets.84 
Stone’s reforms, which Hoover chose to ignore, only applied to the Department of 
Justice.  Military intelligence and local law enforcement still collected information on 
alleged internal subversive activities as well as working to stop external threats.  It 
seemed as if Hoover was playing a dangerous game but nine months after Stone began 
his reform of the Justice Department, the former attorney general became a U.S. Supreme 
Court judge, where he eventually became chief justice, and Hoover continued to shape 
U.S. domestic intelligence for the next fifty years.85 
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Herbert O. Yardley, a World War I cryptanalyst working for the U.S. Military 
Intelligence Division’s MI-8 (the U.S. Army’s cryptographic section), spent the last year 
of the Great War studying British cryptography before joining the  American delegation 
at the Paris Peace Conference.86  On returning to the United States, the State Department 
commissioned Yardley to set up America’s first peacetime code breaking division known 
as the American Black Chamber.  Yardley’s civilian cryptographic section moved into a 
four-story brownstone located at 141 East 37th Street, New York City.  Tasked with 
reading secret foreign diplomatic codes and ciphers by using any means available, the 
State Department warned Yardley that if he were caught, “it would be just too bad!”  
Over the next ten years, the American Black Chamber solved “over forty-five thousand 
cryptograms” breaking the codes of “Argentine, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa  Rica, Cuba, 
England, France, Germany, Japan, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, San 
Salvador, Santo Domingo, the Soviet Union and Spain.”87 
The ability to read Japanese naval and diplomatic codes proved useful as Japanese 
commercial ambitions threatened American economic dominance in the region.  These 
cryptanalysts provided U.S. delegates, attending the Washington Naval Conference, with 
secret information.  U.S. envoys used this knowledge to negotiate with the Japanese.  
Imperial Japan had the third largest navy in the world and they wanted to expand it.  The 
British and Americas wanted to limit Japanese naval construction by allowing the 
Japanese to build eighteen battleships to the Western powers thirty ships.  This agreement 
prevented a naval arms race.  The Washington Naval Conference marked the height of 
the American Black Chamber’s postwar success.  On October 31, 1929, the U.S. 
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government disbanded the American Black Chamber because Henry L. Stimson, 
Secretary of State, believed that “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.”88 
As the federal government curtailed its intelligence operations, private 
intelligence organizations became popular.  Vincent Astor’s secret society known as the 
Room became the most extensive of these.  By 1927, Astor, a multimillionaire, 
philanthropist and friend of Franklin D. Roosevelt, set up a gentlemen’s intelligence 
network composed of like-minded businessmen, who met monthly for dinner and 
conversation at an ordinary apartment building, located in New York City at 34 East 62nd 
Street. These monthly meetings brought together an eclectic group of men who regaled 
their companions with stories of their travels.  While sensationalistic news stories could 
obscure the truth, these travelers met to discuss their personal observations of the world.  
This allowed those present to make business decisions based on firsthand accounts.  
Occasionally, the Room would invite guest speakers, such as Commander Richard E. 
Byrd (polar explorer) and Somerset Maugham (British author and former World War I 
intelligence officer), to talk about a particular topic. 89 
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By 1933, Astor began to send information gathered directly to FDR, the newly 
elected president of the United States.  The information gained by Astor’s adventure 
seeking dilettantes held little strategic value; however, it did provide FDR with a private 
intelligence organization.  The bounds of collective security unraveled as totalitarian 
nations ignored the fundamental rules of the League of Nations.  Imperial ambitions to 
hold as these totalitarian nations carved out empires at the expense of their weaker 
neighbors.  Luckily, FDR relied on the Room to obtain information about the world at 
large. 
 On September 19, 1931, the world watched as the League failed to stop the 
Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) from invading Manchuria, ousting the Chinese, and setting 
up a puppet régime known as Manchukuo.  The League ordered the Japanese to leave 
Manchuria; the Japanese, however, chose to stay and answered the League’s request by 
simply deciding to renounce their membership. 90  In 1935, Benito Mussolini, the Italian 
dictator, defied the League of Nations by invading Abyssinia (Ethiopia).  League 
members refused to provide arms, oil, or rubber to the Italian army but Mussolini ignored 
the League’s call to stop resulting in the fascist dictator’s army conquering Haile 
Selassie’s North African nation. 
Emperor Selassie, like the Chinese, appealed to the League of Nations but his 
pleas, like the Chinese, went unanswered.  In a memorandum from C. Van H. Engert, 
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U.S. Resident in Ethiopia, to Cordell Hull, the U.S. Secretary of State, detailing the 
European Powers desire to avoid war by avoiding a direct confrontation with Benito 
Mussolini, the Fascist Italian dictator whose army invaded Ethiopia.  C. Van H. Engert’s 
memorandum spelled out the political realities.  The Europeans refused to force 
Mussolini to adhere to the League’s Charter.  While willing to pass economic sanctions, 
the League members refused to resort to force to impede Mussolini’s invasion of 
Ethiopia.91 
On June 10, 1936, Neville Chamberlain, realizing the idea of collective security 
perished in the Abyssinia desert sands, gave a eulogistic speech to members of the 1900 
Club stating that “the policy of collective security seemed… an attractive alternative to 
the old system of alliances” but like the old balance of power system, which led to World 
War I, the idea of collective security, as symbolized by the League of Nations, was 
beyond the power of the League to guarantee.  It was time for the League’s member 
states to acknowledge that the League “could no longer be relied upon by itself to secure 
the peace of the world” because nations could not be relied upon to threaten war unless 
their interests were at stake. 92 
By 1937, the Roosevelt administration began to reevaluate the U.S. position in 
Asia.  The Japanese, no longer content to consolidate their position in Manchuria, 
invaded China.  IJA soldiers simultaneously attacked Beijing and Shanghai.  After four 
months brutal fighting, the Japanese began to advance southward toward Nanking which 
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led to the Japanese sinking of the USS Panay, an American naval gunboat operating 
along the Yangtze River just north of the city. 93  The news coverage of the “rape of 
Nanking” coupled with a Japanese soldier’s decision to slap a U.S. diplomat during the 
Japanese assault further aggravated tensions between the United States and Japan. 94  As 
U.S. policy makers began to reassess their strategic Asian goals, Vincent Astor decided to 
take a more active role in intelligence collection.  The multimillionaire, ever the avid 
yachtsman, and Kermit Roosevelt, ever the adventurer, decided to sail Astor’s yacht, the 
Nourmahal, into the Pacific to see if the Japanese were fortifying those islands gained at 
the end of the Great War.  Japanese threats of violence prevented Astor from exploring 
these Japanese held Pacific Islands but he meet some British intelligence officers working 
in the area.  These men provided the amateur spy with the best information available to 
the SIS on Japanese activity in the region. 95 
Threats of violence impeded Astor’s Pacific expedition but his failure to secure 
firsthand information did not deter him, once he returned to New York, he resolved to 
take a more analytical approach to gaining information.  Astor and his organization, now 
code-named the Club, began collecting economic data from New York’s leading banks.  
They traced the money used by foreign powers to finance espionage activities in the 
United States.  Astor realized that "Espionage and Sabotage need money, and that 
[money] has to pass through the banks at one stage or another.”  The multimillionaire 
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used his contacts in the banking community to pressure American banks to, when asked, 
volunteer information about those clients who might pose a threat to the United States.96 
Astor’s banking connections, at Chase National Bank, provided incriminating 
evidence the Amtorg Trading Corporation, the first Soviet Trade Mission to the United 
States, located in New York City, which provided cover for Soviet intelligence working 
in the United States.  The Club, however, failed to unearth any financial evidence 
regarding German or Japanese intelligence agents working in New York.  Even though 
the information obtained by the Club failed to expose financial support for German or 
Japanese agents, these contacts did prove useful.  Shortly after Astor set up this informal 
relationship between the Club and Chase National Bank, the Imperial Japanese 
ambassador asked Winthrop Aldrich, the Chairman of the Board of New York City’s 
Chase National Bank, to send a delegation to Japan.  The Japanese ambassador wanted 
this delegation to show the Japanese how Chase conducted business.  Astor suggested 
inserting U.S. intelligence agents into this group to gain information on Imperial Japan.97 
Fear of domestic subversion, a sentiment exploited by the British during the Great 
War, provided the federal government with a wartime pretext to subvert the U.S. 
Constitution.  The domestic prosperity brought about by the U.S. participation in World 
War I lessened class dissatisfaction and reduced American fear of subversion.  This 
changed with the October 29, 1929 stock market crash.  The onset of the Great 
Depression further compelled the United States to turn inward as the global depression 
destroyed the first global economy.  During the depression, the Communist Party USA, 
established in 1919, found public dissatisfaction a fertile environment for recruiting new 
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members.  The CPUSA expanded during this period of economic hardship by launching a 
grassroots movement among the nation’s economically oppressed masses. 
President Herbert Hoover believed anti-immigration legislation—such as the 
Alien and Sedition Acts (1798), the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), and the Alien 
Deportation Act (1918), and the Immigration Act of 1924—would reduce the plight of 
the average citizen.  Hoover signed the Mexican Repatriation Act (1929) based on his 
belief that it would save American jobs.98  Repatriation, unlike deportation, implied a 
voluntary decision to return to Mexico; but during the Great Depression, fear, 
intimidation and forced roundups compelled roughly 500,000 people to return to 
Mexico.99  Hoover followed his anti-immigration legislation by signing into law the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (1930), by raising tariffs on foreign goods, which resulted in 
U.S. trading partners passing retaliatory tariffs.100 
These legislative measures failed to provide relief to a struggling nation.  By the 
summer of 1932, World War I veterans and their families began demonstrating for 
financial relief in the form of Congressional bonus payments for their service.  According 
to the Adjusted Service Certificates they were given, this bonus was to be paid out in 
1945 but these men and their families were starving in 1932.  These veterans, calling 
themselves the Bonus Expeditionary Force, peacefully assembled in an area known as the 
Anacostia Flats.  More and more protesters joined their ranks causing some to camp in 
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vacant buildings in downtown Washington D.C.  The Bonus marchers, as they became 
known, awaited a congressional solution to their request. 
On July 28, 1932, the Attorney General William D. Mitchell decided to act; he 
ordered the police to remove these veterans and their families, which resulted in the death 
of two protesters.101  After these deaths, President Hoover ordered General Douglas 
MacArthur, the Army Chief of Staff, to end the protest.  Hoover’s decision to suppress 
the Bonus Army coincided with an increase in military intelligence investigations into 
domestic subversive.  General MacArthur ordered military commanders to report any 
treasonous activity.  When these World War I veterans and their families marched to 
Washington to lobby for relief, military intelligence agents exaggerated the communist 
influence on these “insurrectionists.”  These intelligence reports “contributed to the 
decision to use troops in a mass assault to clear the demonstrators out of Washington.”   
Hoover’s decision to use the army and not local law enforcement to subdue these 
demonstrators marked the first time since the Civil War that a U.S. president ordered the 
army to attack its citizens.  The suppression of the Bonus Army exemplifies one of the 
worst abuses of executive power in American history.  Although MacArthur exceeded 
Hoover’s instructions, the press portrayed Hoover as a villain who was insensitive to the 
plight of the downtrodden, which cost the president the 1932 election.  Despite the bad 
publicity surrounding the Bonus March incident, the military commanders involved 
suffered no real repercussions for their actions and military intelligence continued to 
gather information on suspected civilian subversive organizations.102 
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt won the 1932 election.  Faced with his nation’s 
greatest economic catastrophe, FDR decided that only a massive restructuring of the 
American economy would not only shorten the crisis but would also prevent another 
financial collapse.  The 1932 election gave the Democratic Party control of the White 
House as well as control of both houses of Congress.  The newly elected president, in his 
first one hundred days in office, helped push through Congress an unprecedented number 
of social welfare legislation designed to lessen the financial burden placed on the 
populace by the Great Depression.103 
Even as FDR worked to lessen these financial burdens, the Soviet Union (USSR) 
made great strides in joining the global community.  In 1933, the United States 
established diplomatic relations with the Stalinist regime; and in 1934, the Soviet Union 
joined the League of Nations.  Joseph Stalin’s reach extended to the American 
Communist Party (CPUSA).  The KGB and the GRU began recruiting members of the 
American Communist Party to work as Soviet agents.  Earl Browder, the CPUSA 
General Secretary, recruited secret communist sympathizers to work for the Soviet 
Union. 104  Browder targeted those fellow travelers who had placement and access to 
sensitive information for recruitment.  Through Browder’s efforts, the Ware group and 
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the Perlo group, the two largest wartime Soviet spy rings, began working in the mid-
1930s.105 
Even though, Astor uncovered economic evidence to suggest the Soviet Union 
engaged in offensive intelligence operations in the United States, the Roosevelt 
administration ignored these warnings.  Roosevelt and members of Congress decided to 
concentrate on alleged Nazi and British propaganda efforts and even then, the Roosevelt 
administration failed to look into the possibility that foreign agents might be working on 
American soil.  Roosevelt expanded the power of the executive branch by transforming 
the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Investigation into the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).  J. Edgar Hoover remained director of the newly named agency.106  
The FBI followed Harlan Stone’s bureaucratic reforms and, at least publicly, refrained 
from conducting domestic intelligence operations as U.S. isolationist feelings took root. 
During the interwar years, while America turned inward, congressional and 
presidential influence curtailed domestic intelligence operations, which partially 
dismantled the infrastructure of the national security state erected by Wilson during the 
First World War.  The British, on the other hand, facing Bolshevik intrigues expanded 
their intelligence organizations.  In 1919, Lord George Curzon, the head of the British 
government’s Secret Service Committee, recommended combing the army’s MI1B and 
the Admiralty’s NID25 to form a unified peacetime code breaking organization known as 
Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS).  SIS and GC&CS both briefly worked 
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out of the SIS headquarters located in the Broadway Building near St. James Park where 
British cryptanalysis provided decrypted foreign diplomatic and military messages to 
Whitehall.107 
Similar to the British fear of a possible Germanic invasion, the British, by the 
mid-1920s, feared a possible Bolshevik uprising and so they extended both their foreign 
and domestic intelligence organizations.  The fear of Communist activities helped the 
British establish the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS).  The British 
understood the important role that SIGINT played in the Great War and they believed 
SIGINT could provide the informational intelligence needed to counter these Bolshevik 
intrigues. 108  By 1927, GC&CS only deciphered high-level Soviet traffic concerning 
Bolshevik operations throughout the empire.  Because the British intelligence community 
believed the Bolsheviks posed the only real threat to the empire, the British failed to 
notice the growing German or Japanese menace.  GC&CS cryptanalysts placed a low 
priority on intercepting, decrypting, and analyzing German, Italian, and Japanese signals 
traffic.  This was an unfortunate.  Just as these totalitarian nations began to develop their 
own sophisticated signals intelligence apparatus, policymakers and intelligence 
professionals chose to ignore Cuneo’s dictum that everyone spies on everyone else.109 
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By 1926, British, American, and French cryptanalysts began to encounter German 
message traffic encrypted using the newly acquired enigma machine.  Since the Treaty of 
Versailles hindered the Weimar Republic’s remilitarization, the allied cryptanalysts, 
believing Germany to be harmless, quickly gave up trying to crack the new German 
codes.  While the British and the French worried about Bolshevik intrigues, the Poles, 
trapped between Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, looked to their southern border with 
Germany and apprehensively watched Hitler bluff his way toward more and more 
territorial gains.  These Polish politicians, unlike most European leaders, took the time to 
read Adolph Hitler’s Mien Kopf and understood, all too well, that Hitler’s desire for 
lebensraum, or living space, meant the end of the Polish state.  It should come as no 
surprise the Poles, motivated by the fear of Germanic invasion, were the first to crack the 
secrets of enigma—the commercial “off the shelf” solution to Germany’s cryptographic 
needs. 110 
In 1932, Gustav Bertrand, a French Military Intelligence officer, bought secret 
documents about enigma from Hans-Thilo Schmidt, an employee of Chiffrierstelle (the 
Cipher Office), the headquarters for German cryptography.111  By 1933, Bertrand passed 
these documents along to the Polish Cipher Bureau where Marian Rejewski, a Polish 
mathematician, and his colleagues—Henryk Zygalski and Jerzy—struggled to solve the 
riddle of enigma.112  These documents allowed Rejewski to build his own version of 
enigma.  Within a year, the young mathematician, using a cyclometer, compiled a catalog 
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of all the possible permutations.  Rejewski’s work allowed the Polish Cipher Bureau to 
intercept a message then check the catalog to discover the daily key.  The daily key 
allowed the Poles to read the German’s most classified message traffic. The Poles proved 
that hard work coupled with intellectual ingenuity that, in cryptanalysis, nothing 
remained secret for long. 113 
By December 1938, the Germans added two more rotors to the enigma machine, 
which reduced the Poles ability to read German signal traffic.  The Poles realized the 
German’s combined arms approach to war relied heavily on secure communication 
between the battlefield commander and his subordinates.  The Polish Cipher Bureau’s 
ability to read German military communication provided the only hope the Poles had of 
stopping a German invasion and as fate would have it, just as Hitler began to set his 
sights on Poland German message traffic went partially dark.114 
On July 26 and 27, 1939, Alistair Denniston, the head of GC&CS, Dilly Knox, a 
senior cryptanalyst with GC&CS, Commander Humphrey Sandwith, the head of the 
Admiralty’s signals and direction finding unit, and Gustav Bertrand, the French 
Intelligence Officer who originally passed the enigma documents on to the Poles, met 
with Polish cryptographers.  These men traveled to a newly built but heavily guarded 
facility located in a clearing about 12 miles south of Warsaw. 115  The Polish 
cryptographers, some of whom spoke some French or German, met with the British.  The 
technical nature of cryptography coupled with the Polish cryptographers’ inability to 
speak English, French or even German and the British and French inability to converse in 
                                                 
  113 Singh, 138-139. 
  114 Ibid., 148. 
  115 A portion of Denniston’s diary is quoted in Ralph Erskine, "The Poles Reveal their Secrets: Alastair 
Denniston's Account of the July 1939 Meeting at Pyry," Cryptologia, (December 2006): 294–305. 
 135 
 
Polish placed an undue amount of stress on those present.  After the meeting and once the 
British cryptographers were driving away, Dilly, who had spent the last few years trying 
to crack enigma, began to curse and mutter that the Poles must have “pinched” it.  Knox 
doubted their mathematical accomplishments.116 
After the members of GC&CS returned to England, they immediately moved into 
their new headquarters located at Bletchley Park where they strove to improve on the 
Polish cryptologic effort.117  A mere two months before Germany invaded Poland and the 
British and the French declared war on the Third Reich, by happenstance to be sure, 
members of GC&CS secured a rudimentary understanding of enigma.  Winston 
Churchill, through no effort on his part, had access to a sophisticated signals intelligence 
apparatus and a secret window into German military and diplomatic plans.   
Fear of domestic subversion, a sentiment exploited by the British during the Great 
War, lay at the heart of the federal government’s subverting of the U.S. Constitution but 
ironically, just as the First Red Scare ended, the Germans, in desperate need of military 
hardware and technology to help them secretly remilitarize, began to once again 
clandestinely work on American soil.  William Lonkowski, a German Abwehr agent 
know as agent “Sex,” recruited and built one of the most successful spy rings to work on 
American soil during the interwar period. Operation Sex, as the Abwehr referred to 
Lonkowski’s intelligence apparatus, infiltrated the Ireland Aircraft Corporation, the 
Sikorsky plant in Farmingdale, Long Island and the Curtiss Aircraft plant in Buffalo, 
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New York.  Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Lonkowski spy ring 
committed industrial espionage on a grand scale but with a change in leadership in the 
Weimar Republic, the spy ring went into hibernation as Germany severed its ties with 
Lonkowski.118 
By the mid-1930s, the reactivated Lonkowski spy ring merged with Ignatz 
Griebl’s.  Griebl, by 1934, contacted German intelligence and offered his services.  The 
German-American doctor’s main contact was with Paul Kraus, the Gestapo agent in 
charge of smuggling intelligence from America to Germany.  Kraus used the North 
German Lloyd and the Hamburg shipping lines to move information from America to 
Germany.  These shipping companies became the main method for transporting 
information obtained by the Lonkowski spy ring to Berlin.119  On September 25, 1935, a 
curious security guard stopped and questioned Lonkowski as he tried to board the 
Europa, a ship bound for Germany.  The guard wanted to see Lonkowski’s violin.  Asked 
to open the case, the security guard found the documents Lonkowski was trying to 
smuggle out of the country.  The guard questioned the German spy but let him go.  The 
guard told him that he would have to come in for further questioning.  Lonkowski went 
home, packed his bags, grabbed his wife and fled the country.120 
Without further investigation into this German spy ring, the German Abwehr 
continued procuring an astonishing amount of information on the U.S. aircraft industry.  
The specifications for every plane built at the Farmingdale Sikorsky plant, the blueprints 
for U.S. Navy’s new carrier based scout bomber, the designs for a new Boeing built 
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bomber, the acquisition of classified maps of the United States, plus a classified report on 
the U.S. Army Air Corps tactical air exercises conducted at Long Island’s Mitchell Field 
fell into the German’s hands.  The success of German espionage in the United States was 
so great that member of the Abwehr began to boast, “The United States cannot plan a 
warship, design an airplane, develop a new device” without those secrets being passed to 
a member of German intelligence.121 
While German intelligence infiltrated American munitions factories, the effects of 
the Great Depression compelled many Americans, suffering severe economic hardship, to 
search for reasons behind their plight, which gave rise to the growing isolationist 
sentiments that hindered the nation’s economic recovery.  In April 1934, as the Germans 
reactivated the Lonkowski spy ring, the Special Committee on Investigation of the 
Munitions Industry, more commonly referred to as the Nye Committee named after the 
committee Chairman Gerald Nye (R-ND), began investigating the relationship between 
U.S. arms manufactures and the eventual U.S. involvement in World War I.122 
The committee’s findings into what Dwight Eisenhower would later term the 
military-industrial complex were inconclusive but suggested the United States entered the 
war in Europe not to keep the world safe for democracy but to ensure the British and the 
French did not default on their wartime loans.  Because of the economic blockade of 
Germany, American munitions manufactures could not sell their wares to the Central 
Powers so American industrial might churned out weapons of war that were sold to both 
the British and the French leading many Americans to believe that the war was fought to 
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protect the bankers and the manufacturers—a fact the Nye Committee could never quite 
prove but a perception of the U.S. entry into the war that never really gone away. 123 
While the Nye Committee looked into the economic reasons for U.S. entry into 
the First World War, the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, chaired by John 
W. McCormack (D-MA) and Samuel Dickstein (D-NY) known as the McCormack-
Dickstein Committee, examined the effect of Nazi propaganda on the American public.  
The McCormack-Dickstein Committee exaggerated the threat from pro-fascist groups 
working in the United States by stating that German agents were waiting to overthrow the 
U.S. government.124  By the summer of 1938, political infighting caused the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) to reorganize the special investigation 
committee, now chaired by Martin Dies, Jr. (D-TX).  Dies, referred to in the U.S. press as 
der Fuhrer, wanted to expose British propaganda efforts in the United States; so, he 
ordered his committee to study all foreign propaganda efforts.  The Dies Committee 
failed to find any evidence of British wrongdoing.125 
Congress responded to the Nye Committee findings by passing a series of 
Neutrality Acts (1935-1939) mandating a strict policy of nonintervention with all 
belligerent nations.  In June 1938, in response to the Dies Committee findings, Congress 
passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which required all foreign agents to 
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register with the State Department.126  While the legislative branch worked to ensure that 
the United States would never again become embroiled in a foreign war, the executive 
branch revived the FBI’s domestic intelligence activities as President Roosevelt 
established the “basic domestic intelligence structure and policies for the federal 
government.”  Attorney General Homer Cummings and Hoover both recommended that 
Roosevelt’s call for domestic intelligence operations “be handled in the strictest 
confidence” so as to “avoid criticism or objections which might be raised to such an 
expansion by either ill-informed persons or individuals having some ulterior motive.”  
Thus, the president decided to kept U.S. domestic intelligence investigations secret to 
include excluding members of Congress from knowing about his decision to expand of 
these organizations.127 
By 1936, FDR ordered the FBI to conduct a “limited” investigation into Nazi 
activities in the United States.  Working with members of the Secret Service and with 
Immigration Bureau agents, the FBI began to look into pro-fascist groups.  Military 
intelligence, working independently of the FBI, concluded these pro-fascist groups 
would, in time of war, resort to sabotage in an attempt to “cripple” the U.S. industrial 
infrastructure.  Hoover reported to the president that the communist wanted to gain 
control of U.S. labor organizations such as the United Mine Workers union, the West 
Coast longshoremen’s union, and the Newspaper Guild.  By controlling these there 
organizations, the communist would be able to halt shipping, paralyze industry, and stop 
the publication of any newspaper associated with the Newspaper Guild.128 
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While the FBI and military intelligence investigated domestic subversive activity, 
the Abwehr, Germany’s military intelligence service run by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris 
continued working in the Americas.  These Abwehr agents ignored FARA and refused to 
register with the U.S. government.  By 1938, espionage activity increased from an 
average of thirty five cases a year to a staggering 634 alleged instances of spying.129  The 
most famous case involved military intelligence agents capturing Guenther Rumrich, a 
member of the Ignatz Griebl’s spy ring.  The Rumrich trial played out in the media 
shocking the American populace by portraying the Germans as cunning spies and 
saboteurs.130 
Rumrich, proved to be an effective but erratic agent.  He bought, for $30, a copy 
of the Army signal code used for ship to shore communications from Private Erich 
Glaser, a German native serving in the U.S. Army.  The success of this operation earned 
the German spy the code name “crown.”  Rumrich made about $80 for the classified “Z-
code.”  So, when his Nazi handler, Karl Schlueter, a steward on the Europa, working for 
Dr. Erich Pheiffer, the head of the Abwehr section located at Wilhelmshaven, told him 
that German intelligence would pay him $1000 to get fifty blank U.S. passports for 
German agents being sent to the Soviet Union, all he could see were dollar signs.131 
Rumrich did not know the Abwehr, after Lonkowski’s flight from the United 
States began to send the information gained by their agents by coded messages through 
the mail.  In this case, a World War I war widow, living in Dundee, Scotland received 
these messages and then passed them on to Berlin.  A curious mailman reported that this 
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fifty-one year old woman received a lot of mail.132  Major W.E. Hinchley Cooke, of MI5, 
after placing the widow under surveillance, discovered that she was a mail drop for 
German intelligence.  The British decided to tell the Americans; so Captain Guy Liddell, 
deputy chief of MI5 traveled to Washington where he met with J. Edgar Hoover.  Liddell 
explained there was a significant German spy ring working in the New York.  Hoover’s 
men began searching for its agents.133 
In February 1938, Rumrich’s attempts to gain blank U.S. passports led members 
of the U.S. Army Intelligence to arrest him.  Military Intelligence decided to transfer the 
German spy to FBI custody for interrogation.  Rumrich talked.  Soon, the FBI brought 
Ignatz Griebl in for questioning, and he supplied the names for the other members of his 
spy ring.  In total, Leon Turrou, the FBI agent in charge of the investigation, identified 
eighteen German agents.  Turrou decided not to arrest Griebl, who was cooperating, or 
for that matter, the other members of his spy ring; instead he told these German agents 
that they would be subpoenaed for a future court appearance.  Fourteen of the eighteen 
spies fled the country.  Only four members— Guenther Rumrich, Otto Herman Voss, 
Johanna Hoffman, Erich Glaser—were arrested and convicted.  Turrou’s mismanagement 
of the Rumrich case depicted the FBI as the Keystone Cops of the intelligence 
community—a humiliating lesson that Hoover vowed never to repeat.134 
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When the British Empire faced its greatest diplomatic crises since the Great War, 
it appeared that American aid would not be forthcoming.  The German remilitarization of 
the Rhineland and the Japanese Imperial Army’s invasion of China prompted England’s 
decision to rearm.  Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, in a classified memorandum dated December 31, 1936, stated “One 
other great change has taken place to our detriment: the recent neutrality legislation in the 
United States.  We scrambled through the last war by importing in its early stages some 
500 million dollars’ worth of American munitions.  To-day, in the event of war, we can 
count on getting nothing.  Our own supplies will therefore have to be more plentiful and 
timely.”135 
Vansittart recommended that Whitehall should curry American favor in case of 
war.  A plan quickly discarded by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s government.  
Chamberlain, best remembered for his claim the Munich agreement meant “peace in our 
time,” ignored Vansittart’s call for the shaping of American public opinion.  He decided 
to go it alone.  The result of Chamberlain and the Western powers’ decision to appease 
Hitler in 1938 was a war by 1939.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Neutrality and War 
 
Figure 41 
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As the German Wehrmacht marched into Poland, Neville Chamberlain’s four-year 
diplomatic pursuit of a “peace in our time” resolution to a resurgent Germany eventually 
gave way to a more Clausewitzian approach to international affairs.  The brutal memory 
of the carnage caused by the first modern global industrial war persuaded many European 
political leaders to follow a policy of appeasement.  Adolph Hitler’s geopolitical 
ultimatums came when British and French diplomats chose to accept the German 
dictator’s hawkish demands instead of war.  These diplomatic decisions sacrificed 
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Wilson’s dream of collective security for the elusive promise of peace.  Avoiding war at 
any cost seemed preferable to the alternative, but political hesitancy only emboldened the 
former corporal.  Hitler watched the League of Nations fail to act against Japanese 
aggression in Manchuria and he watched as the League failed to stop Italy’s invasion of 
Ethiopia.  These diplomatic failures showed the idea of collective security to be a mere 
illusion.  States, like people, act out of self-interest.  British and French support for 
Poland did not deter the German dictator and on September 1, 1939, Hitler invaded 
Poland.  Two days later, England and France declared war. 
On September 3, 1939, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appointed 
Winston Churchill First Lord of the Admiralty, the same position Churchill held during 
the first few years of the Great War.  It was a bittersweet return for grizzled old warhorse 
who later wrote “I came again to the room I had quitted in sorrow and pain almost a 
quarter of a century before.”  A sense of melancholy may have stricken Churchill on his 
return, but the Admiralty Board, delighted by the news, immediately sent a fleet-wide 
message proclaiming, “Winston is back.”2 
Shortly after Churchill took control of the Admiralty, FDR sent Churchill a 
private letter welcoming him back to his former position.3  With this letter, FDR began 
communicating with not only the head of the British Admiralty but also with the British 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.  Even as ties between England and the United 
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States unraveled, FDR wanted Churchill to personally keep the U.S. president appraised 
of anything the British felt he should know.4 
Scholars have suggested that FDR “could not have known what he had begun 
with this letter.” 5  Roosevelt’s brush with intelligence during and after the Great War, 
however, suggests the American president understood the importance of setting up 
informal channels of communication.   Using Churchill and his shared experiences as 
“naval men,” the president set up an informal line of communication with the man many 
suspected would become the next British prime minister.  This correspondence continued 
even after Churchill moved from Admiralty House to Number 10 Dowling Street.  These 
letters not only provided FDR with information about the English war effort, but it also 
provided Churchill with the means to privately influence the president of the United 
States.6 
On May 10, 1940, the same day King George VI, the British monarch, 
commissioned Winston Churchill to form a coalition government, thus promoting the 
First Lord of the Admiralty to the Prime Minister’s office, the Germans dramatically  
ended the Phony War by invading Belgium and the Low Countries. The rapid German 
advance through Belgium began with the Wehrmacht’s implementation of Lieutenant 
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General Erich von Manstein’s revised version of Fall Gelb (Case Yellow). 7   This 
invasion provoked the French and the British to send their best troops in a vain attempt to 
rescue the beleaguered Belgians.  British and French miscalculations allowed German 
armor to punch through the Ardennes and encircle the French and British forces rushing 
to aid the Belgian army.8 
By May 15, 1940, the French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud called Churchill to 
explain the French counterattack at Sedan had failed leaving the “road to Paris” open.  
The French Prime Minister believed “all was lost” and he told Churchill that he was 
thinking of “giving up the struggle.”  Reynaud pleaded with Churchill to send more 
troops.  The British Prime Minister explained that he could not afford to send any more 
men.  Churchill tried to calm the worried French Prime Minister; but, shortly after talking 
with Reynaud, Churchill stated, “that whatever the French might do, we should continue 
the fight—alone if necessary.”9 
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On May 18, 1940, Randolph Churchill, on leave from the 4th Queen’s Own 
Hussars, arrived at Admiralty House to visit his father, Winston S. Churchill, the newly 
appointed British Prime Minister.  Randolph went up to his father’s bedroom where he 
saw his father standing in front of the basin shaving with an old fashioned Valet razor. 
According to Randolph, his father had a tough beard and “as usual he was hacking way.” 
Once Winston Churchill noticed his son standing in the doorway, he told him to 
“Sit down, dear boy, and read the papers while I finish shaving.”  After two or three 
minutes of hacking way, he half turned to his son and said, “I think I see my way 
through.”  He resumed shaving. 
Astounded by his father’s declaration, Randolph said, ‘Do you mean we can avoid 
defeat?”—which seemed credible—“or beat the bastards?”—which seemed incredible. 
He flung his Valet razor into the basin, swung around and said, “Of course I mean 
we can beat them.” 
Randolph replied, “Well, I’m all for it but I don’t see how you can do it.” 
By this time, Churchill had dried and sponged his face and once again turned 
toward his son and said with great intensity, “I shall drag the United States in.”10 
Churchill’s extraordinary confidence sprang not from self-delusion but prior 
experience.  He served as the First Lord of the Admiralty during the first few years of the 
Great War, and from that appointment, he had learned how useful a small group of 
intelligence professionals could be in upsetting the geopolitical balance.  He oversaw the 
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actions of NID-25, an obscure naval cryptanalytic section (but more commonly referred 
to as Room 40, because of its location in the Old Admiralty Building).  Admiral Sir 
Reginald “Blinker” Hall’s men helped to convince American policymakers to join the 
Allied cause during World War I.  The correspondence between Churchill and the 
American president contributed to the Prime Minister’s confidence. 
Churchill, a student of history, saw the historical parallels between the summer of 
1914 and the events unfolding in the spring of 1940.  The former First Lord of the 
Admiralty knew the only way to get the Americans into the conflict was to destroy the 
nation’s commitment to remain neutral.  British intelligence would need to orchestrate a 
campaign of whispers, rumors, and innuendo.  By creating a culture of fear, British 
agents of influence hoped to convince the Americans that it was in their best interest to 
fight.  Political warfare operations, Churchill realized, often proved as effective as 
bullets, tanks, and bombs in overcoming political reservations.  
Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. Ambassador to England, reinforced Churchill’s fear 
that Britain might just have to stand alone.11  Kennedy, who believed the British would 
soon surrender to German demands, brought dark tidings from Washington.12  The 
Americans would play a duplicitous game walking a thin line between neutrality and 
supporting the British.  The United States would sell military equipment to the British on 
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a cash-and-carry basis.  They refused, however, to allow British aircraft carriers to dock 
in U.S. waters because this would be viewed as a violation of America’s Neutrality 
Laws.13  Members of Congress, following American public opinion, continued to call for 
the nation to remain neutral.  Without congressional approval, FDR told Churchill that he 
could not authorize giving the island nation forty to fifty obsolete U.S. destroyers.  The 
U.S. Navy would also be unable to send their fleet into the Atlantic at “least for the time 
being” the fleet was to remain at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.14  Churchill responded to 
America’s lack of support by issuing a veiled threat.  He stated the British “are 
determined to persevere to the very end whatever the result of the great battle raging in 
France.”  If his government fell, the new prime minister would be duty bound to secure 
the best terms possible with the Germans.  This meant handing the British fleet to the 
Germans.15   
Roosevelt ignored the British Prime Minister’s threat.  FDR explained the United 
States was doing everything it could to “furnish all of the material and supplies which can 
possibly be released to the Allied Governments.”  The legislative realities, however, 
meant it would take some time before these efforts could “be successful to the extent 
desired.”  FDR stated, as one naval person to another, that he understood the importance 
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acquiesced to Roosevelt’s demands and thus the British, French, and Chinese were able to buy munitions.  
  14 “Telegram from the President to the former naval person, May 16, 1940,” Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library, Papers as President: Map Room Papers, 1941-1945, Box 1; Reasoning behind disposition of fleet 
at Pearl Harbor can be found in “Retention of the U.S. Fleet in the Pacific,” Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 
Official File, Box 2, China 1930-1940. 
  15 “Letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, May 15, 1940,” Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Papers as 
President: Map Room Papers, 1941-1945, Box 1. 
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of the British fleet.  If the worst should come to pass and Churchill’s government should 
fall, the prime minister should understand that “if a General asks for an armistice for his 
land forces, he does not control or include the disposition of Naval forces.”16 
Winston Churchill knew that fortune favors the bold, and that time was running 
out.  Failure to act would ensure the dissolution of the empire.17  Churchill believed that 
by employing the methods developed and perfected by Admiral Sir Reginald ‘Blinker’ 
Hall, during the Great War, that he could, once again, drag the United States into a 
predominately European conflict.  Strategic political warfare campaigns required a 
unique combination of tactical human exploitation operations combined with a strong 
signals intelligence apparatus.  The Polish Cipher Bureau’s decision to pass on the secrets 
of enigma gave the British a viable cryptographic device.  Now all he needed was 
someone to set up, organize, and manage a complex clandestine human exploitation 
operation in the Americas.  An organization designed to neutralize pro-fascist propaganda 
while shifting American public opinion from neutrality to interventionist.  A daunting 
task considering America entrenched anti-colonial, anti-imperialistic, isolationist 
tendencies, which ran counter to providing unilateral support for the British war effort.18 
In the spring of 1940, Colonel Stewart Graham Menzies, recently appointed head 
of British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), code named “C”, sent William Stephenson, a 
                                                 
  16 “Letter from Roosevelt to Churchill, June 14, 1940,” Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Papers as 
President: Map Room Papers, 1941-1945, Box 1. 
  17 Audentes Fortuna Iuvat. Virgil, Aeneid X, 284. 
  18 In Europe, Churchill, in July 1940, established the Special Operations Executive (SOE) a clandestine 
paramilitary organization tasked with conducting political warfare operations against the Axis powers.  For 
more on SOE see W.J.M. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-
1945, (London: St. Ermins, 2002). 
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Canadian industrialist, to the United States.  C wanted Stephenson to reestablish ties 
between SIS and J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).19  
Immediately after the British declared war, the United States severed ties between these 
two intelligence services.20  Four months later, in January 1940, the British tried to 
reestablished communication with the FBI.  Arthur Purvis, the head of the British 
Purchasing Commission, failed to convince J. Edgar Hoover to support the British.21 
At the time, the United States did not have a unified peacetime intelligence 
organization.  During the interwar years, the FBI took on a law enforcement role.  The 
Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MID) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 
provided tactical (informational) intelligence for their respective services.  The British 
view of American intelligence capabilities was low, and they took a condescending 
approach to their American counterparts; thus, Anglo-American intelligence cooperation 
did not exist during the 1920s and 1930s.  This did not mean that there was no contact 
                                                 
  19 Thomas F. Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origins of the CIA, (New Haven 
& London: Yale University Press, 1996), 34-36.  The details surrounding this first meeting between J. 
Edgar Hoover and Stephenson has become a matter of some debate as J. Edgar Hoover lists 1942 as the 
first time these two men officially met but both men had several unofficial meetings well before 1942.  The 
date of the meeting has become a matter of conjecture.  Thomas F. Troy, in Wild Bill and Intrepid, based 
upon a letter discussing a business trip by a Canadian industrialist to California which mentions 
Stephenson’s visit to the war arms factory during April 1940 as well as using the date Stephenson requested 
a Visa to visit the United States, which was also April 1940 as well as Troy simply corresponding with MI6 
in November 1969, the reply to Troy’s inquiry unequivocally stated that Stephenson visited the United 
States in April 1940.    
  20 The fear that American soldiers might be called upon to fight on foreign shores in the event of another 
global conflict led to the passage of the Neutrality Acts of 1936 and 1939.  These acts, a legislative 
response to the Nye Committee findings, which investigated the allegation of unethical business practices 
used by members of the arms and munitions corporations during World War I, were designed to prevent the 
United States from being “drug” into another European or Asiatic conflict. 
  21 Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid, 37-38.  This contact went through Assistant Secretary of State Adolph A. 
Berle who reported the contact to the Inter-departmental Intelligence Committee (IIC).  The FBI turned 
down this request as well as the one made by Hamish Mitchell, security officer working for British 
purchasing. 
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between the two nations.  In the years before the German invasion of Poland, British 
Intelligence supplied the Americans with information.  British intelligence, for example, 
gave the Americans information on the Rumrich spy ring, but they did not provide this 
information out of the friendship.  They gave it because it hindered German espionage 
activities.22 
In the winter of 1940, Vincent Astor’s the Club set up a working relationship with 
SIS agents Sir James Paget and Walter Bell.  Paget and Bell worked for the British 
Passport Control Office, located in New York City.23  The Passport Control Office (PCO) 
provided cover for SIS agents working in New York City.  Trying to hinder German 
espionage in the United States, the British passed information to members of the Club 
and representatives of various U.S. intelligence agencies—FBI, ONI, and MID.  When 
members of the State Department heard about this illicit relationship between U.S. 
intelligence and the British, they complained.   Working in a neutral country requires a 
soft touch, the British, having no choice, ordered Paget and Bell to sever their ties with 
the Americans.  Astor understood Paget and Bell’s value to U.S. intelligence.  
Information gained by the Imperial Postal and Telegraph Censorship stations in Bermuda, 
Trinidad, and Jamaica intercepted postal, telegraphic and radio communication between 
Nazi-controlled Europe and the Americas and Astor knew this information was critical to 
                                                 
  22 For a detailed overview of the Rumrich case see Raymond J. Batvinis, The Origins of FBI 
Counterintelligence, (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2007) 3-28. 
  23 Keith Jeffery, The Secret History of MI6: 1990-1949, (New York: Penguin Books, 2010), 438.  At this 
time the British operated three SIS stations in the Americas—the New York Passport Control Office 
(48000), an office in Panama (72000) and one in Montevideo (75000). 
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U.S. global interests.  The amateur spy asked Roosevelt to reestablish contact with at 
least the Imperial Postal and Telegraph Censorship stations, but FDR refused.24 
Purvis’ failure and the State Department’s decision to sever contact between 
Astor’s private intelligence apparatus and SIS compelled Menzies to send an unlike 
intermediary to the United States to ask for J. Edgar Hoover’s support.25  At first glance, 
Stephenson, a former World War I flying ace, amateur boxer, one-time conman and thief, 
turned highly successful inventor and businessman, seemed an odd choice.  During the 
interwar years, Stephenson, like Vincent Astor, managed his own informal clandestine 
industrial intelligence.  This quiet Canadian shared the information gathered with his 
government, which brought him to the attention of both Winston Churchill and SIS.  
Menzies, like Hall before him, realized that possible German intelligence operations in 
North America, while not directly threatening American internal security, posed a clear 
and present danger to the British war effort.  As U.S. demography suggested, even two 
decades after the Great War, German and Italian immigrants still comprised the majority 
ethnicity of longshoremen working at U.S. East Coast ports.   U.S. neutrality caused 
British agents to question these dockworkers’ loyalties.   It was possible these men might 
be susceptible to recruitment by members of German intelligence.  Not an unfounded fear 
as German intelligence successfully recruited longshoremen during the Great War. 
                                                 
  24 Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid, 65. 
  25 During the First World War, Stephenson, accidently shot down by the French Air Force, spent several 
months in a German prisoner of war camp.  While a prisoner of war, Stephenson stole a German made can 
opener, which due to the global conflict had only been patented in Germany.  Stephenson escaped and once 
he made it back to England, he immediately took out a patent on the can opener from which he made his 
first fortune.  Bill Macdonald, The True ‘Intrepid’: Sir William Stephenson and the Unknown Agents, 
(British Columbia, Canada: Timberholme Books, 1998), 42. 
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The British feared that German agents, working on the docks, might inform 
German submarines, operating in the waters just off the coast of the United States, when 
a British ship transporting munitions left U.S. ports heading for Britain. The British 
lifeline once again tenuously traversed the Atlantic where Hitler’s U-boats sought to sink 
British merchant shipping.  If German submarines could sink enough British ships, they 
might be able to starve the British into submission just as the British blockade had done 
to the Germans during the First World War. 26 
Knowing that a formal meeting between British and American intelligence, in 
May of 1940, could prove as big a failure as the one conducted five months before, 
Stephenson decided to arrange a private informal meeting with the Director of the FBI.  
Contacting a mutual friend, Gene Tunney, the world heavyweight boxing champion best 
known for defeating Jack Dempsey in 1926 and again in 1927, Stephenson set up a 
meeting with America’s premier law enforcement official to discuss a possible war-time 
collaboration between SIS and the FBI.27  The meeting went better than Stephenson could 
have expected.  The FBI Director agreed to work with SIS on two conditions.  First, the 
arrangement would remain hidden from the State Department and second J. Edgar 
                                                 
  26 While the United States stubbornly clung to the precepts of neutrality members of the U.S. Congress, at 
FDR’s urging, repealed parts of the Neutrality Acts to allow American manufacturers to sell arms and 
munitions to the British on a cash and carry basis. 
  27 The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940-1945, (New York: Fromm 
international, 1998), xxv-xxvi.  For the reminder of the text these documents will be referred to as the BSC 
Papers.  Letters from Gene Tunney to Thomas F. Troy, 6 and 19 August and 18 September 1969, quoted in 
Thomas F. Troy, “The Coordinator of Information and British Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence, 
(Spring, 1974): 22-23.  The official U.S. account of this meeting states Hoover “discussed arrangements for 
co-operation between British Intelligence Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”  Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, “British Intelligence Service in the United States (Running Memorandum),” 1 
January 1947 (Freedom of Information Act Release, 2009), 1. 
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Hoover wanted presidential authorization before he would agree to reestablish contact 
with SIS.28  Franklin D. Roosevelt realized the chance of the United States avoiding war 
was dwindling.  The American president believed war was coming; so, FDR decided to 
hide his actions from both the State Department and Congress.  According to Ernest 
Cuneo, FDR enthusiastically gave his consent.  The president stated, “There should be 
the closest possible marriage between the FBI and British intelligence.”29  
On returning to England, Stephenson, meeting with Menzies, provided the head of 
SIS with a detailed briefing on his trip to the United States.  Stephenson suggested every 
effort should be made “to do all that was not being done and could not be done by overt 
means to assure sufficient aid for Britain.”  He told C that he planned to “eventually bring 
America into the war.”30  Menzies dislike of Stephenson did not stop him from 
appointing the Canadian industrialist to head the British Passport Control Office (PCO), 
located in New York City. 31   The PCO provided cover for SIS agents working on 
foreign soil. Desmond Morton, Winston Churchill’s personal assistant, might have helped 
overcome C’s unease with Stephenson.  Morton was impressed with Stephenson.  He 
agreed with Stephenson’s assessment of the current situation and he was impressed with 
                                                 
  28Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man of Secrets, (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 2001), 265. 
  29 There seems to be some discrepancy over whether or not Cuneo actually made this statement as 
reported in H. Montgomery Hyde, The Quiet Canadian: The Secret Service Story of Sir William Stephenson 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962), 26; William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War, (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 79-80.  Ernest Cuneo denied making the statement in Troy’s 
Intrepid and Donovan two decades after these events occurred and while the BSC papers refer to this 
conversation between a mutual friend of Stephenson and the president, the papers fail to provide the name 
of this unknown mutual friend.  Troy suggests that the unknown friend might have been Vincent Astor and 
not Ernest Cuneo but without definitive proof, the name of this intermediary might just be lost to history. 
  30 The BSC Papers xxvii.    
  31 Gill Bennett, Churchill’s Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence, (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 255. 
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the Canadian’s ability to secure U.S. cooperation when SIS’s agents failed.  Not willing 
to assign an amateur to run SIS operations in New York City, Menzies chose an 
intelligence professional C.H. ‘Dick’ Ellis to be Stephenson’s second-in-command.32  
Some scholars suggest that C suspected Dick Ellis was a Nazi sympathizer and moved 
him from SIS’ headquarters to Stephenson’s new organization.33  At this time, William 
Wiseman showed up at C’s office looking for a job.  He wanted to return to the United 
States and resume his role as a British agent of influence.  C refused.   The SIS chief 
stated that “both my predecessors made it clear that in their view Wiseman should never 
be employed again by this Organization.  They had their reasons.”  So, Stephenson set 
sail for the United States.34 
Stephenson and his wife, Mary French Simmons, journeyed to New York.  His 
mission was to drag the United States into the war. 35   Stephenson knew the British, 
politically isolated with only the English Channel standing between their tiny island 
                                                 
  32 Menzies and Stephenson did not like each other.  “C” tried to ensure that Churchill sent someone else 
back to the United States as Stephenson did not have any diplomatic or intelligence training and the 
position Stephenson would hold would require the skills of both a statesmen and a spy.  Churchill refused 
to listen to Menzies’ complaints and ordered Stephenson back to the United States.  Anthony Cave Brown, 
“C”: The Secret Life of Sir Stewart Graham Menzies, (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1987), 262. 
  33 For more information on Ellis’ status as a Soviet mole, see Thomas E. Mahl, Desperate Deception: 
British Covert Operations in the United States, 1939-1944, (Washington: Brassey’s, 1998), 18-19. Troy, 
14-15.  Troy explained that MI5 and MI6 conducted a “hostile” interrogation of Ellis where he admitted to 
helping the Germans before the war but denied being a Soviet spy.  Stephenson believed the charges 
stemmed from political infighting regarding Ellis and control of MI6.  Troy, a member of the U.S. 
intelligence community, noted that Pavel and Anatoli Sudaplatov’s Special Tasks: the Memoirs of an 
Unwanted Witness (New York: Little Brown, 1994) fail to mention Ellis’ role as a Soviet mole, but the CIA 
historian could not help but ponder what secrets, regarding Ellis, were hidden behind the veil of national 
security. 
  34 Menzies to Jebb, 21 June 1940, quoted in Jeffery, 440.  This dislike of Wiseman might have stemmed 
from his altercation with Guy Gaunt’s girlfriend during the Great War.    
  35 Hyde, 31. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor compelled the United States to enter the war but it can 
be argued that the BSC’s propaganda efforts are what made it acceptable for the United States to pursue a 
Eurocentric approach to fighting the war. 
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nation and the German Wehrmacht, needed American support to survive. The British 
industrialist turned spy arrived in New York just as France fell.  Isolationists, 
noninterventionist, and Nazi sympathizers believed the English, facing overwhelming 
odds, had no other choice but to surrender.  Stephenson, like Churchill, knew that time 
was running out.  He judged the New York City passport control offices, located in the 
Cunard Building in lower Manhattan, to be inadequate for his purposes; and while he 
searched for better accommodations, Stephenson worked out of his apartment 
overlooking Central Park.36 
In June 1940, Stephenson focused his attention on Doctor Gerhard Westrick, a 
high-ranking German agent.  Westrick, who registered with the U.S. State Department as 
a Commercial Councilor, worked at the German Embassy; however, the German agent 
pretended to be a private citizen living in an expensive rental in Long Island, New York.  
Westrick, a legal spy, maintained a discrete cover away from the Germany Embassy.  He 
claimed to be an employee of Texaco; a Texas based Oil Company, whose Norwegian-
American president, Captain Thorkild Rieber, had long been suspected of supplying oil to 
Nazi Germany, in violation of American neutrality.37 
The war in Europe divided the U.S. business community into two groups those 
who saw an opportunity to make a profit by financing and supplying Hitler’s regime and 
those whose loyalties lay with the British Empire.  As Stephenson arrived in New York, 
                                                 
  36 Hyde, 32.  Stephenson found the PCO office, located in the Cunard building, to be “cramped and 
depressing.”  The one room office and staff, consisting of one assistant and one secretary, seemed wholly 
inadequate for the type of intelligence apparatus Stephenson envisioned. 
  37 The BSC Papers, 56.  When Doctor Gerhard Westrick applied for a driver’s license, he listed a local 
Texaco office as his business address. 
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Westrick rented a large suite at the Waldorf Astoria to celebrate the fall of France. 
Westrick’s primary mission was to convince American executives, particularly those 
working in the Oil industry, to support the Nazi cause.  The German agent of influence, 
regularly, entertained in his Long Island home those American businessmen whom he 
believed he might sway to support Hitler’s growing empire.  The party at the Waldorf 
Astoria, however, was a public celebration designed to drive home the point the British 
could not help but surrender.  Westrick explained it was only a matter of time before 
Germany defeated Britain.  In exchange for their efforts to convince isolationist America 
to remain neutral, they would be rewarded with business contracts in Axis-occupied 
Europe.38 
Stephenson compiled evidence against Westrick exposing the German agent.  
More than a propagandist, Westrick met, at his Long Island home, with “obscure young 
men of German decent who were employed in strategic factories.”  Stephenson, working 
through intermediaries, gave the news story, written by members of BSC, to the media.  
A series of articles published in the New York Herald Tribune resulted in a State 
Department request that Germany remove Westrick for “pursuing activities unfriendly to 
the United States.”  The negative publicity caused Texaco shares to drop leading to 
Thorkild Rieber’s decision to resign as president of Texaco providing the British with 
their first political warfare victory.39 
                                                 
  38 Stevenson, 115-116. 
  39 The BSC Papers, 56-57.  Hyde, The Quiet Canadian, 70-71. 
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The amateur agent of influence understood that one successful operation would 
not win the war and that continued success would depend on his organizational skills.  
Stephenson needed to recruit sympathetic representatives.  People, who by the nature of 
their daily activities, had access to information that could help persuade U.S. government 
officials and the American public to support the British war effort.  He needed to 
cultivate and develop a close working relationship with the FBI.  And he needed to 
implement offensive intelligence operations against pro-Axis organizations operating in 
the Americas.  After a few weeks, Stephenson rented room 3603 in New York City’s 
Rockefeller Center where he established the British Security Coordination (BSC). 40    
Rockefeller rented this space to Stephenson for a penny a year.41  It might seem strange, 
today, that Stephenson did not move the BSC to Washington D.C. but instead chose to 
stay in New York City.  New York City’s vast harbor provided the lifeline for American 
supplies heading to England.  The disaster at Dunkirk, where the British were forced to 
leave the majority of their equipment, meant the British army needed U.S. war materiel if 
they hoped to stop a Germanic invasion. 42 
Stephenson realized the decentralized nature of British and American intelligence 
made coordination and cooperation difficult; so, he began unifying all British intelligence 
activities in the Americas and then nearly concomitantly he began suggesting how the 
United States government could centralize and operate a national level intelligence 
                                                 
  40 Jeffery, 441.   
  41 Mahl, 11.  Rockefeller Center would become the home to many organizations working to fight against 
the Axis powers.  The British Press Service (located on the forty-fourth floor) and the British Front 
organization—Fight for Freedom (located on the twenty second floor). 
  42 Hyde, The Quiet Canadian, 3. 
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agency based on the BSC.43  In an effort to consolidate British intelligence activities, 
Stephenson convinced the British Purchasing Commission to allow the BSC to take care 
of all physical security for cash and carry (later Lend-Lease) shipments being sent to 
England.44 
The safe transit of these supplies cannot be overstated nor can British fears of 
possible sabotage.  There were nearly six million German-Americans and almost four 
million Italian-Americans.  “Many of these American citizens were employed as workers 
in the factories producing British war material” any one of which might be sympathetic to 
the Axis cause.  The BSC believed subversive elements, working in the United States, 
might hinder the British war effort.  BSC agents viewed the German Bund, U.S. 
isolationist organizations, nationalist Indians, anti-British Irish, businessmen with 
European interests, and “communist influenced left-wingers, preaching against the 
imperialist war” as possible threats to British interests.45 
The British intelligence community struggled to ensure these supplies reached 
England.  The BSC worked with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian 
intelligence organizations, U.S. Customs and Immigration officials, local police and port 
authorities, and the FBI to protect these shipments.46  Next, Stephenson began to recruit 
American citizens “who were in a position, directly or indirectly, to influence American 
                                                 
  43 For more information on the historiographical argument surrounding Stephenson’s influence on the 
creation of the Office of Strategic Services, see Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid. 
  44 The BSC Papers, 240-241.  
  45 Ibid., 239-240. 
  46 Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid, 68. 
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public opinion.” 47  FDR began campaigning for American readiness and the BCS 
developed political warfare plans designed to help the president with his efforts to sway 
public opinion.  The British industrialist turned spy renewed his friendship with William 
J. Donovan.48  During World War I, Donovan, a Wall Street lawyer, won the Medal of 
Honor and earned the nickname “Wild Bill.’’ Donovan arranged a meeting between 
Stephenson and Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, and Henry Knox, Secretary of the 
Navy, to discuss Churchill’s request for fifty obsolete American destroyers.  Church 
wanted the destroyers transferred to the British Royal Navy to help safeguard the British 
Atlantic merchant traffic.  The German U-boat attacks against this “Atlantic lifeline” 
were taking their toll.  Stephenson met with Knox and Stimson to discuss finding a way 
around the U.S. Neutrality Acts. 
The major problem, as all three men agreed, hinged on England’s ability to 
convince the American public that they intended to resist Hitler’s onslaught.  In the 
spring of 1940, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox convinced Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
send Donovan and Edgar Allen Mowrer on a fact-finding mission to Britain.49   Knox 
ordered Donovan to find out if the British would continue to defy Hitler.  Knox sent 
Mowrer, a Pulitzer Prizewinning foreign correspondent working for the Chicago Daily 
News, a newspaper owned by the Secretary of the Navy, to look into German Fifth 
                                                 
  47 The BSC Papers, 16. 
  48 The BSC Papers, 3; Gentry, 265; Jeffery, 440. 
  49 Lothian to Halifax, 10 and 11 July, The National Archives (Kew, UK), TNA/FO 371/24237; Troy, 
Donovan and the CIA, 31. 
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Columnist activities in Europe.50  The information Washington received from London 
stated the British would surrender.  The American Ambassador to the Court of St. James, 
Joseph Kennedy, whose friends included such notable British pro-fascist parliamentarians 
as Lady Astor, believed the British lacked the backbone to resist the Germans and the 
British would have to sue for a negotiated peace.  Donovan’s mission was to see for 
himself if Kennedy’s assessment of British capabilities and intentions was correct.51  
When Donovan returned, he could then report on British morale and give the White 
House a detailed list of the war materiel needed to ensure the British could continue to 
resist.  On July 15, 1940, five days after the beginning of the Battle of Britain, William 
Stephenson sent a telegram to “C.”  Stephenson explained that Colonel Donovan had left 
by ship, and the State Department did not inform the U.S. Embassy, in London, about the 
nature of his trip.  Stephenson clarified that he believed Donovan represented the key to 
American support and the British should open every door for him. 52 
Donovan, during his two-week trip, went through a lot of doors.  Kennedy, aware 
of Donovan’s mission, believed the British sense of propriety would ensure the British 
                                                 
  50 The term fifth columnist originated with a radio broadcast in 1936 during the Spanish Civil War when 
the Nationalist general Emilio de Mola announced that his army was advancing on Madrid with four 
columns preparing to assault the city from four different directions.  The fifth column was located within 
the city and would attack the defenders from within once the battle commenced.  See Francis MacDonnell, 
Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 4. 
  51 The BSC Papers, 9-10; Thomas Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, (Fredrick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1996), 31.  
There is some dispute about who actually set up this trip for Donovan.  Stephenson claimed that he 
arranged the trip while Donovan states that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy asked him 
to make the trip.  For the purpose of this narrative it is not important who sent Donovan only that he went. 
  52 Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid, 53.  Stephenson might have believed that U.S. Ambassador Joseph 
Kennedy did not know the nature of Donovan’s trip but Thomas F. Troy points out that Donovan took the 
time to dine with the U.S. Ambassador and it is naïve to think the subject of his trip to England did not 
come up during the course of the meal. 
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aristocracy would rebuff a lowly colonel’s visit to England as an affront to their rigid 
class standards.  The American ambassador viewed Donovan’s trip as a waste of time.  
What Kennedy did not know was that high-ranking British citizens, working in America, 
ensured that Donovan would see the right people.  Stephenson supported this trip and 
Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr), the British Ambassador to the United States, stressed the 
importance of this mission to the British war effort.53   In a series of letters and cables 
sent to London, Stephenson and Lord Lothian opened the doors to the heart of Britain, 
which gave Donovan the access he needed to complete his mission.  More access than 
Kennedy dreamed possible.  The former World War I hero visited the King and Queen, 
the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the British Prime Minister and allowed him to visit a 
wide variety of civil and military instillations.  During Donovan’s meeting with Winston 
Churchill, the newly commissioned prime minister used the opportunity to explain British 
materiel needs especially the importance of getting those obsolete U.S. destroyers. 
During his stay in England Stewart Menzies, the head of SIS, acted as Donovan’s tour 
guide.54 
On August 4, 1940, Donovan returned to Washington. He had dinner with Frank 
Knox, Admirals Harold R. Stark and Walter Anderson, Assistant Secretary of War 
Robert Patterson, General Sherman Miles, and James Forrestal, Undersecretary of the 
Navy, where he related the details of his trip.  These men listened as Donovan explained 
that he believed that British morale was high, but they would need more materiel and 
                                                 
  53 Lothian to Halifax, 10 and 11 July, The National Archives (Kew, UK), TNA/FO 371/24237. 
  54 Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid, 54. 
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equipment to repulse a Germany invasion.  Over the next few days, he repeated his 
findings to Henry Stimson, to members of both houses of Congress, and, on August 9, 
1940, to the President of the United States. 55   This meant that key members of the U.S. 
government understood that support given to the British would be used to fight the 
Germans.  American politicians feared that if Britain surrendered these weapons would 
be used against America; Donovan assured them that England would not fall. 
In the coming weeks, the destroyer-for-bases deal consumed most of Donovan 
and the members of the BSC’s attention.  The Wall Street lawyer charted a course 
between constitutional law and domestic politics to find a way for the British to get their 
destroyers without having to go to Congress.  Donovan argued that exchanging the 
destroyers for bases fell under executive privilege and FDR, therefore, did not need 
congressional permission.56  On September 2, 1940, Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, 
announced the United States would be given rent-free land in various British colonial 
possessions.  A ninety-nine-year lease to establish military bases in exchange for the 
transfer of fifty destroyers to the Royal Navy seemed like a good deal.57 
While Hull, Knox, and Stimson worked on the destroyer for bases deal, Donovan 
and Mowrer published a series of articles on German fifth columnists.  These articles tore 
“away the veil of secrecy and subterfuge” surrounding suspected German agents working 
                                                 
  55 The BSC Papers, 10; Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid, 56-57. 
  56  Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid, 59.  Troy rightly points out that there is no extant (read paper trail) proof 
that Donovan acted as a legal advisor during these proceedings other than a statement made by Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, years later, stating that Donovan had done just that.  Hyde, 38. Stephenson, quoted in Room 
3603, states that “As a lawyer argued that there was no need for the President to submit the plan to 
Congress, on the ground that it was broadly speaking, an exercise of the tradition power of the Executive in 
foreign affairs.” 
  57 “Strategy: Bases Chosen,” Time, 2 December 1940. 
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in the United States.  These frightening reports told the American public about the 
underhanded tactics employed by foreign agents living in the United States.  The main 
purpose of these exposés was “in fore-warning and thus fore-arming the American people 
against a subtle form of attack” employed by the Totalitarian powers elsewhere.  These 
editorials also helped justify, to the American public, the need to send fifty obsolete 
destroyers to the British.  England became America’s first line of defense against the 
Axis powers.  Mowrer pointed out that recent German victories were due in part because 
Hitler understood the importance of subversive operations calculated to incite “mental 
confusion, indecisiveness, and panic” to demoralized the enemy.  Donovan and Mowrer 
cited example after example of how Fifth columnists helped bring down nation after 
nation—Austria, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Holland, Poland, and even France.58 
The French waited too long to expel German agents.   Mowrer explained these 
men and women corrupted the press and poisoned army morale.  Donovan and Mowrer 
described how the German propaganda machine shaped French public opinion.  The 
details of German propaganda read like the playbook for political warfare operations—
ironic, considering the British, at this time, were running similar operations in the United 
States.59  The Germans patiently watched and waited until the time was right to strike.  
With almost mathematical precision, the Germans carried out their political warfare 
campaigns: 
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For years, his [Hitler’s] agents in France had…patiently ‘worked’ the 
French leaders.  When necessary, they were assisted by beautiful women; 
the Baroness von Einem, the Princess von Hohenlohe and others of lesser 
brilliance…They ‘arranged’ for trips to Germany of authors like Alphonse 
de Chateaubriant and newspapermen like Jean Fontenoy, both of whom 
returned rabid Hitlerians. 
 
They [Hitler’s agents] went everywhere, saw everybody, came to know 
everything, dipped into French politics through those scandalously venal 
French newspapers.  To the weak and the cynical they preached defeatism, 
to the unsuccessful, hatred of the Jew, to all the possibility of living on good 
terms with Germany, if only France could break relations with the 
abominable Bolsheviks.60 
 
The result of France’s refusal to defend against this new type of warfare was that 
defeatism took root and the German military brazenly and with lightning speed forced the 
nation to its knees.  According to Mowrer and Donovan, Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich spent 
$200 million a year on foreign propaganda and employed almost four million agents bent 
on world domination.61  These German agents, according to Mowrer and Donovan, 
worked for the Auslands-Organization (Foreign Organization of the Nazi Party or AO), 
which had 600 local groups located in forty-five countries.  Gauleiter Ernst Wilhelm 
Bohle, managing AO operations from Berlin, required “every German leaving the Reich 
to promise to report” everything they saw or heard while abroad.62 
As the Nazis gained control over most of Western Europe, a larger and larger 
portion of the German budget for foreign propaganda was spent keeping the United 
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States out of the conflict.  Following the same Nazi propaganda efforts that led to the rise 
of Adolph Hitler and to the fall of various European nations, the pro-Axis agents, 
working in the United States, formed “patriotic societies” calling for American neutrality.  
Donovan, worried about fifth columnist activity and the media, decided to talk to 
American public opinion experts.  These experts reported that a two-week examination of 
the U.S. press indicated “an almost complete failure to prevent an Axis monopoly of war 
news coverage…most journalists…carry a preponderance of Axis news coverage.”  
American newspapers published very few pro-British stories.  Those writers interviewed 
explained the “Germans show a far better sense of the news” and that their stories have 
better timing as well as showing a “better understanding of U.S. psychology.”63 
Donovan gave Stephenson a copy of his investigation of the U.S. media.  During 
the years leading up to Pearl Harbor, the BSC struggled to counter German propaganda 
efforts.  Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister for Propaganda, adhered to the dictates 
of Sir Campbell Stuart’s Secrets of Crewe House, which outlined the covert nature of 
British political warfare during the Great War. 64  Goebbels came to believe that British 
political warfare efforts during the Great War compelled members of the German 
Imperial government to surrender to Allied demands resulting in the Allied betrayal at 
Versailles.  A successful propaganda campaign depended upon a nation’s ability to stay 
on message.  Hans Fritzsche, who worked for Dr. Goebbels as the Chief of Germany’s 
Press Section, established the Information Section.  This section conducted propaganda 
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campaigns against nations targeted for assimilation into the Third Reich.  Through 
Fritzsche’s efforts, the Reich government increased the budget of the D.N.B., the official 
German news agency, by tenfold—from 400,000 marks to 4,000,000 marks.  The D.N.B 
spared no cost to spread favorable stories about the Third Reich to foreign markets.  
Fritzsche built a formidable propaganda machine that relied on controlling American 
access to news from Europe.  America journalists received their information from the 
Transocean News Agency, the Europa Press and D.N.B.; thus, the raw news used by U.S. 
journalists to write stories about the war in Europe all had a pro-German slant.  This 
perspective carried over to their news stories. 65 
The embarrassing public Rumrich spy ring trial convinced Hitler to order the 
Abwehr to cease their operations in the United States.  Dr. Goebbels’ Ministry of 
Propaganda, however, continued to conduct political warfare campaigns in the Americas.  
The Nazi propagandist’s investment in the media paid off in the United States.  Pro-Axis 
groups used U.S. isolationist and anti-British sentiment to further their agenda.  This 
resulted in Nazi propaganda showing up on “the front pages of newspapers, shouted at 
mass meetings, disseminated through special societies and proclaimed in the Senate and 
the House of Representatives.”  U.S. Senators spoke of England’s resistance to fair trade 
and freedom of the seas while members of Congress blamed Britain and France for the 
current war.  Rhetoric designed to convince the American populace that nonintervention 
was the best course.  On occasion, everyday men and women violently expressed their 
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anti-British sentiment.  For example, rotten tomatoes and eggs thrown by disgruntled 
American women who did not want their husbands or sons to go off to fight in a foreign 
war pelted Lord Halifax, Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, while he visited Detroit.  The 
aim of these politically motivated women, according to one report, proved accurate 
leaving a disheveled Halifax to retort, “We do not have any such surplus in England.”66 
Anti-British sentiment was at an all-time high. Mowrer, in his article on German 
fifth columnists, failed to mention the success of the pro-Axis propaganda; instead, these 
articles spoke of German agents, hiding in plain sight, silently waiting for orders from the 
Third Reich to commit murder, orchestrate kidnappings and organize armed rebellion.67  
The articles explained the danger of high-level influence on American politics.  Similar to 
Kaiser Wilhelm’s Imperial Germany during the Great War, Hitler’s Third Reich 
continued to employee its diplomats to preform intelligence functions.  Mowrer pointed 
out the German Fuhrer publicly congratulated Captain Fritz Wiedemann, Hitler’s former 
World War I company commander and the German General Consul in San Francisco, for 
his efforts, in July 1939, to prevent the U.S. Senate from accepting Roosevelt’s proposed 
changes to the Neutrality Acts.68  This article warned that it might already be too for the 
United States.  Nazi fifth columnists, already, worked within each of the forty-eight 
continental states and American citizens’ failure to act could lead to the nation’s 
downfall.  The article said the Nazi’s were only effective when unopposed.  Mowrer 
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explained that Hitler seized “Austria, Czechoslovakia and Denmark by propaganda and 
blackmail; taken Poland by violence, occupied Norway, Belgium, Holland and 
Luxemburg by force, ruse and treachery; conquered France by superior military 
equipment and strategy.”  Now all that kept the Nazis from assaulting the Americas was 
“the might of Great Britain.”69 
While Mower and Donovan’s articles began to shift American public opinion, 
Stephenson cultivated relationships with influential members of Roosevelt’s 
administration.  Men like Frank Knox, Henry Stimson, Cordell Hull, Ernest Cuneo, 
Robert Sherwood, and Vincent Astor who all had access to the right people to help the 
British spy solidify the relationship between the BSC and the White House.70  Donovan 
and Cuneo, eventually, became two of the most important intermediaries between the 
BSC and the White House.  Robert Sherwood, a famous playwright who referred to 
Stephenson as the “quiet” Canadian, wrote most of Roosevelt’s important speeches on 
international affairs.71  Sherwood, with presidential approval, showed the early drafts of 
these speeches to Stephenson.  Stephens made “small” suggestions to help FDR present 
the British in the best light.72  Roosevelt appointed Vincent Astor, whose informal 
intelligence organization, the Club, had provided the American president with 
information since 1933, as his personal liaison to Stephenson’s BSC.  On June 26, 1940, 
FDR sent a memorandum to Admiral Harold Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations 
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(CNO), stating that he asked Astor to “coordinate the Intelligence work in the New York 
area.”  Roosevelt told Stark that Astor had a “wide knowledge of men and affairs in 
connection with general Intelligence work.”  The president, therefore, wanted Stark to 
pass this information on to Admiral Walter Anderson, Director of Naval Intelligence 
(DNI).73  Anderson placed Astor on inactive reserves.74  While working in New York, 
Astor passed information, considered too sensitive to send through diplomatic channels, 
to the president.  He also passed on the “more important results of BSC’s investigations 
into enemy activities” in the Americas.  The president, in turn, would send, through 
Astor, comments, information and suggestions that allowed the BSC to coordinate its 
political warfare operations with the White House.75 
In the years leading up to Pearl Harbor, J. Edgar Hoover became the BSC’s 
staunchest ally.  Hoover ordered his agents to “assist BSC in every way open to them.” 
The FBI Director even allowed the BSC to use an FBI wireless channel, which provided 
Stephenson with a secure line of communication with SIS headquarters in London.76  
With Hoover’s patronage, the fledgling intelligence organization flourished.  Given his 
notoriously xenophobic attitude, Hoover’s decision to work with British Intelligence 
might seem out of character.77  Why, even with presidential approval, would Hoover risk 
public ridicule and scandal to help the British?  FBI support allowed the BSC to operate 
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in the Americas.  U.S. Neutrality laws ensured the connection between the FBI and 
British intelligence remained hidden from both the State Department and from members 
of Congress.  This was a risky proposition for Hoover.  Stephenson believed Hoover to 
be “a man of great singleness of purpose, and his purpose was the welfare of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.”  Hoover wanted to transform the FBI into the nation’s premier 
intelligence agency and his ambitions gave Stephenson an opportunity to expand the 
influence of British intelligence in the United States.78 
Stephenson knew the FBI competed with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 
and the Military Intelligence Division (MID) to see which organization would become 
America’s premier intelligence apparatus.  All three organizations conducted 
counterintelligence operations in the United States.  Hoover, however, wanted to ensure 
FDR gave sole counterintelligence responsibility to the FBI.  In exchange for helping 
protect British interest in the Americas, Stephenson placed the resources of SIS at J. 
Edgar Hoover’s disposal.  SIS agents operating in Latin American provided Hoover with 
intelligence reports.  British Imperial Censorship agents sent material they from their 
Caribbean listening posts to the FBI.  Hoover’s relationship with the BSC gave him a 
distinct advantage since he could pass along information to ONI and MID that, “they 
required but could not otherwise obtain.”79 
Intelligence operations differ from law enforcement; the FBI’s handling of the 
Rumrich case proved the FBI lacked the training necessary to conduct these types of 
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operations.  By 1940, the FBI bought modern equipment to help in their daily “crime 
detection” duties.  This equipment, however, was “inappropriate to the efficient conduct 
of counter-espionage” work.  Catching criminals required the FBI to investigate, to 
collect evidence, and then to provide their findings to a federal prosecutor who would 
then try the case.  A counterintelligence agent wants to identify “more of the accused 
man’s sources of information, channels of communication, paymaster, accomplices, and 
methods of training.”  A public trial is not always in the nation’s best interests.  A trial 
might disclose the technical means and sources used to gain the evidence against a spy, 
so a trial and imprisonment was not always the answer.  Removing the spy’s access to 
classified information might be enough.  Turning the agent might be preferable to 
imprisonment.  Espionage proved to be more of a gray area than the black and white 
world of cops and robbers.  The intricacies of intelligence work ran counter to the FBI’s 
mandate of catching the bad guy.  In the summer of 1940, SIS educated Hoover’s men.  
SIS technicians taught FBI agents the fundamental tradecraft needed to conduct 
counterintelligence work.80 
The first real test of this FBI-SIS relationship occurred in the autumn of 1940.   
German agents, as in World War I, worked in Mexico.  These German officers reported 
to Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and not Franz von Papen.  Stephenson knew that Canaris’ 
men posed a greater threat than those the “pretentious ass Franz von Papen” employed.  
Stephenson held von Papen in contempt.  He believed the German to be a dilettante, a 
failed politician, and a failed soldier and spy.  Canaris, on the other hand, Stephenson 
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viewed as cunning and formidable. 81  BSC agents, in Mexico City, reported that sixteen 
Axis vessels—four German and twelve Italian ships, docked in Tampico and Vera Cruz, 
were planning to run the naval blockade, which confined them to Mexican waters.  If 
these vessels made it past the blockade, they stood a good chance of returning to their 
respective countries a prospect the British hoped to avoid.  The British, forbidden to 
operate in Mexico’s territorial waters, wanted to use limpet mines to prevent these Axis 
ships from leaving.  Sabotage, on such a grand scale, meant the risk of exposure and the 
British could not afford the bad press. 82  Needing American support, Stephenson asked 
Hoover, who had begun to run his on Special Intelligence Service in Central and South 
America, to have the U.S. Navy patrol the waters outside Vera Cruz and Tampico.83 
The FBI Director knew the use of U.S. warships to prevent these vessels from 
leaving Mexico would be a violation of U.S. Neutrality but he convinced the director of 
ONI to have the Navy send the ships to the Gulf of Mexico.  The U.S. Navy worked out 
an ingenious plan to stop these ships from running the blockade.  On November 15, 1940, 
the four German ships tried to run.  The U.S. Navy trained their spotlights on the fleeing 
ships illuminating the vessels and the surrounding sea, which convinced the Germans to 
return to port.  Two weeks later, the Germans tried a daylight run.  The Americans 
shadowed these vessels relaying their positions to the Royal Navy, whose ships waited 
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outside Mexican territorial waters.  This covert support allowed the British to intercept 
these vessels and allowed the Americans to preserve the façade of neutrality.84 
While American neutrality provided political debate during the summer and fall 
of 1940, FDR began to prepare the nation for war.  Almost a year before Stephenson 
moved to New York and three months before the outbreak of war, FDR began 
centralizing the fragmented American intelligence community.  On June 26, 1939, the 
president of the United States issued a secret directive ordering J. Edgar Hoover,  
Sherman Miles, Director of Army Intelligence, and Rear Admiral W.S. Anderson, 
Director of Naval Intelligence, “to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.”  
This directive outlined the shared responsibilities for domestic counterintelligence 
operations between these competing U.S. agencies.85  Unfortunately, FDR failed to 
define the global responsibilities for each of these organizations.  This became 
problematic.  During the years leading up to Pearl Harbor, each agency competed with 
the other two.    ONI and MID wanted the president to give their organization the 
responsibility for global intelligence work. 86  The establishment of the Interdepartmental 
Intelligence Conference failed to prevent FBI, ONI, and MID agents from continually 
crossing “each other’s tracks” leading to wasteful and inefficient use of manpower.87 
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FDR’s World War I experience with German intelligence made the president 
wary of possible attacks by German fifth columnists.  The British exploited this fear.  On 
September 8, 1939, President Roosevelt, held a press conference to explain his decision 
to change the FBI mandate.  Roosevelt authorized the FBI to conduct domestic 
intelligence operations.  The president reminded the American public that in the years 
leading up to the First World War the United States had been subjected to German 
sabotage and propaganda operations.88   
FDR wanted to avoid the excessive World War I violation of American civilian 
liberties by vigilante groups, like the American Protection League, whose members often 
exceeded their authority.  As Attorney General Frank Murphy explained, “Twenty years 
ago inhuman and cruel things were done in the name of justice; sometimes vigilantes and 
others took over the work.  We do not want such things done today.”  On September 6, 
1939, FDR sent out a second presidential directive.  He ordered all police officials to turn 
over to the FBI any information “obtained pertaining to espionage, counterespionage, 
sabotage and violations of neutrality regulations.”  The president gave the FBI 
jurisdiction over all foreign intelligence matters concerning the Western Hemisphere. 89  
This second directive expanded the FBI’s area of operation.  The BSC and the FBI, 
working in Central and South America, fought to ensure that Nazi sympathizers did try to 
repeat the Kaiser’s World War I intrigues of embroiling the United States in a shooting 
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war with Mexico.  To keep their association secret from the State Department, the BSC, 
and the FBI needed a secure conduit for passing information.  On August 16, 1940, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, by executive order, appointed Nelson Rockefeller, then 
only 32 years old, to head the newly established Office of the Coordinator of Commercial 
and Cultural Relations between the American Republics (OCCCRBAR), commonly 
referred to as the Rockefeller Office.90  The Rockefeller Office, the FBI, and the BSC 
conducted offensive operational intelligence campaigns in Central and South America. 
Stephenson’s decision to rent office space in Rockefeller Plaza proved fortuitous since 
his office was located in the same building as Rockefeller’s new organization. 91 
The BSC and the Rockefeller office approached Latin America from two different 
points of view.  The British wanted to disrupt regional pro-Axis operations while the 
Americans wanted BSC agents to help ensure hemispheric unity and defense.  The 
Rockefeller office set up a “voluntary” program to remove pro-Axis agents affiliated with 
U.S. business ventures in the region.  Compliance had to be voluntary, but the financial 
backing of the Rockefeller family name, who’s Creole Oil Company conducted a 
substantial amount of business in the region, lent weight to this policy.92  Identification of 
potential Nazi agents working in the area became an issue in the months leading up to 
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Pearl Harbor.  The United States might have viewed Latin America as its personal 
domain, but it lacked an operational intelligence apparatus in the region.  While the State 
Department and the FBI maintained a few agents in the area, they did not have enough to 
establish a human intelligence (HUMINT) collection operation.  FDR ordered the FBI 
and the State Department to coordinate their efforts with the Rockefeller Office.93 
By late August 1940, Percy L. Douglas, formerly of the Otis Elevator Company, 
John E. Lockwood,  Rockefeller’s friend, George H. Butler, a State Department agent, 
and Percy Foxworth, the FBI liaison officer to the BSC, conducted joint operations 
examining regional Nazi commercial activity.   The BSC passed any pertinent 
information gained from British imperial censors to the FBI’s New York City office to 
include the preliminary target list.  The FBI integrated the BSC’s data with information 
obtained by their agents.  Using material from both agencies, the FBI wrote a detailed 
reports  marked “personal and confidential.”   These agents sent these reports to 
Rockefeller’s Washington D.C. office, located next to the White House in the old State, 
War, and Navy Building.  Rockefeller Office employees removed any mention of British 
intelligence from these reports.  All the information was attributed to unnamed sources.  
Each report either began with “We understand from a confidential source believed to be 
reliable” or “Information has been received from a reliable confidential source.”  This 
complicated process allowed FDR and the FBI to hide British support from the State 
Department and members of Congress.  The Rockefeller office produced a detailed report 
designed to hammer home the importance of regional unity.  This report revealed that 
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“firms and individuals known to support objectives contrary to the best interest of the 
American Republics” represented U.S. businesses, in Central and South America.  These 
pro-Axis businesses used their advertising dollars to persuade U.S. newspapers and radio 
stations to “adopt anti-American editorial policies.”  Money, also, helped convince some 
to pass confidential trade information to the Axis powers.94 
While the BSC and the Rockefeller office conducted a secret war in Central and 
South America, Stephenson set up a secret organization for spreading rumors.  Directed 
from New York City, these rumor-spreading campaigns worked to publish misleading 
information about Allied strategy as well as working to embarrass targeted Nazis by 
spreading scandalous gossip about their private lives.  Stephenson’s men knew that a 
“good rumor should never be traced to its source.”  It should have a specific purpose and 
it should simultaneously originate in several different locations.  Rumors should be 
designed for a particular audience.  For example, South American Catholics responded 
well to stories about Nazi desecration of European churches and monasteries.95 
The idea of embarrassing and harassing Nazi sympathizers in the Americas lead 
Stephenson’s organization to create the game of “Vik.”  The BSC Papers admit that this 
game never really took off as the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, which brought the 
United States into the war but the idea proved interesting.  Station M, located in Canada, 
forged documents used for special operations being conducted in Europe but these men 
and women also came up with Vik.  Station M printed cheap books that they secretly 
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distributed in South America.  These books, published in English, French, Spanish, and 
Portuguese, urged Allied sympathizers to “organize themselves into teams and to 
compete with one another by scoring points for every annoyance or embarrassment 
caused to the Nazis and their confederates.”  Billed as “a fascinating new pastime for all 
lovers of democracy,” Vik encouraged these competitors to harass and embarrass their 
Nazi neighbors.  Players should call at all hours of the night.  They should let the air out 
the Nazi sympathizer’s tires.  They should call various businesses and arrange to have 
large quantities of useless goods sent COD.  And they should spread rumors, targeting 
these men’s girlfriends, suggesting that they suffered from a mysterious illnesses.  The 
options for harassment were only limited by one’s imagination.  The rules stated “it 
should be possible to invent at least 500 ways of persecuting a victim without the 
persecutor compromising himself.”  Station M reminded these competitors that in playing 
Vik they were “acting as a fighting member of the forces of Democracy.”96 
While Station M’s game seems amusing today, the work conducted by Eric 
Maschwitz’s team helped shift U.S. public opinion.  Maschwitz’s operation hid behind 
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.  Just as in 1914, the British turned to atrocity 
propaganda and Maschwitz realized that some of the evidence used to drum up support 
for the British would have to be manufactured.97  He would need a “complete library” of 
photographs of German personnel, equipment, and vehicles.  Maschwitz would also need 
actual German equipment to be used as props.98  Members of Station M believed that 
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their product had to pass the most microscopic of scrutiny—to include chemical tests.99  
Information and a deft touch and the blending of fact and fiction could turn a patriot into 
a spy.  Maschwitz manufactured evidence that led, for example, the Germans to execute a 
Czech traitor and collaborator.100  As mentioned before, it is considered the highest form 
of deception to get your enemy to execute their own people. 
As Stephenson’s organization took shape, U.S.-Japanese relations deteriorated.  
Roosevelt not only had to worry about ensuring the British could survive against Nazi 
Germany but he also began to worry about Imperial Japan’s expansionist policies in Asia.  
Fortunately, the closing of Herbert O. Yardley’s Black Chamber did not stop U.S. signals 
intelligence collection.  It just closed up the civilian agency responsible for SIGINT 
collection.  Army and Navy signals intelligence continued “reading other people’s mail” 
to include the Japanese.  U.S. Naval cryptographers read Japanese diplomatic and naval 
codes and the U.S. Army created the Signals Intelligence Service.  When war broke out 
in Europe, the Army Signals Intelligence Service immediately received more money, 
more personnel, and more office space.  By the summer of 1940, army cryptographers 
had broken the most important Japanese diplomatic code—called PURPLE.  The 
decryptions of Japanese traffic became known as MAGIC and remained one of the 
nation’s most guarded secrets.101 
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The power of the FBI increased to help safeguard those secrets.   By 1939, the 
FBI no longer operated under State Department statutes.   The FBI’s power to conduct 
intelligence investigations came from Executive orders.  Hoover hid his relationship with 
BSC from Members of Congress and from the State Department.  This did not stop the 
FBI Director from telling the House Appropriations Committee that he had, on 
presidential say so, set up a General Intelligence division tasked with investigating 
espionage, sabotage and neutrality violations.  Ironic, since the FBI and the Executive 
office were both violating the very laws Hoover was ordered to investigate.  Just like the 
Great War, Congress tightened the laws on sedition.  The passage of the Smith Act made 
it a crime to advocate for the violent overthrow of the Government and the Voorhis Act 
required subversive organizations to register.  These two laws augmented the 1917 
Espionage Act but enforcement of these laws occurred rarely during the Second World 
War.102 
The FBI began supplying the White House with information about subversive 
activities.  Hoover’s men compiled a Custodial Detention List and they began infiltrating 
suspected subversive groups.  At this time, wiretapping “persons suspected of subversive 
activities against the United States, including suspected spies” became a staple of FBI 
investigation.  The FBI needed the approval of the U.S. Attorney General before tapping 
a suspect’s residence but he rarely said no.103  Wiretapping violated the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934 but Attorney General Robert H. Jackson believed the 
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government could wiretap its citizens since this information would not be disclosed to 
anyone outside the government.104  The FBI began teaching wiretapping and bugging at 
the appropriately named “Sound School.”  The FBI taught its field agents telephone 
surveillance (TELSUR), microphone surveillance (MISUR), and physical surveillance 
(FISUR).  These field agents referred to these various surveillance methods as “taps,” 
“bugs,” and “tails.”  The FBI, under the guise of national security, bugged several 
Washington and New York brothels.  These agents were looking for blackmail material 
to be used against foreign nationals.  Unfortunately, indiscriminate bugging does not 
distinguish between foreign nationals and U.S. citizens; so, the FBI collected 
embarrassing information on prominent Americans.  As one historian explained, 
“Buggings, wiretapping, break-ins, mail opening, and telegraph and cable 
monitoring….adopted under the guise of ‘wartime necessity’ and found to be highly 
useful shortcuts, became standard, albeit secret, investigative tools of Hoover’s FBI.”105   
Franklin D. Roosevelt, therefore, received information for British Intelligence, the 
FBI, ONI, MID, and from MAGIC intercepts.  This gave the president a unique 
perspective going into the 1940 presidential elections.  Should he run for a third term or 
not.  The Republicans, in the spring of 1940, believing that FDR would not run for an 
unprecedented third term, assumed the Republican Party would retake control of the 
White House.  The U.S. response to the war in Europe, however, played a decisive role in 
the presidential election.  The war divided the GOP.  There were those who resisted 
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British propaganda efforts and remained devout isolationists and those who believed, like 
FDR, that the U.S. should provide all necessary aid to England short of war.  Senator 
Robert Taft (R-OH), Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-MI), and New York District 
Attorney Thomas E. Dewey all campaigned on a similar isolationist platform with each 
candidate appealing to a different geographic region. Even though these men all had years 
of political experience, the public could not distinguish one candidate from the other 
solely based on their views of the war.  The war had become the most important political   
issue, and the fall of France only exacerbated the situation. 106 
According to Life magazine, most Americans, in the summer of 1940, held strong 
opinions about the war. Most Americans believed that Germany and Italy would win, and 
this victory would endanger the United States.  Most Americans, therefore, supported 
compulsory military training, U.S. rearmament, and a commitment to defend Central and 
South America from European invasion.  With the world tittering on the brink of another 
global conflict, 43 percent of Americans felt optimistic about the future. 107  A war-weary 
republic’s optimistic world view may have contributed to a dark horse candidate stealing 
the Republican presidential nomination.  Wendell Willkie, a man who had never held or 
run for political office, suggested the United States should do everything in its power, 
short of war, to help the British.  By appealing to the other GOP political factions, 
Willkie, in what has become known as the “Miracle in Philadelphia,” defeated the 
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Republican front-runners and secured the presidential nomination.108  Thomas Mahl, in 
Desperate Deception: British Covert Operation in the United States, 1939-1944, 
suggested the BSC helped secure Willkie’s nomination.  According to Mahl, Sam Pryor 
replaced Ralph Williams, who injured himself shortly before the GOP Convention, as the 
head of the GOP Convention Committee.  Sam Pryor used his influence to ensure that 
former President Herbert Hoover and zealous isolationist did not have the opportunity 
give a rousing isolationist speech, which would have pushed the delegates to support 
anyone else but Willkie.  The reason behind Pryor’s desire to help was simple enough.  
Pryor knew that Willkie did not have the popular support to carry the election, and so 
Willkie’s candidacy ensured that Roosevelt would win an unprecedented third term in 
office.109 
The momentum gained by Willkie at the GOP convention may have helped 
convince FDR, at the last moment, to run for an unprecedented third term.  Ernest Cuneo, 
however, stated that Roosevelt gave the “green light” to a third presidential term as early 
as 1938.  According to Cuneo, he enlisted the aid of Walter Winchell, a staunch 
Roosevelt supporter, to help shape U.S. public opinion to support a possible third term.110  
It does not really matter if FDR planned to run in 1938 or 1940.  Either way, Roosevelt 
played the reluctant candidate.  He explained, “Eight years in the presidency, following a 
period of bleak depression, and covering one world crisis after another, would normally 
                                                 
  108 Joseph Barnes, Willkie, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952), 170.  Barnes used the phrase Miracle 
in Philadelphia for the title of Chapter Eleven of his biography on Willkie. 
  109 Mahl, 160-163. 
  110 “For the Record Crusader to Intrepid,” Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Ernest Cuneo Papers, Box 107, 
Folder 86. 
 186 
 
entitle any man to the relaxation that comes from honorable retirement.”111  His speech 
implied that if the people called, he would answer.  At the July 1940 Democratic 
Convention, the people called as state delegation after state delegation shouted “We want 
Roosevelt.” FDR responded to the call, accepted the Democratic presidential nomination, 
and thus broke with America’s most fundamental political tradition and ensured 
American support for the British. 112  Walter Lippmann best summed up Willkie’s role. 
Second only to the Battle of Britain, the sudden rise and nomination of 
Willkie was the decisive event, perhaps providential, which made it possible 
to rally the free world when it was almost conquered.  Under any other 
leadership but his the Republican Party would in 1940 have turned its back 
upon Great Britain, causing all who still resisted to feel they were 
abandoned.113  
  
Stephenson, during this contentious presidential election, did not remain idol.  
Knowing that U.S. sentiment supported hemispheric defense, he could convince the 
United States that it was in its best interest to enter the fray while the struggle with 
Germany occurred on foreign shores. Standing between Stephenson and his goal were the 
isolationists, a diverse group of Americans dedicated to ensuring the British not embroil 
the United States in another predominately-European war.  Not surprisingly, as FDR 
pushed the United States toward intervention, that politically, the core group of 
isolationists came from the Republican Party.  In the U.S. Senate, men like William 
Borah (R-ID), Robert La Follette (R-WI), Hiram Johnson (R-CA), Arthur Vanderburgh 
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(R-MI), Burton Wheeler (R-MT), Robert Taft (R-OH) and Gerald Nye (R-ND) all 
worked to keep the United States out of the war.114 
The isolationist Republican senators’ aims should not be confused with pacifism, 
fascism, or an unwillingness to bluster defense spending.  These isolationist politicians 
just refused to aid to the Allies—Britain and France.  Content to watch the British and the 
French fall to Hitler’s Wehrmacht, the isolationists clamored for hemispheric defense and 
for the United States to establish fortress America.  They suggested the United States 
forgive British and French World War I debt in exchange for British and French 
Caribbean possessions.  By removing every vestige of European influence in the 
Americas, these men believed they could set up an impregnable fortress safely guarded 
against invasion by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, which formed the Americas’ eastern 
and western border. 115   
Latin or South American despots, who refused to preserve cordial diplomatic 
relations with the United States could be dealt with.  General Robert E. Wood stated “no 
government in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean South American countries 
will be tolerated unless it is friendly to the United States…if necessary; we are prepared 
to use force to attain that objective.”  The use of force was never an issue for American 
policymakers becoming embroiled in a second European was their concern.116  To justify 
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their cause, isolationists often quoted men like Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Philips and 
economist John T. Flynn.  Both men stressed the logistical impossibility of Hitler sending 
enough men and supplies 3,000 miles across the Atlantic to invade the United States.  
These convoys would be sitting ducks for U.S. bombers who would easily be able to 
destroy enemy ships as they entered American territorial waters.  Following Philips and 
Flynn’s rule, if the Germans could not safely reach America, then logically America 
would have to be the aggressor, and without direct provocation, risk millions of 
American lives.117  One year and three days after Germany invaded Poland; it seemed to 
isolationists that their country wanted to do just that. 
On September 16, 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Selective 
Training and Service Act of 1940, which required all men between the age of eighteen 
and thirty-five to register with their local draft boards.  By October 1940, the first 
peacetime conscription began as the military, traditionally viewed as the tool of despots 
by American politicians, began forcibly inducting men into the service of their country.  
Ironically, the nation, at peace, and with no threat of war on the horizon chose to prepare 
for war.118  On September 4, 1940, after Congress passed a law allowing conscription, 
Robert D. Stuart, Jr., a Yale Law School student and heir to the Quaker Oats Company 
founded the American First Committee (AFC)—an isolationist organization with about 
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800,000 members.119  Chairman of Sears, Roebuck and Company, General Robert E. 
Wood assumed the leadership of the AFC while Charles Lindbergh became the 
organization’s most famous spokesman.  The AFC “did not start out as a pro-German 
association.”  The AFC gave out propaganda designed to “obtain the support of the 
greatest possible number of groups and cliques.”  Their rhetoric appealed to pacifists, 
anti-New Dealers, Anglophobes, anticommunists, anti-Semites, American imperialists, 
and those who viewed Europe as “a corrupt and backward region which stood for all the 
things from which the Pilgrim Fathers and their successors had fled.” 120  The AFC, like 
Congressional isolationists, believed in hemispheric defense.  No foreign army can 
successfully invade a militarily prepared nation.  The best way to ensure military 
preparedness was by keeping the United States out of the war and by refusing to aid the 
Allies.  AFC members believed the United States could avoid entering another 
predominately European conflict—a prospect that weighed heavily on the minds of most 
Americans during the summer and fall of 1940.121 
 As the presidential election of 1940 approached, the tension over the war reached 
a fevered pitch.  Many believed the result of the election would provide the victor with a 
mandate on how the United States should approach the conflict.  On November 5, 1940, 
Americans cast their vote, and Roosevelt overwhelmingly won the electoral vote securing 
449 votes to Willkie’s 82.  The president, after a hard-fought reelection, promised not to 
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run for a fourth term.122  A promise he would eventually break, but shortly after FDR’s 
reelection, the BSC continued its political warfare campaign to bring the United States 
into the “shooting” war.  Having won reelection, FDR redoubled his efforts to secure aid 
for the British.123  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Empire and War 
 
 
Figure 51 
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President Roosevelt’s efforts to bypass the Neutrality Acts became a legislative 
issue in the spring of 1941.  Shortly after his reelection, FDR realized the British were on 
the brink of bankruptcy; so, he began promoting his new plan to aid the Allies.  As early 
as December 1940, Roosevelt, speaking to those political factions that supported 
hemispheric defense, stated, “We do not need to fear attack in the Americas” as long as 
Britain, “our most powerful neighbor in the Atlantic” remains steadfast in resisting Nazi 
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aggression.  Roosevelt stated that England remained America’s first line of defense 
against German aggression.  The president went on to explain 
Does anyone seriously believe…that we could rest easy if the Axis powers 
were our neighbors there? If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will 
control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the high 
seas—and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval 
resources against this hemisphere.  It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, 
in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a gun—a gun loaded 
with explosive bullets, economic as well as military.2 
 
Roosevelt’s solution was the passage of the “cash-and-carry” addendum to the Neutrality 
Acts.  This addendum allowed the United States to sell munitions to belligerent nations 
for hard currency allowed the British to survive the summer of 1940.  The president’s 
idea was simple and appealed to the fundamental tenants of American exceptionalism.  
Roosevelt suggested the United States lend the British all the equipment they needed to 
fight the Germans. 
Roosevelt equated leading war material to allowing a neighbor whose house is on 
fire to borrow a hose to douse the flames.  The President went on to state that after the 
neighbor had extinguished the fire he expected him to return his hose.3  Senator Robert 
Taft (R-OH) pithily quipped, “Lending war equipment is a good deal like lending 
chewing gum. You don't want it back."4  Senator Burton Wheeler (D-MT) stated the 
passage of Lend-Lease was the first step toward war and that FDR’s foreign policy 
decisions would “plow under every fourth American boy.”  Wheeler’s accusation 
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offended the American president.  At a January 1941 press conference, FDR stated he 
believed Wheeler’s proclamation was “the most dastardly, unpatriotic thing” uttered by a 
U.S. senator.  The president went on to say that Wheeler’s comments were “the rottenest 
thing that has ever been said in public life.”5 
During the spring of 1941, Congress debated the president’s plan to lend material 
to the Allies and the AFC came to believe the passage of this bill would bring the United 
States one-step closer to war.  As members of the America First Committee lobbied 
against this bill, British Security Coordination agents came to see this organization and its 
message as the greatest threat to British war aims.  As the AFC launched a full-scale 
propaganda campaign against Lend-Lease, Stephenson made them the primary target of 
British counterpropaganda efforts even.6  Members of the AFC took out full-page 
advertisements designed to “obtain the support of the greatest possible number of groups 
and cliques.”   With the passage of Lend-Lease, the AFC, undaunted, lobbied against 
FDR’s proposal to use U.S. Naval vessels to convoy these supplies across the Atlantic.  
Another fight they would lose to presidential political maneuvering.7 
Stephenson’s counterpropaganda campaign called for BSC agents to travel to 
various U.S. cities across the country to attend AFC meetings.  By befriending AFC 
members, BSC agents began to piece together a plan to impede these isolationists’ 
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influence.  Determined to discredit the AFC, BSC agents began getting proof that Nazi 
officials had direct contact with American First members.  The BSC got copies of checks 
made out to members of Congress from Nazi agents.  For example, Representative 
Hamilton Fish (R-NY), who Time Magazine referred to as the “nation’s No. 1 
isolationist” received a $3,100 check from G. F. Hansen-Sturm, a Nazi propagandist 
working as the assistant treasurer of the Romanoff Caviar Company.8  Fish publicly 
called Pearson a liar and Sandy Griffith, the head of the Nonpartisan Committee to 
Defeat Hamilton Fish, tried to convince Pearson to sue the representative for liable.  A 
gambit Pearson refused.  The columnist believed a lawsuit would be time-consuming and 
he preferred to support the British war effort through well-written columns touting the 
British cause.9 
Stephenson’s propaganda campaign used journalists to shape American public 
opinion.  Shortly after arriving in the United States, he renewed his friendship with Ernest 
Cuneo, owner of the North American Newspaper Alliance.  Cuneo’s chain of newspapers 
employed such notable pro-British journalists as Drew Pearson and Walter Winchell.  He 
contacted George Backer, publisher of the New York Post, Ralph Ingersoll, editor of the 
PM, Helen Ogden Reid, New York Herald Tribune, Paul Patterson, publisher of the 
Baltimore Sun, A.H. Sulzberger, President of the New York Times, and Walter Lemmon, 
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owner or WRUL—a popular radio station.10  Stephenson, also, used journalists, to 
included Walter Lippmann, William L. Shirer, Edmond Taylor, Douglas Miller, H.R. 
Knickerbocker, Raymond Gram Swing, Walter Winchell and Drew Pearson.   The New 
York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the New York Post, and the Baltimore Sun ran 
BSC “plant” stories discrediting isolationist groups.11  These propaganda campaigns, 
conducted by BSC controlled newspaper columnists, worked because these stories 
proved to be factual.  These columnists’ careers rose as the quality of their stories 
improved.  Having the SIS provide factual material for their articles ensured that they 
could “scoop” their competition.12 
Walter Winchell and Drew Pearson proved especially useful.  These men 
published “hot” stories by collecting “dirt” on prominent public figures, which they 
threatened to publish “unless their prospective victims” supplied them with whatever 
information they needed.  These men proved invaluable to the British war effort but they 
also represented a dangerous source of information.  The British knew Winchell and 
Pearson could turn on them at any time but these men knew the inner workings of the 
U.S. government and this knowledge would prove invaluable.  If Stephenson was going 
to succeed, he needed to not only control their vast network of informants but also 
influence, through pro-British news stories, their broad readership.  Winchell wrote a 
daily column printed in more than 800 newspapers and read by well over 25 million 
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people.  Drew Pearson wrote a regular column entitled the Washington Merry-Go-Round, 
which was published in 616 newspapers with a readership of nearly 20 million.  Both 
Winchell and Pearson had a Sunday night radio broadcast with an estimated 15 million 
listeners each.  Both men proved instrumental in helping to sway U.S. public opinion. 
Setting up contacts within the U.S. media enabled the BSC to launch offensive and 
defensive political warfare programs.  This allowed Stephenson the flexibility to counter 
external propaganda (German intelligence) and internal (isolationist and 
noninterventionist) domestic campaigns.  The BSC continuously worked to ensure 
nothing hindered the growing Anglo-American cooperation.  German and British 
intelligence fought, this war of words, by using intermediaries—mostly affiliated with 
isolationist and interventionist organizations.  While the British political warfare effort 
was not revealed during the conflict, the British did successfully expose “German 
inspired subversive propaganda” operations. 13  
While Stephenson held a broad mandate to work in the Americas, the BSC did not 
at first direct these early counterpropaganda efforts.  Special Operations Executive’s 
(SOE) SO1, the division tasked with foreign propaganda that worked with the British 
Ministry of Information (MOI), initially waged a covert war against the pro-Axis 
organizations working in the United States.  By financially supporting various American 
interventionist organizations, SOE agents began to infiltrate and assimilate these political  
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groups into their political warfare program.14  Organizations like: 
1.  The Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League to Champion Human Rights.  This 
society organized boycotts of all firms dealing in German Goods, published 
exposures of Germans and pro-German Americans in the USA, picketed 
isolationist meetings and issued a periodic bulletin on Nazi activities in 
America.  As an example of its work, at an American First rally, featuring 
Lindbergh as speaker, the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League distributed leaflets 
showing Lindbergh in amicable conversation with the be-medaled Erhard 
Milch of the Luftwaffe. 
2. The League of Human Rights, Freedom and Democracy.  This was a 
committee aimed at winning the support of organized labor. It had branches in 
over 200 cities.  Its honorary president was William Green, head of the 
American Federation of Labor; its president, Matthew Woll, vice-president of 
the American Federation of Labor; and its vice-president, David Dubinsky of 
the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union.  Its theme was that 
American labor owed it to itself to assist British labor in the fight against 
Hitler.  One of its best achievements was the distribution of a pamphlet 
contrasting Nazi statements of principle with those of distinguished 
Americans, under the title of ‘Their Aims—Our Aims.’  Sample copies of this 
were sent to 4,800 branch offices of the AFL unions, with such success that 
over 8,000,000 were eventually distributed in the United States and 2,000,000 
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more in Latin America.  In addition, it sent selected news items to 400 labor 
papers and magazines every week. 
3. The American Labor Committee to Aid British Labor was another affiliate of 
the American Federation of Labor, also under the chairmanship of Matthew 
Woll.  It held mass meetings, sponsored radio broadcasts and distributed ‘Aid 
British Labour’ buttons, ‘Help Spanish Dictators’ circulars, posters, etc.  
These two committees were particularly useful in the period when much of the 
organized labor was still anti-British because if followed, or was attracted to, 
pro-Soviet isolationists.  It was impossible to do anything with large segments 
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations before June 1941, but its powerful 
rival, the American Federation of Labor, was thus induced to side with the 
British. 
4. The Ring of Freedom, an association led by the publicist Dorothy Thompson, 
the Council for Democracy; the American Defenders of Freedom, and other 
such societies were formed and supported by to hold anti-isolationist meetings 
which branded all isolationists as Nazi-lovers. 
5. The Free World Association, which had on its committee the Spanish 
Republican politician Julio Alvarez del Vayo, the Uruguayan anti-Nazi 
propagandist Hugo Fernandez Artucio, the Socialist Louis Dolivet, and other 
distinguished liberals with whom BSC was closely in touch.  Founded in 
June-July 1941, it functioned in the United States mainly through liberal 
meetings and articles in liberal weeklies, but had more influence in Latin 
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America…It also sponsored broadcasts in Europe.  In conjunction with the 
‘Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies’…it held over a hundred 
‘Stop Mass Murders’ meeting throughout the USA in November 1941 against 
the shooting of French hostages by the Germans.  There were 750 speakers, 
the estimated attendance was 350,000, and 20,000 newspapers carried 
announcements or reports of the proceedings. 
6. The Civilian Defense and Information Bureau, which sent 85,000 copies of an 
article on the British Empire by Sir Norman Angell, reprinted in pamphlet 
form, to the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, local chairman 
of the ‘Committee to Defend America,’ doctors, lawyers, and educators 
through the USA. 
The BSC and SOE concealed, from the general public, their efforts to stimulate and 
encourage pro-interventionist societies.  “All financing and all contacts were managed 
through reliable cut-outs so that the fact that Britain was greatly responsible for what 
appeared to be a new surge of honest American opinion was never revealed.” 15 
The British found the average American worker to be uneducated and lacking any 
real political traditions.  And yet, the pro-British labor organizations—American Labor 
Committee to Aid British Labor and the Fight for Freedom Committee—tried to convince 
American workers to support the British war effort.  Most of these foreign-born blue 
collar workers barely spoke English.  To reach these men, the BSC found impassioned 
speeches appealed to the lowest of human emotions often swayed them.  By March 1941, 
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as Lend-Lease became a reality, the American Labor Committee to Aid British Labor 
held a rally where New York Governor Herbert H. Lehman gave the keynote speech 
helping to raise $5,000,000 to support the British.  The insidious nature of the British 
political warfare campaign to win over American workers relied on BSC agents working 
behind the scenes.  By that, the British could hide their true intentions since no British 
citizen belonged to or attended these meetings.16 
The largest two American labor organizations were the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Labor (CIO).  Members of the AFL 
supported Roosevelt and the idea of providing aid to Britain.  John L. Lewis, the head of 
CIO, not only personally disliked Roosevelt but was also staunchly isolationist.  
Unfortunately, most of the defense industry workers were affiliated with the CIO and the 
BSC quick began to view “Lewis’s prejudices” as a “menace to Britain.”  FDR, also, saw 
Lewis as a threat.  The American president ordered the FBI to investigate Lewis.  Before 
the 1940 presidential election, the public became aware of this federal investigation, 
which cost Roosevelt the support of the CIO.17 
In November 1941, at the CIO Nation Convention in Detroit, the BSC front 
organization Fight for Freedom went on the offensive attacking Lewis and his isolationist 
beliefs.  The members of the Fight for Freedom Committee conducted extensive polling 
of the CIO delegates making sure to phrase their questions to “steer the delegate’s 
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opinion toward support of Britain and the war.”  By manipulating the questions to illicit a 
preordained response, the delegates polled stated “96percent thought defeating Hitler was 
more important than keeping the USA out of the war.  90percent said they would fight at 
once if it seemed certain Hitler would defeat Britain.  87percent supported Fight for 
Freedom against America First.”  In fact, those polled voted Charles Lindbergh the 
number one fascist in the United States.  This same poll voted Senator Burton Wheeler, 
the chair of the Senate Interstate Commerce Commission, who, in August 1941, began 
looking into the interventionists working in Hollywood, number two.  Members of the 
Fight for Freedom Committee got the delegates at the CIO National Convention to 
unanimously pass a resolution to support the president’s foreign policy.  They also passed 
out pro-interventionist literature to include “25,000 copies of Hitler-Wanted for Murder; 
2,000 copies of Fight for Freedom; and 2,000 Smash Hitler buttons.”18 
The BSC began investigation the connection between pro-Axis propaganda 
efforts and isolationists legislators.  It seemed that members of German Library of 
Information, in New York City, received franked envelopes from a several senatorial and 
congressional offices.  Odd since the signature on these envelopes appeared to come from 
the same hand, and the senators and representatives came from all over and yet the letters 
were all sent from New York City.  The British became convinced there was a single 
distribution center for these franked letters.  Most of these letters came from 
Representative Rush D. Holt, Sr. (D-WV), Senators Gerald Nye (R-ND), George 
Tinkham (R-MA), Jacob Thorkelson (R-MT), and Burton K. Wheeler (D-MT).  All of 
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these men held isolationist or anti-British views.  BSC agents, working in New York, 
discovered the pro-Axis franking operation used a blue stencil.   They believed this 
stencil came from a unique addressing machine.  They quickly discovered there were 
only three of these types of machines in New York City.  Further investigation concluded 
that these letters were being assembled and sent from the Steuben Society, listed as 
German cultural organization.  Once the BSC presented evidence the Steuben Society 
violated postal regulations, government officials forced this German cultural organization 
to pay a fine while embarrassing the senators and representatives involved.19  
While the BSC worked to expose congressional bias, the Rockefeller Office, and 
the FBI continued conducting economic warfare against Axis allied businesses located 
south of the border.  By the summer of 1941, U.S. businesses severed ties with more than 
a 1000 pro-Axis firms.  The Rockefeller office expanded its voluntary mandate against 
pro-Axis firms.   Rockefeller employees asked Latin American companies to look into 
how their employees spent their money.  They wanted to stop these employees from 
spending their money on Nazi propaganda.  They also asked U.S. importers to stop 
dealing with suspected Central and South America Nazi purchasing agents.  Not 
everyone was willing to sacrifice profit for patriotism.  James D. Moony, General 
Motors, and William Rhodes Davis, Davis Oil Company, refused to adhere to this 
voluntary program.  Business was business and they refused to stop turning a profit just 
because there was a war being fought in Europe.20  On July 19, 1941, U.S. sentiment had 
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shifted enough to allow FDR to make his economic warfare policies compulsory, which 
marked the end of the Rockefeller office’s offensive intelligence operations in the region.  
The multimillionaire transferred all information complied by his agents about suspected 
pro-Axis business dealings to the State Department’s newly established World Trade 
Intelligence Division.  To ensure continuity of service, Rockefeller, also, sent some of his 
organization’s key personal to work for this new State Department agency.21 
In a little more than a year, Stephenson set up a clandestine intelligence 
organization working out of New York City.  He maintained a close working relationship 
with the FBI.  The BSC, working with the Rockefeller Office, successfully orchestrated a 
covert economic warfare campaign against Nazi sympathizers working in Latin and 
South America.  The BSC using cutouts monitored anti-British organizations working in 
the United States.  Stephenson, also, designed and carried out counterpropaganda 
campaigns designed to shift U.S. sentiment to support the British war effort.  The passage 
of Lend-Lease proved that these counterpropaganda campaigns worked.  American 
agents of influence working with British intelligence began influencing presidential 
policy decisions by having access, through Sherwood, to FDR’s political speeches. 
The greatest BSC success occurred during the first half of 1941.  Stephenson and 
British Intelligence convinced FDR to create the first centralized American peacetime 
national level intelligence agency.  This decision had far-reaching implications that 
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extended beyond the end of the war.22  As early as June 1940, Stephenson began to 
understand that he needed to “secure full American participation in secret activities 
directed against the enemy outside the Western Hemisphere.”  Intrepid needed something 
that did not yet exist.  He needed “an agency responsible for conducting, on behalf of the 
United States Government, secret activities throughout the world.”  Stephenson 
envisaged an organization similar to the BSC, which would allow for easy collaboration 
between the two nations.  Stephenson began discussing his plans for American 
intelligence reform with Donovan. 23 
Stephenson, however, does not deserve all the credit for setting up COI.  
Roosevelt, as early as 1939, realized, as did the directors of the FBI, ONI, and MID, that 
war required a centralized intelligence apparatus, which is why FDR set up the 
Intradepartmental Intelligence Committee (IIC).  The FBI and the military struggled to 
gain control of whatever wartime intelligence agency Roosevelt chose to create.  The 
military suggested creating a Joint Intelligence Committee with the armed services in 
control of wartime intelligence.  J. Edgar Hoover, working through the IIC, believed that 
Roosevelt would expand his mandate from the Americas to conduct global intelligence 
collection in support of U.S. military operations but the president decided to go another 
way.24 
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In December 1940, “Wild Bill” Donovan, the president’s unofficial eyes and ears, 
took a second trip to war-torn Europe.  The facts about this mission remain murky as 
Stephenson claimed that through his efforts, he orchestrated Donovan’s second trip to 
Europe.  A claim Donovan denied.  The former soldier turned amateur spy stated that he 
did not know Intrepid when FDR asked him to make this second trip.25   
According to Donovan’s account, FDR asked him to “go and make a strategic 
appreciation from an economic, political, and military standpoint of the Mediterranean 
area.”26  Regardless of whom arranged the trip, the two men traveled together to Lisbon 
and then on to London.  Stephenson, just before leaving the United States, sent a cable to 
Menzies, the head of SIS, stating that it was  
Impossible to over-emphasize importance to Donovan’s visit…He can play 
a great role perhaps a vital one…but it may not be consistent with orthodox 
diplomacy nor confined to its channels…You should personally convey to 
Prime Minister that Donovan is presently the strongest friend we have…27 
 
The head of the BSC understood that Donovan exercised a “controlling influence 
over Knox, a strong influence over Stimson, friendly advisory influence over President 
and Hull.”28  A sentiment reiterated by Alfred Duff Cooper, British Minister of 
Information under Churchill.  Cooper enthusiastically supported Donovan’s return to 
London.  Besides being a friend, Cooper realized the extent to which Donovan had gone 
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to ensure the British got the supplies they needed to fight the war.29  Donovan was 
instrumental in orchestrating the destroyers for bases deal as well as ensuring the United 
States provided Britain with the latest bombsights for their bombers.30  
This trip differed from Donovan’s first as it included an extensive tour of the war-
torn Balkan’s as well as North African.  According to an official British account, Winston 
Churchill asked Donovan to visit the Balkans on “Britain’s behalf,” which he did.31  
Donovan met with King George and Premier Metaxas of Greece, King Boris of Bulgaria, 
and Prince Regent Paul Karadordević of Yugoslavia. Stephenson’s account of Donovan’s 
trip to the Balkans credits him with “paving the way for the coup d’état” against Prince 
Paul’s pro-German government. 32  When asked by General Dusan T. Simovic whether he 
believed Britain would hold out against German aggression, the former World War I 
Colonel stated that he thought the British would hold out.  Simovic, two days after the 
Yugoslavian government signed the Tripartite Pact, coordinated the coup that removed 
Prince Paul and his Prime Minister, Dragiša Cvetković, from power compelling Hitler to 
invade the Balkan nation.33 
After his brief stop in the Balkans, Donovan headed to North Africa where he met 
with King Farouk of Egypt.  Similar to his first trip, he went everywhere and met with 
everyone.  FDR’s envoy, at each of his stops, discussed regional strategy, logistics, and 
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long-term plans for resisting Nazi advances in these regions with heads of states, general 
officers, and intelligence specialists.  Intrepid, also, once again ensured that British 
intelligence experts gave Donovan an insider’s view of how the British conducted special 
operations throughout Europe.  These conversations with “C” helped Donovan convince 
U.S. policy makers to establish a centralized intelligence apparatus patterned on British 
Intelligence.34  
When Wild Bill returned, he argued the key to retaking Europe lay with the 
British ability to gain and control North Africa.  The British would then need to extend 
their military influence to include the entire Mediterranean Sea.  By using the British 
Grecian salient, the British could counterattack through the Balkans to the heart of 
Hitler’s Empire.  The loss of this salient, a few months later, caused this invasion plan to 
be altered.  The information collected by Donovan, however, provided the framework for 
the first Anglo-American offensive operation of the war—Operation Torch.35 
On March 18, 1940, after three and a half months of unofficial snooping into the 
allied war effort, Donovan returned home.  Similar to his first trip to London, Wild Bill 
carefully calculated how to disseminate the information he collected.  He immediately 
contacted his friend and mentor Henry Knox.  The following day, Donovan briefly met 
with FDR.  There is no written record of what the two men discussed.  Historian Thomas 
Troy believed Donovan took the opportunity to “suggest [to the president] the creation of 
a new agency” tasked with conducting wartime intelligence operations.36 
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Shortly after this early morning meeting with the president, the former World War 
I hero, relying on a meticulously drafted “to do” list, began once again making his way 
through Washington’s burgeoning intelligence community.  He stop to talk with 
intelligence professionals about wartime censorship, subversive activities, and 
propaganda broadcasts.  Making time to further the British cause, Donovan met with 
those responsible for shipping U.S. Army equipment, U.S. aircraft, and U.S. munitions to 
the English Isles.  All the while telling anyone who would listen that British morale was 
high.37 
 Donovan’s movements quickly came to the attention of General Sherman Miles, 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.  Miles, alarmed by rumors of a “super agency” 
tasked with controlling all intelligence, sent a memorandum, outlining his concerns, to 
General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff.  Miles explained that “such an 
agency, no doubt under Col. Donovan, would collect, collate, and possibly even evaluate 
all military intelligence.”  Miles did not remind Marshal that J. Edgar Hoover continued 
to ask for the FBI to be given responsibility for all foreign and domestic intelligence 
operations.  MID had successfully, except in Latin and South America, kept the FBI from 
encroaching on its foreign intelligence collection activities.  The War Department, having 
fought to keep an independent intelligence apparatus, now had to contend with the 
possibility of Donovan taking control.  Miles feared that this new agency would become 
a clearinghouse for the raw product collected by all three major intelligence agencies.   
This new agency would then be able to filter the information for presidential 
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consumption, which according to Miles would be “calamitous” for the War 
Department.38 What the War Department did not realize is that Stephenson had been 
“attempting to maneuver Donovan into accepting the job of coordinating all U.S. 
intelligence.”39 
Publicly, the idea of directing this new agency did not appeal to Donovan, who 
continually asked to for a battlefield command.  As one historian so eloquently explained, 
Donovan was “a hero in search of a role.” 40   Before taking his second trip to Europe, 
Donovan asked Stimson for a military command.  Stimson explained there was very little 
chance of him getting command.  Privately, Donovan realized that command was no 
longer an option began to lobby to establish a new centralized intelligence agency, which 
kept his name at the top of the shortlist to command the new agency.  It might not be a 
military command, but it would do.  In addition, as the COI transformed into the OSS, 
Donovan’s twisting of his mandate ensured his men saw combat—most of which 
occurred behind the lines. 
Stephenson, working behind the scenes, provided Donovan with access to the 
most powerful men in Britain.  He considered Donovan to be the only person for the job.   
According to Stephenson, Donovan was the logical choice.  “He had the confidence of 
the president, of the Secretary of State and the civilian heads of the Service 
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Departments.”  Since the Great War, Wild Bill had “made some study of, and had given 
considerable thought to, the conduct of secret activities” and Donovan “had already 
shown himself willing to cooperate fully with BSC.”41 
 As early as April 26, 1941, Donovan began seeking allies to help convince the 
president to set up a new centralized intelligence agency.  Donovan wrote a short letter to 
his friend and mentor Frank Knox explaining to the Secretary of the Navy the 
“instrumentality through which the British Government gathers its information in foreign 
countries.”  Any new intelligence agency “should not be controlled by party exigencies.” 
As “the most vital means of national defense,” the new agency “should be headed by 
someone appointed by the President and directly responsible to him and to no one else.”  
The organization’s budget should be “secret and made solely at the discretion of the 
President.”42 
Donovan went on to explain the new organization “should not take over the home 
duties now performed by the FBI, nor the intelligence organizations of the Army and the 
Navy.”  Instead, the new intelligence apparatus would have three primary roles.  First, it 
would “have sole charge of intelligence work abroad.”  Second, it would “coordinate the 
activities of military and naval attaches and others in the collection of information 
aboard.”  Third, it would “classify and interpret all information from whatever source 
obtained to be available for the President and for such of the services as he would 
designate.”  These three primary functions of intelligence make what would become the 
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COI, the OSS, and eventually the CIA  seem nothing more than a clearinghouse for 
intelligence—a classified news service supplying information to the president. 43 
Donovan, however, saw a multifaceted intelligence apparatus.  A place where 
data analysis would play a small but vital function.  The former World War I Colonel 
went on to explain to Knox that, “Modern war operates on more fronts than battlefronts.  
Each combatant seeks to dominate the whole field of communications.  No defense 
system is effective unless it recognizes and deals with this fact.”  Thus according to 
Donovan, “the interception and inspection (commonly and erroneously called censorship) 
of mail and cables; the interception of radio communication; the use of propaganda to 
penetrate behind enemy lines; the direction of active subversive operations in enemy 
countries, all comprise an essential facet of intelligence work.”  Donovan wanted the 
president to establish a centralized intelligence agency able to run any type of operation.44 
Donovan realized the FBI, ONI, and MID would not willingly submit to a new 
agency.   He proposed the president set up “an Advisory Committee consisting at least of 
Assistant Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, Navy and Justice and perhaps a junior 
permanent committee to make certain of the full cooperation of all departments. 
Donovan’s proposed committee mimicked IIC and the IIC had failed to foster a spirit of 
cooperation between the rival intelligence services.  FDR’s decision not to institute this 
oversight committee suggests the president did not want an extra layer of bureaucracy 
between the Oval Office and COI.45  By June 10, 1941, Wild Bill put his ideas for a new 
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agency into a concise report, entitled “Memorandum of Establishment of Strategic 
Information”, which formally set down his ideas for creating a global intelligence agency.  
Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of State, John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of 
State, and Henry Knox, Secretary of the Navy, knew the directors of the FBI, MID, and 
ONI would hate the idea; and yet, these men  supported Donovan’s plan.46  America 
needed a centralized intelligence agency. 
Donovan next turned his attention to finding allies from within Roosevelt’s inner 
circle.  He pitched his idea for a combined intelligence service to Vincent Astor, whose 
amateur intelligence organization had helped keep FDR informed about world events 
while acting as a conduit between British Intelligence and the FBI.  Donovan hoped to 
sell Astor on his plan and then have Astor present these ideas on intelligence reform to 
FDR; unfortunately, Astor preferred the FBI to Donovan’s yet unnamed intelligence 
organization. Donovan, searching for allies, next turned to Robert E. Sherwood, 
presidential speechwriter, and BSC confidant.  Sherwood like Knox and Stimson 
supported Donovan, but the presidential speechwriter was out town during the first part 
of June 1941.47   
The greatest push for Donovan’s organization came from two unlikely sources—a 
British Admiral and the new U.S. Ambassador to England.  On May 25, 1941, Real 
Admiral John H. Godfrey, the British Director of Naval Intelligence, and his aid, 
Commander Ian Fleming, arrived in Washington D. C. to discuss with the U.S. president 
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the importance of integrating the decentralized U.S. intelligence community.  Godfrey, 
having met Donovan during his two trips to London, pushed the 40-year-old Colonel on 
FDR as the logical choice to run this new super agency. 48  As the discussion over this 
new agency reached its climax, John G. Winant, a former New Hampshire governor who 
FDR had just recently appointed as the Ambassador to the Court of St. James, replacing 
the defeatist minded Joseph Kennedy, returned from London.  Over the course of several 
days, Winant met five times with the president.49  Stephenson referred to Winant as an 
avenue “of influence at the White House” an avenue the BSC director intended to exploit 
to ensure the United States established a global intelligence service.  Winant and 
Godfrey’s pleas for creating Donovan’s agency bore fruit and on June 18, 1941, 
Stephenson sent a telegram to Menzies stating that 
…Donovan saw President today and after long discussion wherein all points 
were agreed, he accepted appointment… He will be Coordinator of all 
forms intelligence including offensive operations equivalent to S.O.2…he 
will hold rank of Major General and will be responsible only repeat only to 
the President…Donovan accuses me of having ‘intrigued and driven him 
into appointment…You can imagine how relived I am after three months of 
battle and jockeying for position in Washington that our man is in a position 
of such importance to our efforts…50 
 
Donovan’s accusation of British meddling reflected a self-deprecating remark made by a 
man who secretly wanted the appointment.  Wild Bill worked to convince Washington 
insiders to set up COI and he want the job almost as much as the British wanted him to 
have it. 
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FDR gave Donovan a broad mandate under which to conduct intelligence 
operations in support of what the executive branch, in this case, the president of the 
United States, considered national security issues.  The American president ordered 
Donovan’s organization “to collect and analyze all information and data which may bear 
upon national security.”  COI was tasked with correlating this data and making it 
“available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as 
the President may determine.”  Miles’ prophetic vision of Donovan’s centralized super 
agency exceeded his worst prediction.  COI’s mandate allowed the organization “to carry 
out when requested by the President such supplementary activities as may facilitate the 
securing of information important for national security not now available to the 
Government.”51  Thus, centralizing all U.S. intelligence operations under COI gave 
Donovan the ability to conduct global offensive intelligence operations.  To say that this 
mandate shocked members of the FBI, MID, ONI would be an understatement.52 
Creating COI hurt the FBI.  The FBI, because of this intelligence reorganization, 
lost its monopoly on being the only U.S. agency to have direct dealings with SIS.53  
Hoover, in a fit of rage, threatened to resign over Donovan’s appointment but on 
reflection reconsidered.  Hoover, ever the political survivor, however, arranged for the 
FBI to conduct the background checks on prospective COI agents.  The FBI director, 
having learned from the BSC, then simply had his agents infiltrate first the COI and then 
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the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).  Some of these agents rose to high-level positions 
within Donovan’s agency.  These men provided Hoover with all the information the 
director needed to ensure his organization survived the war.54 
By the fall of 1941, Stephenson’s organization, working with COI, provided a 
“vast volume of intelligence” to Menzies.  The director of MI6 realized that Stephenson 
had set up “an almost unassailable personal position in the U.S.A.”  The former 
industrialist turned spy controlled all British secret activities in the Americas and had 
become the “backdoor contact with the White House.”  The BSC, because of Roosevelt’s 
intelligence reorganization, achieved the impossible.  Stephenson, working as the conduit 
to the various U.S. intelligence agencies, all of which refused to work with one another, 
somehow convinced these competing agencies to share information with British 
intelligence working in New York City.  When this arrangement proved inefficient, 
Stephenson worked to create a centralized American intelligence agency.  The BSC 
ensured FDR appointed an Anglophile to head the new organization.55  And Stephenson 
arranged for British intelligence to train all new COI agents at a secret facility in Canada 
known as Camp X.56  
  As the British worked to ensure the Axis powers did not expand their political 
warfare operations into the Americas, the BSC began looking for ways to weaken the 
German-Japanese alliance.  Stephenson’s men wanted to expose the Japanese to anti-
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German propaganda.  They enlisted the aid of Juiji Kasai, a prominent member of the 
Japanese Diet.  Kasai, a moderate, agreed to send personal letters home to his associates.  
To avoid postal censors, Captain (later Colonel) James Roosevelt, the president’s oldest 
son and “a good friend of the BSC,” arranged to have the Washington Post Office stamp 
the letters “airmail, special delivery.”  These postal workers did not mail the letters; 
instead, a courier delivered Kasai’s letters to the captain of the Heiyo Maru, a Japanese 
ship bound for Yokohama.57 
The British and the Americans, also, began using shortwave radio to reach the 
Japanese.  The British began a rumor campaign suggesting that German fifth columnists 
were influencing the Japanese government.  William Winter, a useful idiot and well-
known American journalist, reported  
The chances are that Japan would remain neutral, and would support a 
peaceful policy towards the United States, if Japan were entirely directed 
by the Japanese.  The facts, however, are that there are more than three 
thousand Nazis in Japan.  They are not Japanese; they are Germans. They 
are reported—and incidentally this is not to be construed as any “inside” 
information—it is material that has widely been published—the report is 
that there are more than three thousand well-trained agents, listed as 
businessmen, technicians, advisers, and just plain tourists, all over the 
country…Whether Japanese intelligence will overcome Nazi persuasion 
only the future can reveal.58 
 
Winter soon became a regular commentator working for KGEI out of San Francisco and 
he never discovered that he worked for the BSC.  The Malay Broadcasting Corporation 
and the Australian Broadcasting Commission translated his commentaries into Dutch, 
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French, Chinese, Japanese, Tagalog, Thai, and Malay and then retransmitted these 
broadcasts throughout Asia.59 
These efforts to destroy the German-Japanese alliance as well as exposing the 
aggressive expansionist plans of the militarist could not stop diplomatic relations between 
the United States and Japan from deteriorating.  Stephenson’s organization penetrated the 
Japanese Embassy in Washington and the Japanese Consulates in New York and San 
Francisco.  The BSC passed the information obtained by these agents to the Whitehouse, 
which provided FDR a behind the scenes glimpse into Japan’s attitudes towards the 
United States.  The news from these agents became more and more alarming.  On 
November 27, 1941, according to the BSC papers, James Roosevelt, FDR’s son, 
delivered a private massage to Stephenson.  “Japanese negotiations off.  Services expect 
action within two weeks.”60  American intelligence proved accurate and on December 7, 
1941, Imperial Japan attacked U.S. Naval forces stationed at Pearl Harbor.  No one 
expected an attack on U.S. forces stationed in Hawaii—least of all Winston Churchill. 61   
As one author put it, “The isolationist cause died on the spot.”  With the death of 
almost 2,500 American servicemen, the British finally gained an ally.  Winston Churchill 
immediately called Roosevelt, who told the British prime minster that he intended to ask 
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Congress for a declaration of war.  Churchill assured the American president that 
England intended to join the United States in declaring war against Imperial Japan.  As 
Churchill went to bed that night, he thought “we have won after all.”  The next day the 
United States declared war.62  
Half a world away, Chiang Kai-Shek, the leader of Nationalist China, also felt 
relieved.  The Japanese militarists had finally done the one thing, Chiang had secretly 
been hoping for, they attacked the United States.  Now, America’s war aims coincided 
with China’s, who had been fighting the Japanese for the better part of a decade.  The 
origins of the China lobby can be traced back to the Sino-Japanese Wars.  On September 
18, 1931, the Kwantung Army, considered by many to be the most prestigious command 
in the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA), took advantage of China’s Civil War and seized 
Manchuria.  Colonel Seishirō Itagaki and Lieutenant Colonel Kanji Ishiwara believed that 
Manchuria could solve two of Japan’s most pressing economic problems—poverty and 
lack of natural resources.  Hoping for Tokyo’s blessing the men plotted.  When Tokyo 
refused to sanction their plan, Itagaki and Ishiwara committed gekokujo (insubordination) 
and orchestrated the Mukden Incident, which allowed the Kwantung Army to set up a 
Japanese-controlled puppet régime called Manchukuo.63  Henry Stimson, the Secretary of 
State, formulated the non-recognition doctrine, which stated the United States would not 
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recognize territorial gains won through force of arms.64  The Japanese responded by 
compelling the Kuomintang (KMT or Chinese Nationalist Party) to sign the Tanggu 
Truce, which ended the conflict on Japanese terms.  As the Kwantung Army withdrew 
north of the Great Wall, the treaty terms went into effect setting up a demilitarized zone 
between the two nations.65  
The Kwantung Army consolidated its position in Northern China by building 
railroads, encouraging Japanese citizens to migrate to the region, and by boosting 
regional industrialization.  Tokyo renounced its commitment to the Washington Naval 
Treaty and began to expand its navy.66  By extending their control over their client state, 
the Japanese, according to U.S. policymakers, intended to use Mongolia as “a possible 
‘jumping off’ line to attack Russia.”  Rationalizing their conquest, Tokyo established the 
Amau Doctrine, which was similar to the Monroe Doctrine. 67  Just as the Monroe 
Doctrine protected U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere.  The Amau Doctrine 
allowed Japan to act unilaterally to preserved the peace in East Asia.  If the Tanggu Truce 
laid the foundation for future Japanese adventurism, then the Amau Doctrine provided 
the philosophical legitimacy for the future subjugation of China.68   
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The United States response to Japanese aggression consisted of a series of 
diplomatic warnings expressing U.S. treaty rights in the region.  As long as Japan 
allowed U.S. merchants to prosper in China by following the dictates of the U.S. inspired 
Open Door Policy, the United States continued to follow a non-interventionist plan.  On 
December 5, 1935, Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, said “Political disturbances and 
pressures give rise to uncertainty and misgiving and tend to produce economic and social 
dislocations.  They make difficult the enjoyment of treaty rights and the fulfillment of 
treaty obligations.”69 His statement provides a clear example of the diplomatic rhetoric of 
the times.   
 While the IJA consolidated power in Manchuria, Chiang Kai-Shek struggled to 
find allies to help prevent future Japanese incursions.  With non-interventionist feelings 
taking root in the United States, Chiang turned to Germany for support.  Stripped of its 
colonial possessions, the Weimar Republic forged an alliance with Nationalist China.  
This period of Sino-German cooperation worked on the barter system where the Germans 
provided the foreign credit Chiang needed in exchange for the raw materials that 
Germany needed to re-arm.  During this period of political instability, German financial 
investment in China helped the nation to both modernize and westernize.  Germans 
served as military, political, and economic advisers to Chiang.  These men, using the 
Prussian model, reorganized the Chinese military and set up a Western system of 
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education.  As China began to modernize, the KMT vowed to reunify China under 
Nationalist rule but the CCP resisted reunification.  The Chinese Civil War continued.70   
On December 12, 1936, Marshal Zhang Xueliang, the former warlord of 
Manchuria, ordered Colonel Sun Mingjiu to kidnap Chiang Kai-shek.  Zhang had grown 
tried of Chiang’s “determination to exterminate the Communist Party before resisting 
Japan.”  During the early morning hours, Sun’s men moved in and using brute force 
killed those who stood in their way.  Chiang recalled, “Bullets whizzed by quite close to 
my body and some of my bodyguards were hit and dropped dead.”  Chiang hid in a cave 
but soon the elements proved too much and the fifty year old Generalissimo surrendered 
to Sun. 71   Zhang’s hope of dealing directly with Chiang turned sour as the Generalissimo 
refused to talk and he refused to eat.  Worried about his place in history, Chiang decided 
that if it was to be a show trial followed by execution then he would met his fate on his 
feet.72 
Zhang was at his wits end and not sure what to do.  Chiang’s refusal to negotiate 
had him stumped; so, he contacted the CCP, who had no idea the Young Marshall had the 
audacity to order his men to arrest the leader of China.  Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai 
were elated when they heard the news and thought it was best to just kill Chiang but 
decided to defer to Stalin.  While waiting on Stalin’s reply, Zhou, the CCP’s top 
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negotiator, went to Xian.73  T.V. Soong and Mayling Soong, Chiang’s wife, also, headed 
to Xian to negotiate for his release.74  The Xian Incident has become a focal point for 
historians with no clear answers about what really occurred.  Chiang said that once Zhang 
read his diary the Young Marshall knew the Nationalist leader was the only man capable 
of leading China in its struggle against Japanese imperial ambitions.75  Others contend 
that Stalin decided to place his hopes in Chiang as being the only man who could keep 
the Japanese busy enough so the Kwantung Army did not turn its attention northward.76    
Chiang’s two and a half weeks in captivity altered the course of a nation.  Chiang 
put aside his policy of exterminating the CCP and formed the Second United Front.77  
Mao Zedong’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT put aside 
their ideological differences and decided to fight the Japanese.  The Nationalist leader’s 
decision to work with the CCP allowed Mao and his followers the time they needed to 
gain in strength.  By integrating the People’s liberation Army into his forces, Chiang gave 
Mao’s troops combat experience.  Experience, Mao would use against Chiang once the 
war was won.   
By the summer of 1937, the IJA advanced southward taking Beijing and opening 
the Northern China plain to further assault.  Up to this point, the Japanese hoped to secure 
a quick cease-fire followed by a negotiated peace granting Tokyo more Chinese territory, 
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but the battle of Shanghai changed everything.78  Chiang decided enough was enough and 
instead of negotiating he decided to fight.  Some historians believe the Xian Incident 
bolstered Chiang’s resolve but it was not ending the Chinese Civil War that made the 
Nationalist leader bold.  No it was the promise of Soviet support if Chiang stood up to the 
Japanese.79  The bloody urban fighting lasted throughout the summer and into the fall.  
The Chinese, out-gunned, retreated southward leaving the way open for the Japanese to 
advance on Nanking.80  
By August 1937, Joseph Stalin authorized $100 million worth of military aid to 
Nationalist China.  Four months later, the Soviet dictator approved another $200 million 
in aid.   A promise was a promise and to be honest Stalin’s motives were not purely 
altruistic.  Japanese expansionist policies placed the USSR and the Japanese at odds.  
Stalin hoped by supplying the KMT with weapons, munitions, and technical advisers that 
the Chinese would be able to bleed the Japanese dry. 81  Germany and the Soviet Union 
provided weapons to KMT troops until each of these totalitarian nations signed treaties 
with Imperial Japan.  Then the supplies stopped coming.82  
By the summer of 1940, Chiang needed a new ally.  Since the Nationalist 
government had been forced to flee to Chungking, “the spirit of the Chinese had reached 
                                                 
  78 For more on the battle for Shanghai see Peter Harmsen, Shanghai 1937: Stalingrad on the Yangtze, 
(Havertown, Pennsylvania: Casemate Publishers, 2013). 
  79 For a detailed view of this argument see Tsang, “Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘Secret Deal” at Xian and the Start 
of the Sino-Japanese War.” 
  80 Toland, 198. 
  81 From September 1937 until June 1941 the Soviet Union gave the Chinese 904 planes, 82 tanks and 
almost 1,150 pieces of artillery.  See Stuart D. Goldman, Nomonhan, 1939: The Red Army’s Victory that 
Shaped World War II, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 73. 
  82 Letter from T.V. Soong to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 7 August 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library, Official File China, Box 4, Military Mission to China.  
 224 
 
one of its all-war lows.”83  The IJA seemed unstoppable “as every major city was in the 
hands of the invader.”84  The Kwantung Army took the Yangtze River port of Ichang, 
which put Imperial Japanese bombers in range of the “new” Chinese capital.  This 
intensive bombing campaign took its toll on Chinese morale.  Morale was so low the 
Chiang sent out peace feelers to see what terms he might get for a negotiated peace with 
Tokyo.  The Generalissimo sent one of Dai Li’s agents to the British colonial possession 
of Hong Kong.85  This agent bore a striking resemblance to T.L. Soong, one of his 
brothers-in-law.  This gave the Japanese the impression that they were negotiating with a 
member of Chiang’s family.  These secret talks broke down over the issue of Manchukuo 
and the Japanese quickly realized that Chiang was not sincere in his desire for peace.86   
In the absence of a military victory, Chiang needed a political one; so, he sent his 
other bother-in-law, T.V. (Tse-Ven) Soong, to Washington to secure American aid.  
Soong, educated at Harvard and Columbia, understood America and he hoped to secure 
U.S. aid before Roosevelt left office.  Soong knew a third presidential term was an 
impossibility.87  Just like William Stephenson, T.V. Soong arrived in America with his 
wife, Laura.88  The couple moved into a small suite at the Shoreham Hotel.  
Unfortunately, T.V. underestimated FDR’s political ambitions.  Soong quick discovered 
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that Roosevelt’s advisers were too busy trying to get the president reelected than to worry 
about China’s problems.  T.V. realized that securing a loan on Chiang’s behalf would 
prove a bit more difficult than he thought.  He moved out of the Shoreham and into a 
small house on Connecticut Avenue.  Chiang’s brother-in-law began entertaining 
Washington’s political elite.  Joseph Alsop and Ansel Mowrer (journalists), Harry 
Hopkins, the president’s special assistant, John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, 
Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, and Thomas G. Corcoran, known as 
“Tommy the Cork” and an influential member of Roosevelt’s New Deal “brain trust.”  
All of these men dined at Soong’s house.  Soong disliked Chinese food but served it to 
his guest because that was what was expected and Soong knew how to play game. 89   
Poker often followed dinner.  Soong, understanding the rules of client competition, lost; 
even though according to one admirer, he “could have taken the shirts off their backs had 
he chosen to do so.”  This allowed Soong to get “on very intimate terms with them.”90  
Soong’s strategy was simple.  To win American support, he would present China 
in a new light and thereby “help the Americans realize what China is doing and what 
China needs.”91  T.V. Soong enlisted the aid of Dr. Ludwig Rajchman, a Polish Jew, to 
act as his adviser.  A confidential FBI report described Rajchman as “T.V.’s evil genius” 
while Harry Dexter White, a senior U.S. Treasury department official and Soviet spy, 
                                                 
  89 Sterling Seagrave, The Soong Dynasty, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1985), 364-367.  For 
more information of Corcoran see the unpublished Corcoran biography, “From Lawyer to Field Marshall,” 
Franklin D. Franklin Library, Ernest Cuneo Papers, Box 111. 
  90 James M. McHugh quoted in Yu, note 96 on page 491-492. 
  91 Letter from T.V. Soong to Madame Chiang, 21 November 1941, Hoover Institution on War, 
Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, T.V. Soong Collection, Box 11.  
 226 
 
referred to him as a “smooth boy.”92  As T.V. Soong’s network expanded deep into the 
U.S. government, the quality of information he received increased.  This network marks 
the beginning of the “China Lobby.”  Soong, often, boosted “there is practically nothing” 
that goes on in the U.S. government that his sources do not pass to him within three 
days.93 
By September 1940, T.V. Soong’s efforts began to pay off. 94  He secured a $25 
million dollar loan from the United States, which was followed by another $50 million.95  
This was still far short of the funds Chiang needed to fight the Japanese but it was a start.   
By the winter of 1941, bolstered by securing U.S. aid, Chiang invited Lauchlin Currie, an 
administrative assistant to the president, to visit Chungking.  The reason behind Currie’s 
visit varies.  Some historians suggest that FDR wanted to make sure the money sent to 
aid China was being spent on the war effort and not lining Chiang’s families pockets.  
Others have suggested that FDR wanted to set up a “direct channel of communication 
between Chiang and Roosevelt.”   A communication link similar to the arrangement with 
the BSC, which would bypass both Congress and the State Department.96  Knowing the 
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American president, it was probably a little of both.  Currie, a Soviet spy, explained to 
Chiang that the U.S. press had presented the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in a 
sympathetic and favorable light and that it was in the Nationalists leader’s best interest to 
work with Mao Zedong’s CCP.97  Currie also met with Zhou Enlai, who told FDR’s 
envoy that Chiang’s government was riddled with pro-Japanese sympathizers.  When 
Currie returned from China, he told Roosevelt the best way to keep the Chinese from 
succumbing to the Japanese was by providing the Chungking government with the money 
and materiel they needed to continue fighting.98 
Following Currie’s advice, FDR asked Thomas G. Corcoran to resign from the 
federal government and undertake a covert mission to help funnel money and materiel to 
war-torn China.  Roosevelt, like Stalin, optimistically believed that China’s active 
resistance to Japanese encroachment would distract Tokyo from greater territorial 
ambitions.  After conferring with Lauchlin, Roosevelt had him contact Corcoran with his 
clandestine plan to help Chiang Kai-shek.99  Corcoran, a Washington insider, established 
China Defense Supplies (CDS) to act as the sole conduit between the federal government 
and China.  Corcoran modeled CDS on the British Purchasing Commission but CDS 
differed substantially from its British counterpart.  The British Purchasing Commission 
paid cash for all armaments bought from U.S. manufactures—at least until the passage of 
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the Lend-Lease Act.  CDS, on the other hand, would obtain loans from the U.S. Treasury.  
The money from these loans would be used to purchase weapons and materiel to help the 
Chinese fight the Japanese.  This became the entire Lend Lease program for all of 
Asia.100 
Corcoran realized CDS was an “unorthodox operation.”  And that his actions 
could be considered “dubious according to the letter of the law.”  Members of Congress 
had proven reluctant to take any action that might antagonize the Japanese but the 
Neutrality Laws had been written with Europe and not Asia in mind.  This loop hole 
allowed CDS to legally operate during those few months before Lend Lease was enacted.  
According to Barbara Tuchman, Lend Lease “opened the faucet to the real aid to China” 
making “the business generated by Lend-Lease through China Defense Supplies” to be 
more “lucrative than most military procurement operations.”101  CDS existed outside the 
capitalistic marketplace.  The company had only one benefactor, the federal government, 
and only one client, China.  Therefore, according to one historian, “many of those who 
joined Soong’s effort made fortunes in the lucrative sales to China financed by American 
credits.”102   
Shortly after Thomas G. Corcoran filed the incorporation paperwork, he hired 
William S. Youngman, Jr., the former general counsel for the Federal Power 
Commission, to head the new company.  Youngman enlisted the aid of T.V. Soong,  
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Frederick Delano, the president’s uncle, Whiting Willauer, a young lawyer and former 
Youngman co-worker, and Thomas Corcoran’s brother, David, plus a few Chinese who 
were to act as “technical experts.”103  CDS, a Sino-American corporation, eventually 
became the sole representative of China on all Lend-Lease matters.  Eventually this 
obscure organization’s efforts provided a political base for the rise of the China lobby.104  
Edward Stettinius, the administrator for the Lend-Lease Program, found Soong to be “one 
of China’s most eloquent and powerful spokesmen.”105  A U.S. historian described Soong 
as the most “untiring lobbyist” of his time.106   
While Soong convinced Washington to set up an American military mission to 
Chungking, CDS secured about $600 million worth of equipment.107  It would take time 
for the equipment to arrive but the news of Soong’s success helped raise morale in the 
Chinese capital.  By the winter of 1941, T.V. Soong asked Washington to supply five 
hundred bombers, the pilots to fly them, and a loan for enough money to pay for this 
operation.  The Chinese could then “virtually annihilate the Japanese forces within China 
and neutralized Japan’s naval striking ability.”108  According to Morgenthau, Chiang’s 
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request was “like asking for 500 stars.”109  Besides, Soong’s plan ran counter to the 
Europe first approach.  American military commanders were not prepared to bomb Japan.   
Luckily, the British had just turned down an order for one hundred Curtiss P-40 
fighters.  The British Purchasing Corporation viewed these planes as obsolete as a faster 
more maneuverable model was available.  This meant that Nationalist China could 
receive these left over planes to counter Imperial Japanese fighters.  Claire L Chennault, a 
retired U.S. Army Air Corp pilot, who had been working for Chiang Kai-shek since 1937, 
traveled to Washington D.C. to supervise purchasing these planes.  While China Defense 
Supplies bought the planes, Chennault recruited 100 pilots and 200 ground crew.  These 
men formed the 1st All Volunteer Group (1st AVG).  These American military men were 
discharged from the armed forces and were employed by the Central Aircraft 
Manufacturing Company (CAMCO).  CAMCO paid very well.  Pilots made $600 a 
month, flight leaders made $675, and the ground crews made $250 a month.   Pilots were 
promised a $500 bounty for each Japanese plane shoot down. Soong coined the phrase 
Flying Tigers and a legend was born.110  Working under less than ideal conditions, the 1st 
AVG pilots performed well and after Pearl Harbor, these men were transferred back to 
the U.S. military.111  
In the United States, the Japanese attack convinced U.S. officials that Imperial 
Japan planned a full-scale invasion of the U.S. West Coast.  This fear of an external 
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attack blended with the possibility of Japanese fifth columnist laying in wait.  On 
February 19, 1942, FDR authorized the deportation and imprisonment of roughly 107,000 
Japanese men, women, and children.   These immigrants were kept in ten relocation 
centers under the supervision of the War Relocation Authority.112  Executive Order 9066 
made the entire West Coast a military zone, which allowed military commanders the 
power to exclude whomever they wanted.  In this case, people of Japanese ancestry. The 
internment of Japanese Americans constitutes the greatest World War II violation of U.S. 
civil liberties. 113    
 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ensured China’s strategic importance.  
Churchill and Roosevelt needed the Chinese to stay in the fight and the Allies realized 
that Chiang had already tried once to broker a deal with the Japanese.  American and 
British policymakers feared that Chiang would do whatever was best for China and a 
Sino-Japanese peace treaty would hamper Churchill and Roosevelt’s plan to defeat Hitler 
first.  A major American concern was the KMT’s avoidance of direct military action 
against the Japanese.  Many U.S. military commanders thought Chiang Kai-shek horded 
U. S. military materiel.  These men believed the generalissimo needed these weapons to 
fight Mao’s People’s Liberation Army once the Pacific conflict was concluded and the 
bloody Chinese Civil War resumed.  Chiang wanted the KMT to triumph.114   
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Roosevelt might have a romantic view of China.  Believing China to be a great 
nation.  A nation on which the president intended to build his postwar new world order.  
FDR’s postwar dreams aside the president was not willing to place American troops 
under Chiang’s control.  Someone needed to go to Asia to ensure that Chiang’s forces 
stayed in the fight.  General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, selected 
Lieutenant-General Joseph Stilwell to become the Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-skek and 
Commander in Chief of the Allied forces in China.  Stilwell, fluent in Chinese and having 
traveled in China, seemed the perfect choice. 115  “Vinegar Joe” proved difficult.  He did 
not share the president’s romantic vision.  Stilwell believed the United States was “allied 
to an ignorant, illiterate, superstitious, peasant son of a bitch.”116  Chiang found Stilwell 
to be coarse and rude.  The Nationalist leader, in his diary, began referring to the U.S. 
general as “peanut.”  As one historian put it “the idea that the tough, abrasive Yankee 
could work with the Generalissimo…was, at best, a sad commentary on Washington’s 
knowledge of China and its leader.”117  
In March 1942, Stilwell returned to China.  Chiang Kai-skek and his wife 
welcomed the American general and they immediately began working to defend the 
Burma Road, which was the lifeline for Allied supplies being sent to Chungking.  Chiang 
gave Stilwell his two best divisions but it proved too little too late and Burma was lost.  
The Generalissimo believed Stilwell lost Burma because he was arrogant and unwilling 
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to take advice.118  Stilwell’s arrogance and caustic behavior caused Soong and Chiang to 
consider having the American general recalled.119  Both men believed they needed an 
American general who not only shared their strategic vision but who would also take 
advice.  Serious consideration for removing Stilwell occurred twice—once in June 1942 
and again in October 1943 but Chiang proved reticent to follow through.  Eventually, 
Soong, who had received assurances the United States would recall Stilwell on Chiang’s 
say so, convinced Chiang the general may still prove useful; so Stilwell stayed at least for 
the time being.120      
 As for Stilwell, he knew that Chiang wanted him recalled and so he planned to 
remove the leader of China.  On at least two occasions, Stilwell asked his Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) advisers to come up with a plan for assassinating Chiang.121  
The problem between these two men, besides their dislike of each other, dealt with 
priorities.  Stilwell needed to defend Burma and what he viewed as his supply line. 
General Stillwell wanted the CCP and the KMT take a larger role in the defense of China.  
Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong wanted to conserve their forces in preparation for the 
resumption of the hostilities once the war was over.  Stilwell constantly complained about 
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Chiang’s commanders.  He repeatedly asked Soong to convince his boss to “appoint a 
real commander, give him real authority, and hold him responsible.”122  
Even as Stilwell’s relationship with Chiang deteriorated, Soong continued to 
lobby on China’s behalf.  In 1943, he helped set up the Sino-American Cooperative 
Organization (SACO).123  SACO (pronounced SOCKO) established a joint Sino-
American intelligence operation commanded by Dai Li, head of Chiang’s secret police 
known as the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, and U.S. Navy Captain Milton E. 
Miles known as “Mary” Miles.  One historian described the fiercely anti-communist Dai 
Li as “China’s combination of Himmler and J. Edgar Hoover.”124  This is not to suggest 
that Dai Li did not have his U.S. admirers to include Admiral Ernest King.  Mary Miles, 
one of Li’s admirers, summed up the enigmatic Li but stating,  
 Dai’s greatness rests in his indifference to worldly fame and in his fearless 
stand against malicious opposition.  A sincere and loyal flower of his leader, 
he never boasted of his achievements, whose value could not be ascertained, 
he impressed people as being mysterious.  Because he was entrusted with 
the job of uprooting corruption, he faced opposition and attacks from 
influential quarters.  Because he was faithful to his duty, he had to shoulder 
criticism.125 
 
Mary Miles and Dai Li worked well together and SACO took a total immersion 
approach to intelligence gathering.  Roughly 2500 U.S. sailors and Marines trained and 
worked with Chinese guerilla forces.  The “Rice Paddy Navy” as it was informally called 
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often operated behind enemy lines helping to rescue downed Allied pilots and 
intercepting Japanese radio traffic.  Herbert Yardley, after being ostracized by the 
Western intelligence community for publishing his book on SIGINT, went to China to 
work as Chiang Kai-shek’s SIGINT specialist.126   
As the war moved from Europe to Asia, SACO began preparing for the eventual 
invasion of the Japanese home islands.127  The Rice Paddy Navy produced results.  This 
joint intelligence operation, unfortunately, existed in spite of the British, whom the 
Chinese had grown to distrust.  The British trying to survive at any cost began 
intercepting Lend Lease materiel in Burma.  The British wanted to use the threat of 
closing the Burma Road to convince Chiang to protect English interests in China.  The 
British had already lost Singapore and Hong Kong.  They did not intend to sit back and 
watch their empire crumble. 128  What was victory without empire?  Winston Churchill 
and Franklin D. Roosevelt differing views on empire had become a bit of a problem by 
1943.  Churchill knew that FDR had no intention of returning Indochina to the French 
and the British prime minister was concerned that America’s anti-colonial attitude might 
strip the English of some of their colonial possessions.  China became the battleground 
for these two opposing views of postwar reconstruction.129 
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 During the war, the Americans, for all their talk of subversives and communists, 
worked with whoever could get the job done.  Expediency once again trumping ideals.  In 
1944, the U.S. Government sent the United States Army Observation Group, commonly 
referred to as the Dixie Mission, to Mao Zedong’s headquarters in Northern China 
located in Yan’an.   The Dixie Mission concluded that the Chinese Communist were less 
corrupt than the Nationalist making the CCP a useful wartime ally.  Colonel David 
Barrett and John S. Service, an American diplomat, sent Stilwell favorable reports about 
Mao’s People’s Liberation Army.  Even as Chiang and Stilwell’s relationship hit an all-
time low, here was no real effort to shift support to Mao; instead FDR sent Major General 
Patrick Hurley to China.130    
On August 18, 1944, Hurley became President Roosevelt’s Personal 
Representative to China.  Roosevelt wanted Hurley to act as an intermediary between 
Chiang and Stillwell.  In 1943, Washington ordered General Stillwell to take control of 
the Chinese military forces in an effort to stop a Japanese offensive to seize control of the 
U. S. held airfields in Southern China.   The U. S. Army Air Corps used these airfields to 
support military operations in the Pacific, and the loss of these strategic airbases would 
have hampered American efforts to defeat the Japanese in the Pacific.131  Unfortunately, 
General Stillwell and Chiang Kai-shek continued to agree on almost nothing and 
Roosevelt needed results; thus Hurley went to China.   
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Hurley’s first impression of Generalissimo Chiang confirmed his worse fears: 
Chiang could be evasive and intractable.   The Ambassador to China quickly concluded 
that only the formalization of the Second United Front into a stable coalition government 
would ensure the survival of a free democratic China.132  The precarious situation 
between the KMT and CCP convinced Hurley that the American war effort in Asia 
hinged on a political resolution to this civil strife.  The possibility that either the KMT or 
the CCP might sue for a separate peace with the Japanese was too frightening to 
contemplate.  The American war effort depended on continued unified Chinese 
resistance.  The fragile CCP-KMT alliance kept the Kwantung army engaged on the 
Chinese mainland and prevented these Japanese soldiers from fortifying the Japanese 
home islands.  Hurley believed the key to a stable China was to formalize this tenuous 
political relationship through the creation of a coalition government.   Hurley had a 
formidable task before him.133  Hurley wanted to pacify the Chinese by forming a 
coalition government which would avoid a future continuation of internal unrest and 
allow the Chinese to combat the Japanese Kwantung Army. Both the CCP and the KMT 
resisted Hurley’s efforts.  The CCP did not trust Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT refused 
to establish a coalition government because such an agreement would officially 
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acknowledge the CCP as a viable political party. 134   By 1944, the rift between Chiang 
and Stilwell became insurmountable.  Stilwell wanted complete control of all military 
forces in China.  Hurley believed “Stilwell’s every act is a move toward the complete 
subjugation of Chiang Kai-shek.”  The Generalissimo asked FDR to recall the 
controversial general, which he did.  Stilwell was replaced by General Albert C. 
Wedemeyer, who remained in China until the end of the war.135 
In the spring of 1945, the war came home.  Amerasia, a Far Eastern journal, 
provided the link the China lobby needed to prove that Communist sympathizers had 
infiltrated the United States government.  Kenneth Wells, an Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) analyst, noticed that articles published in Amerasia bore a striking likeness to top 
secret OSS and State Department documents.136   Wells told his superiors and they sent a 
team to Amerasia’s offices.  Without a warrant, these OSS agents convinced the building 
superintendent to let them in.  Once inside Frank Brooks Bielaski, the agent in charge, 
found thousands of classified documents.  Bielaski, later testified, that the material found 
in the office “covered almost every department in the government except the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation…There were documents from British Intelligence, Naval 
Intelligence, G-2, State Department, Office of Censorship, Office of Strategic Services.”  
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Bielaski considered some of these documents to be a bit salacious in nature—especially a 
report on “the intimate relations between Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang.”137 
The OSS turned the investigation over to the FBI.   The FBI used illegal 
(warrantless) wiretapping as well as conducting a warrantless search of Amerasia’s 
offices.  Possession of classified documents, while technically a crime, did not constitute 
an act of espionage.  On June 6, 1945, FBI agents, acting on Truman’s orders, raided 
Amerasia’s offices where they “discovered” hundreds of classified documents. Despite 
their concerted efforts, the State Department failed to secure a conviction in this case for 
treason because of Hoover’s use of extralegal means of acquiring evidence. 138 
Meanwhile, J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the FBI, decided the State Department 
mishandled the case to cover up a vast Communist conspiracy within its ranks.   The 
lobby followed Hoover’s logic and claimed that Communist agents had penetrated the 
State Department.  These communist agents worked to influence U. S. policies. 139   
In February 1945, the Big Three—Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Franklin 
D. Roosevelt—met along the shores of the Black Sea to discuss, among other important 
topics, “the political conditions upon which the Soviet Union would enter the war against 
Japan.”140  Roosevelt believed he needed to enlist the Soviet Union’s support in the 
Pacific theater of the war.  Stalin agreed to enter the war ninety days after Germany 
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surrendered in exchange for the lower Sakhalin Islands, Kurile Islands, and China’s 
recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia.  Territorial gain composed a small 
portion of Stalin’s demands; he also wanted control of the former Japanese railway lines 
in Manchuria as well as access to of the warm water ports of Darien and Port Arthur.141 
 Roosevelt believed that Soviet participation in the fight against the Japanese was 
crucial to save American lives in the allied drive to capture the Japanese home islands.  In 
February 1945, the atomic bomb was still a theoretical weapon—granted a theoretical 
weapon with devastating potential, but still, an untested super weapon.  American 
military planners believed Soviet troops would tie down the Kwantung Army in 
Manchuria while U. S. military forces in the Pacific continued island-hopping toward the 
Japanese homeland.  Stalin demanded extensive territorial concessions in the Far East as 
the price of Soviet participation in this Asian conflict.   
On August 6, 1945, as the United States prepared for what many assumed would 
be a costly invasion of the Japanese home islands, the Enola Gay, piloted by Colonel 
Paul W. Tibbits, dropped the first atomic bomb.   This gun-type fusion weapon, 
codenamed “Little Boy,” destroyed the Japanese city of Hiroshima killing roughly 70,000 
to 80,000 people.  Shortly after the destruction of Hiroshima, President Harry S Truman, 
who authorized the use of “Little Boy,” revealed at a press conference the nature of the 
United States’ newest weapon.  Truman took a moment to thank God the German atomic 
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program had failed.  The president explained that if the Imperial Japanese Army did “not 
now accept our terms, they might expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has 
never been seen on this earth.”142  
Three days later, on the morning of August 9, 1945, Major Charles W. Sweeney, 
flying a B-29 Superfortress named Bockscar, dropped the second atomic bomb on the 
Japanese seaport of  Nagasaki.  This plutonium-239 implosion device, codenamed “Fat 
Man,” instantly killed an estimated 40,000 to 75,000 people.  On August 12, 1945, 
Hirohito, the 124th Emperor of Japan, decided to accept the Allied terms of unconditional 
surrender.  The defeated imperial war leader explained to his people, via radio, “the 
enemy now possesses a new and terrible weapon with the power to destroy many 
innocent lives and do incalculable damage.  Should we continue to fight, not only would 
it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would 
lead to the total extinction of human civilization.”143 
Hirohito realized the atomic bomb altered the nature of war.  It fundamentally 
changed international relations.  Nuclear weapons ensured that war could no longer be an 
extension of politics by other means.  Nation-states could no longer use force, in the 
traditional sense, to achieve strategic geopolitical objectives. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Architects of Empire 
 
 
Figure 61 
.- .-. -.-. .... .. - . -.-. - ...   --- ..-.   . -- .--. .. .-. . 
 
The end of the Second World War should have ended the British and Chinese 
influence in American politics but this did not happen.  The British, militarily and 
economically weak, sought a closer alliance with the United States.  The British still 
viewed the Americans as the junior partner but their empire needed help; so, they turned 
once again to their former colony.  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s death provided the English 
with an opportunity to secure their empire.  Roosevelt, staunchly anti-colonial, planned to 
keep the French from regaining control of Indochina.  When President Harry S. Truman 
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took office, the new American president believed the French would be a stabilizing 
influence in the region and decided to let the French back into Indochina.  The fear of 
Stalinist Russia convinced the British and the Americans to sign the UKUSA 
Agreements.  The greatest secret of the Second World War was the use of Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) to win the war.  This secret agreement, signed in 1946, encouraged 
sharing SIGINT between the signatory countries.2  By 1950, the West would share 
information on the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and several Eastern 
European nations.3 
The China lobby’s influence dwindled as the war ended.  With the removal of the 
Japanese threat, the fight to control the fate of China resulted in bloodshed.  At this time, 
the China lobby expanded its reach by recruiting more and more supporters.  Politicians, 
businessmen, former missionaries to China, journalists, and foreign agents of influence, 
all joined the Nationalist cause.  Lobbyists could be divided into three distinct groups—
the realists who feared the spread of communism, the opportunists who wanted to make 
money off the turmoil in Asia, and the evangelicals who believed Chiang’s government 
could be reformed.4    
Ross Koen, in his controversial book The China Lobby in America Politics, 
further divided the lobby into two distinct groups—the core and the periphery. The core 
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organization composed of well financed Chinese nationals who carried out the directives 
given to them by the KMT and right-wing American political and business elites who 
staunchly supported the KMT.  Just like the British, the Chinese used front organizations 
to sway American public opinion.  These organizations included the American China 
Policy Association (ACPA), The China Emergency Committee, the Committee to Defend 
America by Aiding Anti-Communist China, Committee on National Affairs, The Free 
Trade Union, and the Committee for Constitutional Government.5  China lobbyists used 
U. S. newspapers and magazines to launch sophisticated propaganda campaigns.  The 
most important of these included Time, Life, American Mercury, The China Monthly, Far 
East Survey, The New Leader, and Pacific Affairs. 
Most of the senators and members of Congress who came to support the KMT 
came from the Republican Party.6  The Republican Party incorporated the lobby’s 
rhetoric as “weapons for a full-scale dissent” against the Democratic majority.7 Joseph 
McCarthy (R-WI) became one of the most outspoken critics the Truman Administration’s 
Far East foreign policy objectives.  McCarthy single-handedly shifted the China debate 
from a “foreign policy question to front-page charges of domestic subversion and 
disloyalty.”8 Often the anti-lobby congressional members believed that this political 
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pressure group wanted to blackmail the State Department into providing unlimited 
support to Chiang’s government. 
America’s shift from war to peace should have signaled the end of U.S. foreign 
and domestic intelligence operations.  On August 31, 1946, President Harry S. Truman 
abolished the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Rockefeller Office (Office of the 
Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics—
OCCCRBAR).9   General Wild Bill Donovan fought to keep the Office of Strategic 
Services alive and failing that to convince the president the nation needed a peacetime 
centralized intelligence agency.  Donovan failed on both counts.  Truman did not want to 
create an American Gestapo.  Donovan aware of Truman’s wishes suggested this new 
agency “should be prohibited from carrying on clandestine activities within the United 
States.”  He went on to explain that it “should be forbidden from exercise of any police 
functions either at home or abroad.”10  The lack of a law enforcement role should have 
made J. Edgar Hoover happy but Hoover still hoped to expand the FBI’s area of 
responsibility to include foreign intelligence collection operations.  A battle the FBI 
director would lose.  Eventually, Truman decided to dismantle the OSS.  The Research 
and Analysis section, composed of roughly 900 scholars, who used open sources to 
develop intelligence estimates, was moved to the State Department.  The rest of the OSS 
was absorbed into the U.S. Army. 
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While President Harry S. Truman disbanded the Office of Strategic Services, the 
FBI’s extralegal investigative practices continued.  The FBI shifted its focus from Nazi 
spies to Communist agents.  The FBI and military intelligence programs sanctioned by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt continued for decades.  In 1941, J. Edgar Hoover, the 
FBI Director, promised the wartime intelligence apparatus would be “discontinued” once 
the national emergency had passed.  This did not happen.  Domestic intelligence roles 
and responsibilities grew in the decade following the end of the war.  Congress did not 
stop these operations.   Succeeding presidents, from Truman to Kennedy, authorized the 
FBI to investigate all “subversive activity” in the United States.  As the war ended, there 
was “a national consensus regarding the danger to the United States from Communism” 
with little distinction between external (Soviet) and internal (communist living in the 
United States) threats.11 
What no one wanted to admit was that the “Good War” ended badly.  Six years of 
brutal fighting had devastated Europe; combat casualties, Nazi Germany’s genocidal 
policies, disease, and starvation had led to over fifty million deaths.   Indiscriminate 
urban bombing campaigns conducted by both Allied and Axis air forces reduced some of 
the world’s greatest cities to rubble.  By targeting factories, railroads, bridges, and ports, 
the victors   and the vanquished wrecked the industrial capacity of both Europe and Asia.  
The 1944 opening of the second front in Europe, followed by the Allied drive to Berlin 
devastated the countryside.  The massive air and land assaults ensured that those 
fortunate enough to survive the conflict struggled with famine and disease.  As the 
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survivors set out to rebuild their shattered nations, the experience of those early postwar 
years precluded Europeans or Asians from ever viewing the conflict as a “Good War.”12 
In Europe, the people called for land and social reform as well as nationalizing 
industry.  To survive the coming winter,  most urban inhabitants resorted to building 
makeshift shelters out of the rubble of their once great cities.  Looking around, they 
began to believe that their governments could not provide the rapid relief necessary for 
their survival.  In a war-ravaged Western Europe, the combined might of the British, 
American, and Soviet armies, fighting a war of attrition, ensured that Nazi Germany’s 
Gotterdammerung rivaled the end of Richard Wagner’s The Ring of the Nibelung.  In the 
end, the fires consumed Germany’s political demagogues.  Those who could fled, while 
others took their lives, and the rest faced imprisonment and execution.13     
For the average European, the end of the war meant decades living in displaced 
person camps.  The post-World War II refugee problem posed a public reminder of the 
cost of war as the West struggled to house and feed an estimated 1.5 million refugees.14  
While in Asia, China had roughly eight million Japanese technicians, administrators, and 
merchants still needed to be moved back to Japan.15  Many of these people did not want a 
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capitalistic democracy; rather, they wanted a form of socialism, which protected basic 
human rights.  The months following the end of the war saw a rapid increase in 
Communist and socialist party membership: the statistics were staggering for countries in 
Western, Southern, and Eastern Europe.  For example, Communist Party membership in 
Belgium soared from 9,000 in 1939 to 100,000 in late 1945.  Similarly, the Greek 
Communist Party swelled from 17,000 to 70,000 between 1935 and 1945.  Finally, in 
Czechoslovakia the most startling growth numbers shocked those Democratic leaders 
trying to maintain control of their nations.  In just four months, party membership 
exploded from 28,000 in May 1945 to 750,000 in September 1945.16  The growing 
support for Communist and socialist organizations in Europe caused many Americans to 
question the sustainability of their capitalistic system.  The resurgent left posed a clear 
and present danger to U.S. postwar plans of open markets and free trade.  American post-
World War II war aims included developing a free global market.  U.S. policymakers 
wanted to avoid a second Great Depression; so, they set up free trade agreements and 
opened global markets.      
As the Second World War ended, President Truman faced a world torn asunder 
and he had to make a difficult choice.  Should the United States follow a Eurocentric or 
Asian approach to containing the spread of Soviet communism?  The answer, in part, 
came from an unlikely source—the State Department.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, ever 
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mistrustful of those governmental organizations which he could not directly control, 
created an ad hoc foreign policy staff composed of New Dealers whom the president felt 
he could trust.   FDR’s improvised approach to U. S. foreign policy, which often painted 
a rosier picture for the American public than really existed.  This lasted until his death on 
April 12, 1945.  Truman publicly stated that he felt compelled to fulfill FDR’s policies, 
but by 1946 Truman replaced most of Roosevelt’s New Deal cronies with advisers 
sympathetic to his postwar vision of the world.17  Truman chose to rely on the “experts” 
in the State Department.  In February 1946, the Truman Administration sent a query to 
the U. S. embassy in Moscow.  A junior Foreign Service officer named George Kennan 
provided the answers.18  
Kennan’s “long telegram” explained Stalin dissolved the Grand Alliance because 
of the Soviet Union’s need to justify the dictatorship of the proletariat, which demanded 
world revolution.  Stalin needed an external threat to justify the Communist Party’s 
totalitarian stranglehold on Russia.  Kennan stated there could be no possibility of 
negotiating with Stalin.  Containment was the only viable option available to the West.  
Setting up Kennan’s policy of containment provided the teleological impetus the Truman 
Administration needed to erect the national security state.19 
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British influence continued and the Truman administration developed a 
predominately European approach to postwar reconstruction.  The use of Lend-Lease to 
fund economic reconstruction posed a particular problem for Truman as the isolationist 
block in Congress stood firmly in the president’s path.  Truman realized that Europe need 
financial support but finding the money might need a soft touch.  The military spending 
proved to be one area that Truman could reduce the budget.  Truman, always fiscally 
minded, wanted to reduce the military and return it to its peacetime personnel levels.  In 
1945, the U. S. military numbered 12 million men by 1948 there were only 1.5 million 
men.  America reverted to its traditional posture of keeping a small standing army.  A 
smaller army meant a smaller budget.  Truman, always fiscally minded, took the 
Pentagon’s suggested budget of $15 billion and cut it down to $10 billion which was still 
short the $6 to $7 billion budget Truman eventually wanted. 20  Unfortunately, Truman 
lacked a strategic vision on which to base his economic cuts.  He just wanted to be able to 
justify every detail in his financial plan.  While Truman fought to balance the budget, 
allegations of communist infiltration of the U.S. government come to the public’s 
attention and threatened to derail the president’s plans.21   
On November 5, 1945, Elizabeth Bentley, a Soviet spy code named “Clever Girl,” 
contacted the New York office of the FBI and provided information on two covert Soviet 
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spy rings—the Silversmith Ring and the Perlo Group.22  In 1935, Bentley, while 
attending Columbia University, joined the Communist Party.  In 1938, her boyfriend, 
Jacob Golos, convinced her to work for the Soviets.  After her boyfriend died of a heart 
attack, the KGB decided to limit Bentley’s access.  Feeling marginalized and useless, the 
“Red Spy Queen” went to the FBI where she provided her interviewers with name after 
name of Soviet spies.  Despite her detailed recollection of these names, Bentley had no 
documented proof to back up her claims.23  The KGB diligently recalled all of its illegal 
spies.  Bentley’s accusations compromised two major Soviet spy rings.  It would take the 
KGB two years to rebuild what “Clever Girl” destroyed. 24    
Bentley, ridiculed by historians, continued to tell her story to anyone who would 
listen.  She eventually became a prime example for the Left that Soviet espionage in the 
United States was nothing more than empty lies and whispers.25  The release of the ultra-
secret Venona intercepts in 1996 would confirm Bentley’s story.  The U. S. government 
refused to use these intercepts in court.  The publicity would expose the technical means 
and sources of a current intelligence operation.  An operation providing information on 
Soviet espionage activity in the United States.  Intelligence agents are not concerned with 
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prosecution and imprisonment.  These agents only want to plug the leaks.  In Elizabeth 
Bentley’s case, the Soviets dismantled their entire collection apparatus.26 
 Stalin’s mistrust of the West prompted the Soviet dictator to set up an aggressive 
wartime espionage program against his allies.  Soviet agents penetrated the Manhattan 
Project, the OSS, the State Department, the White House, British Security Coordination, 
MI5 and MI6.27  Klaus Fuchs, a German-born physicist, worked on the Manhattan 
Project.  He supplied the Soviets with atomic secrets.   The Alger Hiss spy case provided 
an important talking point for the China lobby in the years to come.28  Hiss like the others 
before him, would deny any wrongdoing; eventually he would be convicted not for 
espionage but perjury.  The lobby tied the Hiss spy case directly to the Yalta Conference.  
The lobby suggested that Hiss whispered quietly into a weakened, sickly FDR’s ear, 
trying to influence U. S. foreign policy.  According to the lobby, Hiss may have been the 
mastermind behind the Yalta Betrayal.  However, Ross Koen points out: “Nowhere do 
the documents indicate that Hiss was a policy maker at Yalta. On the contrary, the 
records show him as a technician” but this did not stop the whispering.29  In one account 
of Yalta, a scholar stated that the agreement about China occurred during a “secret 
meeting with Stalin.  Even Secretary of State Stettinius, who was at Yalta, was not 
permitted to be present…Only the Communist Alger Hiss was permitted to attend 
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Roosevelt—Hiss, the secret Soviet espionage agent…a Communist agent in the State 
Department.”30    
The Amerasia affair, the Yalta betrayal, and the Cold War espionage cases, 
convinced many Americans the Communists had infiltrated the government.  In the years 
to come, foreign agents of influence, using rumors and innuendo, framed a vast historical 
account suggesting a complex Communist conspiracy operated at the highest levels of 
government.  Venona has shown that to some degree Stalinist agents had infiltrated the 
U.S. government.  These Soviet agents worked in a similar fashion to their British and 
Chinese counterparts.  All three nations sought to influence U.S. domestic and foreign 
policy and as America transitioned from war to peace an untested American president 
took office. 
By the fall of 1945, the war in Asia had ended.  Major General Patrick Hurley, 
having failed to convince the CCP and KMT to form a coalition government, returned to 
the United States.  A short vacation before resuming his duties in the Orient.  According 
to Hurley, shadowy forces conspired to keep him from completing his mission in China.  
He believed that Communist sympathizers in the State Department leaked his classified 
reports to the Chinese Communists.  The American Ambassador to China thought that 
these Communists conspired to limit support to the struggling KMT forces in China.  On 
November 26, 1945, Hurley resigned because a persistent rumor suggested that if he 
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returned to China a pretext would be found to fire him.  This would allow Harry S. 
Truman to replace the general with a more politically attractive Democrat.31    
President Truman took Hurley’s abrupt resignation personally. “See what the son 
of a bitch did to me,” exclaimed Truman once he received Hurley’s official resignation.32  
If Hurley’s departure angered Truman, he must have been shocked by the former 
ambassador’s virulent claims that Communist agents were guiding U. S. foreign policy.  
By 1950, Hurley, who believed the Truman Administration had hindered his historic 
mission to China, began to openly aligning himself with the pro-Nationalist lobby by 
attacking the manner in which the United States conducted Sino-American relations 
during the 1940s.  Hurley, for example, referred to the Yalta agreement as “the State 
Department’s blueprint for the Communist conquest of China.”33  The lobby now had an 
influential former American ambassador to China as its new spokesmen. 
The rapid conclusion of the war in the Pacific and the failure of American 
policymakers to forge a coalition government in China forced the Truman Administration 
to reassess its Far Eastern policy.   Many came to believe the growing political instability 
in China might lead to the downfall of the Nationalist government.  As expected, the 
uneasy alliance between the KMT and the CCP began to unravel.  Truman’s response to 
the growing Asian crisis was to order another representative to China.  On December 15, 
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1945, President Harry S Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China.34  The 
president wanted Marshall to find out whether a second Chinese Civil War could be 
averted.  Truman hoped that Marshall might succeed in transforming the uneasy wartime 
alliance between the KMT and the CCP into a stable coalition government.35  The 
Truman administration’s official Chinese policy was “a strong, united and democratic 
China is of the upmost importance…for world peace.” Truman, therefore, ordered 
Marshall to arrange for a cease-fire while also laying the groundwork for “a national 
conference of representatives of major political elements…to develop an early solution to 
the present internal strife.”  President Truman believed these two actions would bring 
about a peaceful unification of China. 36 
The State Department analysts, however, cited three important reasons impeding 
the creation of a democratic China.  “The Communists were efficient, honest, committed, 
militarily strong, actively fighting the Japanese and would control northern China after 
the war.”  Conversely, the Department believed, “the Nationalist government was weak, 
corrupt, inefficient, and led by a man losing support because of his inability to effect 
reform.”   These foreign policy experts recommended the “United States should adopt a 
realistic policy concerning China.”  The policymakers believed the Truman 
Administration needed to support Mao Zedong before China became a Soviet puppet 
                                                 
  34 Draft Telegram to Marshall, 26 February 1946, The Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, 
Official File, Box 150. 
  35 Harry S Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1952, (New York: Signet Books, 1956), 86-
87.  
  36 U. S. Policy towards China (suggested draft of statement by the White House upon the departure of 
General Marshall to China),” published in Marshall’s Mission to China: December 1945-January 1947: 
The Report and Appended Documents, Vol. II (Arlington, Virginia: University Publications of America, 
Inc., 1976), 9-11. 
 256 
 
régime.  These policymakers believed that Chiang Kai-shek’s corrupt KMT only 
hindered U. S. ambitions to create a geopolitically stable Asia with China as the driving 
force in the Far East.  These State Department offices felt that Mao Zedong’s Communist 
ideology differed enough from Stalin’s that the Truman Administration should be able to 
forge a strong alliance with the struggling CCP. 37 
An overconfident Marshall went to China to stabilize the region just as the CCP 
and the KMT went to war over Manchuria.  General Marshall faced the same opposition 
to his mission that Ambassador Hurley had faced.  The CCP held grave misgivings about 
working with the KMT based on Chiang Kai-shek’s eradication of Communist 
sympathizers in 1924.  The Second United Front slowly unraveled as the KMT and the 
CCP tried to consolidate their position in a postwar China.  General Marshall set up a 
cease-fire agreement between the two factions and he tried to set up the infrastructure 
needed to support a democratic government in China.  In January 1946, the Political 
Consultative Conference (PCC) met.  This assembly, led by Generalissimo Chiang, 
quickly guaranteed “freedom of speech, assembly, and association; equal legal status for 
all political parties; the holding of popular elections; and the release of political 
prisoners.”  The PCC also called for a National Assembly to form a committee to draft a 
constitution—democratic reform seemingly was on the way. By February 1946, Marshall 
created a plan for the military integration of the CCP and KMT.  This new power 
structure made the President of the Republic of China the Commander in Chief of the 
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Chinese armed forces.  The new President exercised control through a National Military 
Council.  Marshall had modest success: he had helped to: institute a cease-fire, begin 
political reform, and set up a plan to integrate the Chinese military.  His efforts, 
eventually, failed to achieve U. S. foreign policy objectives. 38  
At this time, Mayling Soong traveled to the United States and began reorganizing 
the Chiang’s political warfare apparatus.  Working in New York City, Madame Chiang, 
just as her bother had done years before, held weekly meetings with any group that could 
effectively influence U.S. politics.39  Chiang Kai-shek used his pro-democratic stance to 
force the United States military to choose sides in the Chinese Civil War.  Even though 
General Marshall secured a cease-fire agreement, the generalissimo used the American 
fear of a communist takeover of Northern China to convince the U. S. Army Air Corps to 
move KMT troops from Southern China to Manchuria.  The State Department had been 
correct in its assessment—the KMT controlled southern China while the CCP 
consolidated power in the north.  The Generalissimo believed he could secure the 
strategically important Manchurian territory left vacant by the defeat of Japan by 
airlifting his troops directly into Manchuria.  General Marshall told Chiang the KMT did 
not have the logistical support to subdue Manchuria.  Marshall shrewdly told the 
Nationalist leader that his plans for Northern China overextended the Nationalist 
military’s reach and left him vulnerable to CCP attack.  Chiang gambled.  If the KMT got 
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into trouble, the ever-present United States would take direct military action to prevent 
the communists from taking over China.40   
The Truman Administration inherited the Yalta accords, which ensured Stalin 
would support the Nationalist government.  Stalin, forever the pragmatist, had no 
intention of supporting Mao. 41  The Soviet dictator did not want a strong centralized 
government along his southern border.   Besides, Stalin and Chiang had signed a Treaty 
of Friendship and Alliance, which officially granted the Soviet Union the territorial gains 
promised at Yalta in exchange for Stalin’s support of the KMT.42  Stalinist support of the 
KMT led Mao to conclude that “Stalin tried to prevent the Chinese   Revolution by 
saying…we must collaborate with Chiang.”43    
If Mao believed the Truman Administration intended to work equitably with both 
the KMT and the CCP, he was disappointed.  Truman told Marshall that no matter what 
happened, he was to support the KMT.  The President’s orders significantly constrained 
his representative.  Both sides continued to violate the cease-fire agreement as each side 
tried to gain political advantage.  Marshall imposed an arms embargo designed to halt the 
violence.  Stalin, however, began secretly supplying the CCP with abandoned Japanese 
weapons caches.  A strong, united China was not in the Soviet leader’s interests, and 
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covert military support for Mao would ensure a continuation of the Chinese Civil War.  
In retrospect, it is fair to infer that by 1947, the KMT was in retreat. 44    
Generalissimo Chiang struggled to control China.  The United States began to 
pull out of China.  In 1945-1946, Truman sent 100,000 American soldiers into China, but 
the KMT needed more support than these men could provide.  Unfortunately, the United 
States could not afford to provide more.  Shortly after that, Marshall returned to the 
United States to serve as Secretary of State.  Marshall realized there was a limit to how 
much support the United States could provide.  The State Department determined that it 
would take an investment of at least $2 billion and a significant intervention by the 
American military to ensure the KMT’s success. In the chaos of those first five postwar 
years, American policymakers realized they could not afford to commit everything to 
Chiang.  Soviet aggression in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe prevented 
Truman from ordering more support to China.   This postwar uncertainty compelled U.S. 
politicians to make difficult foreign policy decisions about Asia and Western Europe.  
These decisions were based on George Kennan’s idea of containment. 45 
The first major postwar diplomatic crisis between the United States and the Soviet 
Union occurred in the Middle East.  In 1946, the U.S.S.R. supported a revolt in Northern 
Iran.46  As the Red Army’s tanks began rolling toward the Iranian border from 
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Azerbaijan, the United States took this developing crisis to the newly established United 
Nations.47  Truman wrote to Secretary of State Jim Byrnes stating that “unless Russia is 
faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making.  Only one 
language do they understand—How many divisions do you have?”  Truman went on to 
say that he “was tired of babying the Soviets.”48  Stalin agreed to withdraw all Soviet 
troops if a joint Azerbaijani oil venture was undertaken in northern Iran.  Stalin’s Iranian 
adventure, however, ended in failure, and as Soviet troops disappeared from Iranian soil, 
and the promise of oil concessions evaporated.49  The 1946 Soviet expansionist gambit in 
Iran, considered a minor problem at the time, became the prime example of Soviet 
postwar geopolitical ambitions.  Stalin’s unpredictability eventually lead the Truman 
administration to reduce foreign aid for the KMT.  The president believed the Communist 
threat was greater in Europe than in Asia.   
With the Iranian failure still fresh, Stalin tried to wrest control of the Bosporus 
and Dardanelle Straits from Turkish control.  The Soviet leader used the threat of force to 
put pressure on Turkey to concede control of the Straits to the Soviet Union.  President 
Truman told the U.S.S.R. that the Straits would remain in Turkish hands.  Truman 
immediately sent a U. S. naval aircraft carrier—the U.S.S. Franklin D. Roosevelt— into 
the Mediterranean Sea to show Stalin the United States’ willingness to project force in 
defense of Turkish autonomy.  The American willingness to go to war over the Straits 
encouraged the Soviet Union to reconsider.  As a result, Stalin ended his quest for 
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external territory and began to consolidate his power base in Eastern Europe. However, 
the damage had been done.  By the winter of 1946, the Truman Administration had 
become convinced there existed a grand Communist conspiracy bent on world 
domination.  The gradual worsening of Soviet-American relations forced American 
policymakers to shift resources from Asia to Europe.   Truman wanted to ensure that pro-
socialist forces in Western Europe did not wrest control of the continent from the pro-
democratic regimes that were struggling to rebuild in the aftermath of six years of hard 
fighting. 50 
The year 1947 marked a fundamental shift in U. S. foreign policy.  The 
communist insurgents in Greece and Turkey were poised to topple the pro-democratic 
government.  A battered, beaten, and beleaguered Britain hastily explained the great 
eighteenth century empire could no longer provide imperial protection to those 
Mediterranean states threatened by internal strife.51  The burden of protecting the Middle 
East would fall to the United States.  Confronted with the possibility of a communist 
coup in Greece and with the growth of communist moments in Western European states, 
the Truman Administration chose to irrevocably alter the American state. 
On February 27, 1947, Truman, Secretary of State George Marshall, and Dean 
Acheson met with congressional leaders at the White House to discuss communist 
incursions into Greece and Turkey.  Acheson explained that the British could no longer 
provide financial support to these two Mediterranean nations and it was up to the United 
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States to stop the westward advance of communism.  Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) 
stated the only way Truman could gain the full support of Congress was by “scarring the 
hell” out of them.  Fear of totalitarian domination would provide the votes needed to 
ensure Greece and Turkey survived the communist onslaught.52 
Therefore, the Truman Administration labored to provide the president with a 
speech designed to ‘scare the hell’ out of not only Congress but the American people.  On 
March 12, 1947, Truman explained that it “would be the policy of the United States to 
support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressure.”   Truman explained the United States role in world affairs was to 
prevent the totalitarian oppression of free peoples.  “If we turn our backs on the world, 
areas such as Greece, weakened and divided as a result of the war, would fall into the 
Soviet orbit without much effort on the part of the Russians.”53  The speech subtly 
expressed the new conflict in universal terms of oppression and freedom.  The American 
people had just fought a three year war against the military dictatorships in Japan and 
Germany.  The Americans understood the need to stop the aggressive expansion of 
militarist nations and they understood the policy of appeasement was a failure.   
Truman formally called on the United States to shed its isolationist tendencies and 
embrace his new internationalist foreign policy objectives.  Truman convinced Congress 
to provide $400 million in foreign aid to Greece and Turkey.54  The president’s speech 
established the American ideological framework for the Cold War.  More importantly, 
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the U. S. diplomatic success in Greece paved the way for U. S. Cold War interventionist 
policy carried out in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.  All of these 
operations were funded by a frightened Congress.  Truman’s successful procurement of 
funding for Greece and Turkey led the president to turn his attention to revitalizing the 
European economy.  America’s fear of communist aggression in Europe provided the 
impetus for the restoring Europe’s vigorous economy.  Most Americans failed to grasp 
that the United States, once again, tittered on the brink of economic ruin.  The America 
industrial sector rose to the challenge of war by expanding to provide war material for the 
Allied cause.  By the end of the war, these factories were retooled to produce the luxury 
items wanted for by a nation that spent three years rationing everything for the war.  
These factories swiftly out produced domestic consumption.  The business community 
turned toward its prewar markets in Europe, but the European markets were still running 
at subsistence levels.  If the Truman Administration did not act quickly, the European 
economic crisis might pull the world into a second global depression.55 
In the spring of 1947, Truman asked Marshall to convince the Europeans to 
develop individual economic recovery plans.  These plans eventually united to become 
the Marshall Plan.  A primary concern for the Western democracies was the American 
desire to reindustrialize Germany as a means of reinvigorating the stagnating European 
economy.  A second concern was the participation of Russia in this economic recovery 
program.  Members of the Truman Administration made sure the plan’s requirements 
were unacceptable to the Soviets.  Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, a Soviet diplomat, 
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warned that the “plan would undermine national sovereignty, revive Germany, allow the 
United States to control Europe, and most ominously, divide Europe into two camps.” 
Molotov then developed his own plan for Eastern Europe, which acted as a foil to 
Marshall’s.  Ironically, Molotov’s prediction came true.  American money circumvented 
national sovereignty, Germany reindustrialized, and Europe split into two well-armed 
camps; however, both Western Europe and the United States also avoided a second Great 
Depression.  Capitalism needed open markets to thrive, but Congress had to approve the 
money to revitalize Europe’s comatose economy. 56   
The crisis Truman needed to push the Marshall Plan through Congress occurred 
on February 1948.  The inherently confrontational nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship 
deepened as a Soviet Union sponsored coup d’état in Czechoslovakia toppled the 
government.  The Soviet backed coup proved to the West that Stalin had no intention of 
keeping his war time promise of allowing the countries in his sphere of influence to 
choose their form of government.57  Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia provided the 
necessary amount of fear needed to force Congress to approve the Marshall Plan.  The 
Truman Administration felt the Communist threat in Europe was greater than the threat in 
Asia.  The Republican dominated 80th Congress (1947), however, began to question 
American policy in China.  Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) stated the new postwar 
policy toward China would ensure American policymakers would no longer try to form a 
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Chinese coalition government.58  Secretary of State Marshall ordered General A. C. 
Wedemeyer to return to China to make “an appraisal of the political, economic, 
psychological, and military” situation.    Wedemeyer stated that a piecemeal aid program 
would fail as it “would be like plugging up holes in a rotten hull of a sinking ship.”  
China needed not only a new ship but an “honest captain and an efficient crew.”59  
Wedemeyer, like Stilwell, did not care for Chiang.  The American general found him to 
be “impotent and confounded.”60   
The Truman administration suppressed Wedemeyer’s final report.  The American 
general stated the Yalta Conference’s decision to allow the Soviet Union access to 
Manchuria, combined with Marshall’s decision to withhold aid to the KMT, significantly 
hindered the Nationalist government’s ability to maintain control of China.  The official 
report suggested the KMT government take their case to the United Nations and request 
aid for postwar economic rehabilitation. 61  Wedemeyer asked the United Nations step in 
to end hostilities in Manchuria.  Finally, the general concluded that once the CCP 
conquered Manchuria, Stalin, who already controlled Outer Mongolia, would simply 
pledge support for the new Communist régime.  The Truman Administration refused to 
implement Wedemeyer’s suggestions in Manchuria because Truman and Marshall both 
                                                 
  58 Bachrack, 37. 
  59 Wedemeyer’s Mission to China, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Volume VII, 638. 
  60 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in the CBI, (Washington D.C.: Office of 
Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 52. 
  61 Wedemeyer’s Mission to China, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Volume VII, 636. 
 266 
 
believed that a U.N. trusteeship of Manchuria would be an infringement of Chinese 
sovereignty.62 
 General Wedemeyer determined the KMT government needed the same support 
as Western Europe.  The Chinese economy was in ruins.  The secret police, hunting 
Communist sympathizers, routinely violated the PCC democratic reforms.  Only money, 
material, and a plan similar to Marshall’s for Europe would save China from a hostile 
Communist takeover.  As a result, the report was suppressed, and Wedemeyer’s 
suggestions were not implemented.  The Truman Administration only provided 
rudimentary financial support, the 1948 China Aid Act, which granted Chiang’s 
government $400 million.  The 1948 fiscal support for the KMT proved to be too little 
too late as some Members of Congress came to believe that “the Chinese situation was 
just hopeless. In 1949, the CCP seized China and the KMT fled to Taiwan.63 
In 1946, President Truman faced what some thought were insurmountable 
domestic problems as Stalin consolidated his hold on Eastern Europe.  In 1946, the 
Republican Party gained control of both houses of Congress for the first time since 1935. 
The Republican Party began to attack the Truman Administrations postwar policies 
especially the idea that Truman was “soft” on communism.  The Republicans were 
wrong.  Truman was not “soft” on communism.  Like Woodrow Wilson, Truman’s 
administration laid the foundation of the national security state.  Elizabeth Bentley’s 
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claims and the subsequent trials about communist infiltration of the U.S. government led 
Truman to implement loyalty oaths.  On Mach 22, 1947, Truman signed Executive Order 
9835 giving the FBI the power to run background checks on federal employees.64   
The National Security Act of 1947 came dangerously close to creating a garrison 
state.  The illusion of civilian control helped the American public accept the changes to 
its government.  The law established the infrastructure of the national security state.  The 
mechanisms of this new national security state included the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA).  The position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
provided a good example of how the military maintained control of these various 
organizations while providing the illusion of civilian control.  The DCI could be a 
military officer but while in charge of the CIA the DCI was not beholden to his parent 
organization.  A senior military officer’s ability to ignore orders from his superiors was 
supposed to provide the DCI with a measure of autonomy.  The majority of these early 
DCIs, however, returned to active military service after their tenure as head of the CIA.  
This meant that if a DCI wanted his career to continue, after his tenure as DCI, then he 
might be swayed to listen to those above him.  It appeared that those skilled in violence 
were taking over. 65   
                                                 
  64 “Memo, Donald S. Dawson to Harry S. Truman, 24 October 1947,” The Harry S. Truman Library, 
Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary File.  
  65 Michael J. Hogan.  A Cross of Iron: Harry S Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 
1945-1954, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 65. 
 268 
 
The debate over Universal Military Training (UMT) provided the catalyst that 
might push the country closer to forming a despotic garrison state.  In 1946, General 
Marshall suggested that the United States maintain a 700,000 man active duty army.  
Each and every man deemed to be in good physical condition would be required to 
receive basic military instruction.66  This military program require a one year 
commitment.  The process would militarize an entire generation.  The ideology of 
military training requires young soldiers to follow orders blindly for the good of the 
organization while democracy requires an inquisitive citizenry. Congress ultimately 
failed to pass UMT; instead Congress increased the size of the military.67 
The domestic political struggle came to a rapid conclusion as Harry S Truman 
narrowly won the 1948 presidential election.  The China lobby believed that Truman had 
no chance of winning this election so they began backing the Republican candidate 
Thomas E. Dewey.68  This presidential election also helped the Democratic Party regain 
some of those Congressional seats lost in the 1946 midterm elections.  Truman shrewdly 
courted the African-American vote, which helped him win the presidential election.  The 
China lobby learned from their mistake and began courting U.S. Congressional leaders to 
help secure aid for China.69 
President Truman knew the United States citizenry might support direct military 
confrontation with Russian to stop Soviet aggression in Turkey, Greece, or Iran.  The 
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conflict in Western Europe, however, did not involve tanks, planes, or men.  Instead, 
Western Europe needed something most Americans were unwilling to give—money.  
The Truman Administration realized that without cold hard cash the rising Communist 
and socialist parties in Europe would more than likely seize control of Western Europe.  
Stalin now needed to remain patient.  Knowing, the West would eventually succumb to 
the Communist revolution.  
By 1949, the nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan (modern Taiwan).  
The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began discussions to 
normalize relations shortly after the communist takeover in 1949.70  As the Truman 
administration waited for the “dust to settle”, military planners proposed that Truman 
avoid aligning the U.S. government with the newly established Taiwan régime.71  Dean 
Acheson made it clear the United States had no intention of protecting Taiwan from a 
PRC invasion.  The China lobby began working overtime.  The Committee for One 
Million was founded.  This new committee had one goal to prevent the normalization of 
relations between the United States and the PRC.  As a secondary goal, the committee 
worked to keep the PRC out of the United Nations.72  The Americans waited while Mao 
Zedong consolidated power on the mainland but then overnight everything changed.  
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On June 25, 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) thundered across the 
38th Parallel, shattering the peace of the “Land of the Morning Calm.”73  The NKPA field 
artillery weakened the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) forward positions.   Soviet T-34 tanks, 
supporting the NKPA Infantry, proved that the mountainous terrain made a fitting place 
for an armor division to operate.74  The audacious NKPA surprise attack caught the ill-
trained and ill-equipped ROK Army off guard.  The NKPA rapidly moved down the 
Korean Peninsula eventually capturing Seoul—the capital of South Korea.  The rapid 
advance forced the ROK and the United States military personnel stationed in South 
Korea to retreat southward to Pusan merely a few miles from the ocean.75   With their 
backs to the water, the ROK and members of the U.S. military dug in and held out.  They 
barely avoided an Asian Dunkirk.  A few months later, General Douglas MacArthur’s 
daring amphibious landing at Inchon roughly 300 miles north severed the NKPA supply 
lines and revitalized the anticommunist war effort.   
As MacArthur thought about crossing the 38th parallel on his trek to the Yalu 
River, the nervous leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong 
considered his options. What course of action was best for the struggling Communist 
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nation?  Mao Zedong decided to create the People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) to help 
liberate North Korea from American aggression.76  The introduction of Chinese 
Communist troops into North Korea transformed the nature of the conflict, fundamentally 
altered the nature of the Cold War, and provided the impetus for the reemergence of the 
China lobby in America politics.    
Scholars struggling to define this new global conflict produced regional studies 
designed to explore American foreign policy in Asia.  A range of books--China, Key to 
the Orient and to Asia; How We Blundered into the Korean War and Tragic Future 
Consequences; and What Caused the Nation’s Crisis-Incompetency or Treachery?--all 
attempted to outline America’s failure in Asia.  The China lobby produced books and 
pamphlets to explain how the Korean War could have been avoided, if only the work of 
Communist sympathizers in the United States government had not betrayed China to Mao 
Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party.  Support for the Kuomintang government in exile, 
on Taiwan, could rectify the diplomatic misfortune of postwar China.  They argued that it 
was not too late.  Authors, journalists, and pamphleteers affiliated with the lobby’s cause 
called for more money, more weapons, and finally for U. S. military intervention.  The 
United States could alter the balance of power in Asia and guarantee the triumphant 
reconquest of the Chinese mainland by nationalist forces by providing direct military 
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support.  The rallying cry became: Why fight in Korea when the real enemy was 
Communist China?77  
The China lobby used the Korean War to reexamine Marshall’s failure in China.  
These lobbyists also worked to bring Wedemeyer’s Report to light.  Senator Joseph 
McCarthy, one of the most outspoken critics of the Marshall Mission, vehemently 
criticized the general’s failure to secure the peaceful integration of Mao’s Chinese 
Communist Party and Chiang’s Nationalist government following the end of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War.   On June 14, 1951, McCarthy delivered a 60,000-word speech 
denouncing Marshall’s ineptitude.  The staunchly anti-communist senator stated, “If 
Marshall were merely stupid, the laws of probability would have dictated that at least 
some of his decisions would have served this country’s interest.”78 McCarthy believed 
Marshall, through “criminal folly,” traveled to China solely to “rob us of a great friend 
and ally”  because there was a vast Communist conspiracy designed to “diminish the 
United States in world affairs.”   
The “red” hating Wisconsin Senator concluded, “Even if Marshall had been 
innocent of guilty intention, how could he have been trusted to guide the defense of this 
country further?” 79 McCarthy, by attacking Marshall, further transformed the nascent 
China Lobby from a marginalized political entity into a national security concern.  The 
During World War II, China lobby used persuasion and propaganda to influence U. S. 
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policymakers to provide men and material for the KMT, but this influence began to wane 
two years after the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific theater.  The Korean War became 
the catalyst for the reemergence of the lobby in American politics and Senator 
McCarthy’s vehement attacks on Marshall and the Truman Administrations China policy 
helped propel the lobby’s agenda to forefront of American national security concerns in 
Asia.   McCarthy’s blistering attacks further alienated those who opposed the power and 
influence exerted by the lobby because those who chose to speak out against the now 
powerful lobbyist group would be branded as traitors.  McCarthy’s claims ushered in the 
Second Red Scare, which resulted in Communist witch hunts and show trials where 
whispers ruined careers.    
The NKPA invasion of South Korea in the summer of 1950 altered the U. S. 
relationship with the KMT.  Chiang Kai-shek wanted to help the U. N. mission in Korea 
to repel Communist aggression.  President Truman polity told him no, but the president 
did order the U.S. 7th fleet to sail toward Taiwan in order to provide protection for the 
KMT government in exile. 80  The commitment of American forces to protect Taiwan 
marked a shift in American foreign policy.  Unbeknownst to Chiang Kai-shek and the 
China lobby, the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attempted to 
normalize relations shortly after the communist takeover in 1949.81  Mao Zedong’s 
decision to support the NKPA ended these talks and ensured American military support 
of the KMT.   
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Chiang Kai-shek’s faith in U. S. support failed to take into account the American 
people’s unwillingness to go to war in China.  Three years of fierce fighting in Asia 
defined a generation.  American foreign policymakers shared the American people’s 
reluctance to stage a full-scale intervention in Asia to support a corrupt régime.  The 
Truman Administration even went so far as to open backdoor negotiations with the CCP 
government in 1949, but the Korean War altered U. S. foreign policy.  Mao’s decision to 
support the Soviet-sponsored NKPA invasion of South Korea forced the United States 
into a marriage of convenience with the KMT government in exile. 
The China lobby’s intense attack against the Truman Administration’s China 
policy, conducted during the Korean War, ensured that the Republican Eisenhower 
administration would continue to support the KMT.  The China lobbyists wove a 
convoluted tale of betrayal tinged with Communist infiltration of the U. S. government to 
explain how the United States had “lost” China.  The lobby helped legitimized 
McCarthyism. The witch hunts and show trials, used by the senator from Wisconsin to 
incite fear and dissension among the American populous, began with the possible 
infiltration of the State Department by Communist sympathizers who ensured the “loss” 
of China.82  The senator was officially censured in 1954, but not before the lobby 
compelled U. S. politicians to reexamined decisions made years before the Korean War.  
The lobby worked to explain how the U.S. lost China.   Lobbyist, also, tried to ensure 
continued support for the Taiwanese government.  During this time, Villains were 
                                                 
 82 The information used by McCarthy to attack Marshall and the Truman Administration had been supplied 
by the China lobby.  McCarthy’s 1951 speech helped launch the Second Red Scare.  Koen, 85. 
 275 
 
created.  Scapegoats manufactured.  Heroes fell, and demigods sprang forth as the lobby 
worked to sway public opinion in light of the aggressive NKPA invasion of South Korea, 
which helped to revitalize the China lobby’s influence on American foreign policy. 
The communist takeover of China in 1949, the Soviet Union’s first successful 
atomic detonation, and the Korean War increased U. S. concerns that Soviet style 
communism was destine to fulfill the Marxist dream of world revolution.  This fear led to 
the creation of NSC-68.  The foundation of Cold War national security policy stated “the 
gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from 
the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet 
system.”  This hostile threat of eminent conflict necessitated developing “a level of 
military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet 
aggression” as well as assuring “the internal security of the United States against dangers 
of sabotage, subversion, and espionage.”  The key to victory was to maximize the peace 
time economy while developing essential reserves of natural resources to be used in time 
of war. 83  
The NKPA’s aggressive drive southward coupled with Mao’s decision to send 
troops to Korea forced Truman to reevaluate his policy on nuclear weapons.  The 
president did not change his mind.  Atomic bombs should only be used as a last resort.  
He, however, allowed his military planners to begin discussing the possibility of using 
these weapons in Korea.  Showing the Soviet Union America’s resolve in ensuring that 
the conflict in the Far East did not extend to Western  Europe, the United States, for the 
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first time, deployed B-29s to both England and Guam.84   This foreword deployment of 
U.S. B-29’s significantly reduced the time required to strike the Soviet Union with 
atomic weapons.   If the Soviets decided to intercede in North Korea drawing America’s 
attention to Asia while Moscow ordered troops to rush through Fulda Gap and into the 
heartland of Western Europe, then the United States was prepared to act.85   
The deployment of nuclear-capable B-29s to England caused some political 
concerns at the time.  The English did not like the idea of having nuclear weapons on 
their soil.  The British government believed these weapons only made them more of a 
target for possible Soviet aggression.  The Truman administration publicized the 
deployment of these planes to England as nothing more than a routine “rotation” of 
personnel.  This made it possible for the president to gently remind the Soviets that 
America not only had the bomb but it also had an efficient delivery system.  The forward 
deployment of nuclear-capable B-29s to both Guam and England proved to be the first 
time the United States used the threat of nuclear war to ensure a diplomatic outcome.  For 
Truman sending these planes to both Europe and the Far East provided the minimal level 
of force required to guarantee the Soviets did not escalate the conflict in either Europe or 
Korea.  America’s show of force during the early days of this conflict was done only in 
part for the Soviet Union.   
The Republican Party’s intense condemnation of the Truman administration 
combined with military planners and the American public’s belief that atomic weapons 
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should be used on the battlefield led Truman to inquire into the feasibility of integrating 
these weapons into the U. S. arsenal.  Policymakers began discussing a “no cities” 
approach to the use of the atomic bomb.  In 1951 and 1952 in the Nevada desert at Camp 
Desert Rock, the United States military conducted a series of tests, code-named Buster-
Jangle.  These tests sought to prove that nuclear weapons could be an effective force 
multiplier.  Seven atomic atmospheric detonations exposed U. S. military personnel, 
located as close as 2,500 yards, to high dosages of radiation.  The army wanted to prove 
the average soldier could maneuver around an atomic blast site within minutes of 
detonation.86   
Regionally, geopolitical nuclear blackmail made sense.  The United States had 
been testing these weapons in the Pacific since the late 1940s, and American scientist 
realized that even multiple strikes against mainland China would have minimal effect on 
the continental United States.  The Chinese lacked nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union 
did not have an efficient method to launch a retaliatory strike against the continental 
United States.  The Soviets might decide to hit Western Europe or maybe attack targets in 
Asia, but the USSR could not attack the United States.  The creation of both the ICBMs 
and the SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile) in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
altered U. S. nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to deterrence.   
These postwar Asian proxy wars spawned by the geopolitical bipolarization of the 
world compelled American civilian and military policymakers to develop a 
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comprehensive plan to integrate nuclear weapons into their postwar strategic planning.87  
Asia, therefore, became the testing ground for developing U.S. nuclear policy.  Most 
Cold War scholars contend that the study of nuclear strategy involves the examination of 
a non-event since neither the Soviet Union nor the United States, except for the initial use 
of atomic bomb against Japan in 1945, unleashed these weapons during the almost forty 
years of undeclared hostilities.88   By the end of the Cold War terms like deterrence, 
massive retaliation, first strike capabilities, decapitation, flexible response, escalation 
dominance, and mutually assured destruction formed the fundamental jargon for 
discussing the deployment of nuclear weapons during times of political upheaval but this 
specialized language did not exist in 1945.  Two short decades later, these terms became 
a part of mainstream American vernacular.    
Intellectually, these words diminished the horrifying reality of nuclear 
Armageddon.  The use of specialized language eventually allowed military strategists to 
remove themselves from the harsh realities of a nuclear confrontation.   Statistics and 
variables allowed these early nuclear strategists to posit the survivability of a nuclear 
conflict without having to delve into the moral quagmire of using atomic weapons against 
civilian population centers.  The development of the atomic bomb followed by the advent 
of the hydrogen bomb rendered the nuclear strategists impotent since these weapons 
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should only be used according to President Harry S Truman, in a 1948 meeting with 
David E. Lilienthal, the head of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), when “we 
absolutely have to…this isn’t a military weapon…It is used to wipe out women and 
children and unarmed people, and not for military uses.”89  The only president to 
authorize the deployment of the “ultimate” weapon against a foreign power would spend 
the first few years of his presidency reticently avoiding any serious attempt to develop a 
coherent strategic plan to utilize nuclear weapons for any purpose other than as a last 
desperate gambit to be unleashed only when all appeared to be lost.90   
While it is true that the intellectualization of nuclear strategy occurred during the 
Eisenhower administration, the exploration of the practical application of atomic 
weapons on the battlefield began late in Truman’s second term.  Truman’s ambiguous 
nuclear legacy still confounds scholars.  By authorizing the use of the atomic bomb 
against Japan, Truman ushered in the nuclear age; however, by creating the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) in 1946, the president ensured that nuclear weapons would 
fall under civilian and not military control.  The specter of Harold Lasswell’s Garrison 
State was not far from the thought of those shaping the post-war U. S. foreign policy. 
Civilian control prevented the rise of tyrannical, despotic regimes and so the illusion of 
civilian control existed, even though, the military continued to act as the driving force 
behind the development of tactical nuclear weapons.     
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The first few years of Truman’s presidency show the president did not concern 
himself with the bomb.  Military planners, working during the nadir of the Cold War, 
tried to integrate nuclear weapons into strategic planning, but Truman resisted their 
efforts.91  The first atomic target list was established as early as 1947 and the newly 
created United States Air Force began developing comprehensive war plans that called 
for aggressive offensive use of nuclear weapons. When Truman became aware of what 
military strategists were planning, however, he ordered them only to craft war plans that 
called for the use of conventional weapons.92   
The successful Soviet detonation of an atomic device in 1949 convinced a 
reluctant Truman to allow Edward Teller, a Los Alamos scientist who worked on the 
Manhattan Project, to develop the hydrogen bomb. Teller successfully detonated the H-
bomb three years later.  The “super,” a term coined by Teller to distinguish the 
devastating power of the hydrogen bomb from the destructive irrelevancy of the atomic 
bomb.  In 1952, the detonation at “Ivy-Mike” relegated the nuclear bomb to a mere 
tactical weapon while the H-bomb became a city killer.93  Military strategists began to 
view the nuclear bomb not as a weapon of last resort but as the most cost-effective force 
multiplier in the U.S. arsenal.  The Buster-Jangle test proved the average soldier could 
navigate around an atomic detonation and still maintain his fighting effectiveness.  These 
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atmospheric bursts, also, revealed a critical weakness in using tactical nuclear weapons 
on the battlefield.  Soldiers could survive the blast as long as they were “dug” in and 
these soldiers could then fight effectively.  The standard operating procedure for the 
infantry was to dig in to protect themselves from artillery barrages.  This typical 
conventional warfare tactic could easily mitigate the destructive power of a Hiroshima-
type detonation.   The mountainous North Korean terrain coupled with the NKPA’s 
elaborate system of tunnels convinced some military strategists that it was futile to use 
tactical nuclear weapons in Korea.  The atomic bomb, designed when saturation bombing 
was a viable option, proved to be most effective against civilian population centers.  The 
atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb became city killers and not weapons used against 
heavily fortified infantry units.   
Eisenhower, a former general, on assuming power in 1953, quickly realized the 
United States could not afford to maintain a professional battle-ready army that would be 
sufficient to meet any possible threat. Thus, the Eisenhower administration rapidly began 
developing a “policy of boldness” that would incorporate the use of atomic weapons into 
U. S. diplomatic and military planning.94  Military strategists began to view the nuclear 
bomb not as a weapon of last resort but as the most cost-effective force multiplier in the 
U.S. arsenal.   
The 1952 elections ushered in a regime change as the reenergized Republican 
Party led by Dwight D. Eisenhower won the presidential election and control of the 
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House and Senate.  Eisenhower inherited Truman’s dismal prospect for peace in Korea.  
The peace talks were at a standstill. The PRC wanted any discussions of peace to include 
proposals for allowing the PRC to join the United Nations.  Mao’s theory of negotiating 
while fighting proved problematic for the American negotiators struggling to find an 
expedient but honorable end to the hostilities.95  The only way that John Foster Dulles, 
the U. S. Secretary of State, could avoid allowing the PRC to “shoot their way into the U. 
N.” was through nuclear coercion or so the story goes.96  The myth of nuclear blackmail 
during the closing days of the Korean War was just that a myth.  Eisenhower, when asked 
years later why the Korean War ended, stated the Chinese feared the United States would 
use nuclear weapons.97  The Korean War ended for the most mundane of reasons—
Joseph Stalin died.  The death of the Soviet leader and his promise of support for the 
Chinese fighting in Korea convinced Mao to return to the negotiating table.  Dulles and 
Eisenhower’s bold public claims to the contrary, the PRC did not fear American nuclear 
superiority.  Mao believed the atomic bomb to be nothing more than “a paper tiger which 
the US reactionaries use to scare people”.98  
On April 16, 1953, shortly after the death of Joseph Stalin, President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, war hero turned politician, at Washington D.C.’s Statler Hotel delivered his 
infamous “Cross of Iron” speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors.99  
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Simultaneously broadcast on both television and radio, Eisenhower, recognizing the 
death of the Soviet dictator symbolized a possible turning point in global affairs, spoke 
not only to the free world but also spoke to the men attempting to fill the political 
vacuum left in the Soviet Union.  A man, who knew first-hand the horror of war, 
acknowledged the fleeting chance for peace that perished eight years ago in the 
smoldering ruins of the Third Reich could still be achieved in the spring of 1953. 
This chance for peace was worth considering since the cost to humanity was too 
high as the worst possible outcome for this undeclared conflict was an atomic war that 
might lead to annihilation of the human race.  At best, Eisenhower envisioned “a life of 
perpetual fear and tension; a burden of arms draining the wealth and the labor of all 
peoples; a wasting of strength that defies the American system or the Soviet system or 
any system to achieve true abundance and happiness for the peoples of this earth.”  The 
president of the United States continued by stating the one obvious truth of the American-
Soviet arms race which was that for “every gun that is made, every warship launched, 
every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not 
fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.”100    
The Cold War’s militarization of both the industrial and scientific community 
drained valuable resources as industry and science expended a tremendous amount of 
energy to create weapons and not enough energy on easing the burdens placed upon its 
citizens.  In the end, Eisenhower concluded that “this is not a way of life at all, in any true 
sense” to live “under the cloud of threatening war” as “humanity hanging from a cross of 
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iron.”101  The Soviets and the Americans failed to take advantage of this pivotal moment, 
and the Cold War lasted for another four decades.  Eisenhower might have talked about 
peace but he put the CIA to good use during his presidency.  All that posturing by the 
Truman administration over the Soviet backed overthrow of the Nationalist government 
in Czechoslovakia did not stop the CIA from orchestrating régime change in Syria 
(1949), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Tibet (1955-1970), Jakarta (1958) and Cuba 
(1959).   Domestically, the FBI continued its domestic surveillance programs.  By 1956, 
these operations fell under the Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO).  FBI 
agents were tasked with causing dissention within the Communist Party U.S.A. 
(CPUSA).102  The CIA, which was only chartered for foreign intelligence collection, 
began influencing the U.S. media.  Operation Mockingbird employed the same journalists 
used by the British during the Second World War to convince the U.S. public of the 
dangers of communism.103 
On September 3, 1954, the dangers of communist expansion, once again, came to 
the forefront as Mao Zedong ordered PLA artillery batteries to open fire on Quemoy.  
Quemoy was a Nationalist held island “within wading distance” of mainland China.104  
The Eisenhower administration believed the shelling of Quemoy was the beginning of 
hostilities in the region.  Mao, on the other hand, did not view the first Taiwan Strait 
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Crisis as a crisis since the PLA, and the KMT had never actually stopped fighting in the 
region.  In fact, Eisenhower ordered that the Seventh Fleet would “no longer be employed 
to shield Communist China” from the wrath of the KMT military. Eisenhower 
“unleashed” Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT and the U. S. officials quietly told the 
Generalissimo that the Seventh Fleet would protect KMT covert military action on the 
mainland.  The KMT stepped up its clandestine raids into mainland China.105   
The saber rattling between the PRC and the KMT grew more intense during the 
closing days of the Korean War.  Chiang Kai-shek stated that he had a five-year plan 
culminating in the invasion of the mainland in his drive to wrest control of the Middle 
Kingdom from Mao’s hands.  Mao, well aware of Chiang’s stated intentions, preempted 
the Nationalist leader by shelling Quemoy in 1954.  Bravado only went so far, and Mao 
understood that sometimes it was necessary to start an international incident in order to 
force an adversary to negotiate.  The U. S. cold war policy of containment also posed 
another problem for Mao.  With the fall of the KMT government on the mainland, U. S. 
policymakers implemented an Asian version of containment by placing men and material 
in Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, Guam, and Taiwan.   
The idea of encirclement, for Mao, meant death.  This concept originated with the 
ancient Chinese game of Wei Qi in which black and white stones are alternately placed 
on a board one at a time in order to encircle and kill the opponent’s pieces, thereby taking 
the space.  Mao viewed the American policy of containment in terms of Wei Qi.  During 
the mid-1950s, the PRC diligently worked to repair relations with those nations bordering 
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the Middle Kingdom.  An armistice restored the status quo in Korea and the French 1954 
defeat in Vietnam secured Mao’s flanks.  The Chinese dictator turned his attention 
toward Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT stronghold of Taiwan.  Mao audaciously probed U. S. 
intentions in the region by shelling Jinmen.  Eisenhower and Dulles both tried to get 
Chiang Kai-shek to relinquish control of Jinmen and Mazu (Matsu) but the Generalissimo 
made it entirely clear that he could not afford to retreat from these two islands because it 
would do irrevocable harm to the morale of his army as well as jeopardize his political 
standing in Taiwan.  Chiang Kai-shek prepared to defend those two islands to the death, 
and he expected the United States to continue to support his desire to reestablish a free 
China on the mainland.106  
By November, the Eisenhower administration began putting together a concrete 
about Taiwan.  His plan called for stopping the Chinese communists from gaining control 
of either the Pescadores or Taiwan “even at the grave risk of general war.”107  In January 
1955, the PLA moved toward the lightly defended the Dachen Islands by capturing the 
island of Yijiangshan.  Eisenhower, unwilling to go to war over these islands, ordered the 
Seventh Fleet to help evacuate the Dachen Islands in March of 1955.108  By April 1955, 
the crisis ended as suddenly as it began.   Zhou Enlai, the Chinese foreign minister, 
offered at the Bandung Conference to hold talks with the United States to resolve the 
hostilities in the Taiwan Strait.  U. S. negotiators initially refused to hold any meeting 
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with the PRC in which the ROC was excluded.  International pressure mounted, and the 
United States capitulated by agreeing to hold talks in the summer of 1955.109 
Members of NATO sharply criticized the United States handling of the first 
Taiwan Strait Crisis to the point that Eisenhower in his memoirs wrote the crisis 
“threatened a split between the United States and nearly all of its allies” as it pushed “the 
country to the edge of war.”110  Western European heads of state began to question the 
U.S. willingness to use atomic bombs on two militarily insignificant islands off the coast 
of China.  U. S. allies believed that “American recklessness, impulsiveness and 
immaturity in the foreign field” might lead to a general world war.111  The threat of 
nuclear war reached its zenith in March 1955.  Even though military intelligence analysts 
confirmed that the PLA had not begun new construction of any major airfields near the 
Taiwan Straits, which would be needed in order to invade Taiwan, the Eisenhower 
administration continued to publicly express the possibility of using atomic bombs to 
defend the ROC against further PRC aggression.  Zhou Enlai’s peace overture in April 
resolved the issue, but the crisis changed how the United States government would 
operate in the future. 
Mao began the crisis to probe U. S. intentions toward protecting the ROC and 
unintentionally compelled American policymakers formally to declare their intentions 
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with the signing of the American-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954.  This treaty 
bluntly stated the U. S. position regarding possible future aggression on the part of the 
PRC.  The crisis also caused the U. S. Congress and the executive branch to reevaluate 
how the United States would conduct future wars.  In 1954, the French government 
wanted President Eisenhower to authorize the use of tactical nuclear weapons to help 
defend the besieged French soldiers at Dien Bien Phu.  The Eisenhower administration 
could not get and do not really want congressional approval for the use of atomic 
weapons in Vietnam, but with the passage of the Taiwan Resolution in January 1955.112  
This resolution gave the president the authority to defend Jinmen and Mazu if it appeared 
that the PRC planned to invade Taiwan.  This act of Congress significantly increased the 
power of the presidency as the Commander-in-Chief no longer, at least in the case of 
Taiwan, had to ask for congressional approval to send troops into combat or for that 
matter authorize the use of atomic weapons in defense of the Nationalist stronghold.113   
Over the next three years, a “released” Chiang Kai-shek began to build up the 
KMT military presence on both Quemoy and Mazu.  The KMT’s aggressive buildup of 
military personnel, as some historians have stated, was not the spark that ignited the 
Second Taiwan Crisis; no, it was Mao’s desire to punish, what the communist dictator 
saw as the aggressive imperialistic policies of the United States in the Middle East that 
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lead to the PLA’s renewed military campaign in the summer of 1958.114  Mao bluntly 
stated that United States imperial ambitions in the Middle East had to be thwarted by a 
show of force in the Far East, and Quemoy was strategically located to ensure a rapid 
response from the Americans.115 
  On August 23, 1958, the People’s Liberation Army launched a new offensive 
against Jinmen provoking the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.  The PLA artillery batteries, 
located near Amoy, pounded the small island firing an estimated 40,000 rounds.   As 
artillery shells rained down on Jinmen, hostilities commenced in the water surrounding 
the tiny island as the PLA air force sank a Nationalist landing craft while the PLA Navy 
engaged and sank a second Nationalist landing craft. The pressure mounted as the PLA 
attempted to capture Tungting, a small island near Jinmen. The heavily fortified island of 
Tungting was able to repulse the PLA’s amphibious assault but the coordinated military 
attack on Jinmen convinced many that the PRC might be preparing for more than just a 
punitive expedition designed thwart Nationalist bravado regarding the reunification of 
China under Nationalist rule.  This coordinated attack on Jinmen might be the prelude to 
a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. 116   
The Eisenhower administration reacted to the Second Twain Strait Crisis as they 
did the first.  Military strategist began postulating what would be the most feasible U. S. 
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response to a possible invasion of Taiwan.  General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained that if nuclear weapons were deemed necessary to 
safeguard democracy in the Pacific the U. S. Air Force would be called upon to drop ten 
to fifteen kiloton bombs on airfields near Amoy.  If this spectacular show of force failed 
to deter communist aggression, then air operations would be expanded as far north as 
Shanghai.  Twining acknowledged that it was possible that the Soviets might respond by 
striking both Taiwan and Okinawa with atomic weapons, but the “risk would have to be 
taken if the offshore islands where to be defended.”117  
U. S. Pacific Strategic Air Command (SAC) placed B-47’s on Guam on high alert 
while Eisenhower pondered nuclear strikes against mainland China.118  While 
Eisenhower contemplated the use of atomic weapons, the USAF armed ROC aircraft with 
Sidewinder missiles and the U. S. Army deployed eight inch howitzers to Jinmen.119  The 
sidewinder equipped ROC fighters succeeded in maintaining aerial superiority over the 
Straits of Taiwan.  As hostilities began to heat up, Mao loosened his hold on Jinmen.  The 
crisis evaporated almost as quickly as it started.  The Communist dictator viewed Jinmen 
as a soft target to be squeezed whenever the PRC wanted to apply geopolitical pressure 
against the United States.120   
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The peaceful resolution of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis marked the end of the 
first period in the evolution of U. S. nuclear strategy.  After 1958, the Soviet Union, and 
the United States developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) which rendered 
Eisenhower’s “New Look” obsolete.  President John F. Kennedy’s administration went 
on to develop the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) which became the 
foundation of U. S. nuclear strategy for the next forty years, but in the early days of the 
Cold War, U. S. policymakers, confronted with perceived Communist aggression, had to 
decide when, how and even if these weapons should be used in war.   
In January 19, 1960, Eisenhower met with newly elected President John F. 
Kennedy.  They met twenty-four hours before Kennedy was to sworn into office and they 
talked for roughly forty-five minutes.  Eisenhower covered the important aspects of the 
job—how to use the black satchel known as the “Football” in case of national emergency.   
How to swiftly call for Marine One if JFK ever had “to get out in a hurry.”  The two men 
began discussing trouble spots—Berlin and Cuba.  Eventually, the topic of China came 
up.  Eisenhower explained that “it’s a high-stakes poker game and there is no easy 
solution.”  Eisenhower went on to explain that he would “try to support” the new 
president anyway he could but if Kennedy decided to approve seating Communist China 
in the U.N. then Eisenhower would break with tradition and publicly come out against the 
president; thus, the influence of the China lobby continued from one president to the 
next.121   
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Wrecking Crew 
 
 
Figure 71 
- .... .   .-- .-. . -.-. -.- .. -. --.   -.-. .-. . .— 
 
James Ellroy, an American novelist, destroyed the idealized vision of American 
exceptionalism when he wrote “America was never innocent.  We popped our cherry on 
the boat over and looked back with no regrets.”  Ellroy understood that Americans, taking 
a realist approach, acted out of self-interest.  The Founding Fathers, using the prose of the 
revolutionary, revolted against England, institutionalized slavery, and wiped out the 
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Congress. 
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native populace to create a republic that stretched from sea to shining sea.  When the 
constitution stood in the way, American politicians, more often than not, subverted it. 
As one damned thing after another confronted the Republic, expediency replaced 
morality.  Politicians, acting for the greater good, made decisions based on the 
information at hand and hoped for the best.  There was no Machiavellian plan designed 
by a secret cabal charting U.S. foreign policy; and yet, somehow, in just over two 
centuries, America avoided the diplomatic shoals that might have scuttled the nation to 
become the world’s only superpower.  The rise of American global influence coincided 
with the rise of the imperial presidency.  American xenophobia allowed political warfare 
experts to create a culture of fear.  By playing on these fears, agents of influence and their 
domestic allies shaped twentieth century U.S. foreign and domestic policy.  In the hands 
of a skilled propagandist, fantasy and reality often merge to form a stylized version of the 
truth.2 
During World War I, Captain (later Admiral Sir) William Reginald “Blinker” 
Hall’s Room 40, Charles Masterman’s Wellington House, and MI6’s Sir William 
Wiseman, conducted political warfare campaigns designed to sway American public 
opinion to support the Triple Entente.   Captain (later Admiral) Guy Gaunt, a member of 
Room 40 working in New York City, used friendly persuasion to convince members of 
President Woodrow Wilson’s administration that German secret agents plotted to bring 
America into a ‘shooting’ war with Mexico.  It helped that Germany really was working 
to bring the United States into a shooting war with Mexico.  Mansfield Cumming, the 
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first head of SIS, sent Sir William Wiseman to New York to set up a field office to ensure 
the safety of British munitions being shipped to Great Britain.  Wiseman’s greatest 
contribution to the war involved developing a personal relationship with Colonel Edward 
M. House and President Woodrow Wilson.  This relationship allowed Wiseman to act as 
an intermediary between Whitehall and the Whitehouse. 3 
Propaganda like comedy is all about timing.  The success of British efforts to 
sway American public opinion during the Great War has to be viewed through the mosaic 
of the times.  The American populace, like most of the world was predisposed to view 
Germany as a threat.  The rapid rise of the German state and the fear of German 
aggression can be seen in the literature of the times from The Battle of Dorking to The 
Invasion of 1910.  This literature, read by British and Americans alike, reflect the 
sentiment of the times—the Germans were dangerous and posed a threat to world peace.  
This made the British job easier.  The inundation of anti-German propaganda helped 
frame the debate about U.S. involvement in the First World War.  It also helped that the 
Germans were actively sabotaging U.S. munitions plants and sinking British merchant 
shipping.  The explosion at Black Tom stood as a stark reminder of what could happen if 
the nation allowed these hyphenated Americans to run amok.  Theodore Roosevelt, in 
speech after speech and in book after book, expressed his fear of the hyphenated 
American.  A fear the British used to convince the populace that German and Italian 
immigrants harbored treasonous sentiment.  While it can be argued that British political 
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warfare efforts, in large part, led to the Congress’ decision to declared war on Germany.  
One cannot forget that role of unrestricted submarine warfare played on Wilson’s 
decision to ask Congress to declare war. 
As the first American soldiers entered the conflict, President Woodrow Wilson 
diligently worked to convince the Germans that any continuation of the conflict was 
futile; and, therefore, it was in their best interest to sign an armistice ending the war. 4  
The Germans, expecting an honorable peace, quickly discovered at Versailles the victors 
dictated the terms of surrender.  The allied powers demanded that Germany sign the 
treaty or face a resumption of hostilities.  Having no choice, Gustav Bauer, the new 
German Chancellor, signed the document.  Wilson’s dream of collective security died on 
the Congressional floor as members of the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of 
Versailles.  It is strange that a nation so ready to embrace Wilson’s war so quickly turned 
its back on his vision for peace.  In large part, this can be attributed to Wilson’s 
propaganda machine closing up shop as the last shots were fired.  If the Creel Committee 
had continued to control the flow of information.  If it had continued to shape public 
opinion then it is possible that the American public might have demanded the United 
States join the League of Nations; instead, Creel stopped advertising America and 
members of Congress decided to reject Wilson’s postwar plans   
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The interwar years proved to be a time of great change as a global depression 
pushed the world toward economic ruin destroying the first global economy.5  While, the 
Americans, facing the worst economic down turn in the nation’s history, reverted to their 
prewar illusions of nonintervention and isolationism; the British Empire fought to keep 
their colonial possessions.  The Bolshevik call for world revolution convinced Whitehall 
to expand its intelligence apparatus to prevent communist inspired uprisings from tearing 
their empire apart.   The newly created Weimar Republic struggled to meet its financial 
debts while internal political maneuvering resulted in the eventual rise of Adolph Hitler’s 
Third Reich.6  In an effort to avoid war, European statesmen, ignoring German efforts to 
remilitarize as well as Adolph Hitler’s brinkmanship diplomatic maneuvers, followed a 
policy of appeasement.7 
The fear of yet another war convinced many U.S. politicians to increase budgetary 
funding to the armed forces but these same politicians, in an effort to avoid fighting in 
another war, passed a series of Neutrality Acts.  Secretly, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
expanded the powers of the FBI.  J. Edgar Hoover’s agents once again began collecting 
information on U.S. citizens.  By the summer of 1940, the British and the Chinese 
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desperately needed American industrial exports to help ensure their national survival.  
Both nations, fighting against totalitarian encroachment, carried out surprisingly similar 
political warfare operations against an unsuspecting U.S. populace.  These two 
intelligence operations, in their own way, influenced U.S. public opinion.  Even before 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor pulled the United States into the global conflict, there 
were clear signs indicating that British and Chinese efforts were helping to shift 
American attitudes toward intervention.  One month after Germany invaded Poland a 
U.S. Gallup poll stated that 68 percent of all Americans polled believed the United States 
made a mistake sending U.S. soldiers to fight in the First World War.  By 1940, 62 
percent believed that the United States should do everything short of war to help the 
British.  And by the summer of 1941, 56 percent of Americans were in favor of U.S. 
warships escorting British merchant traffic carrying war materiel to England.  This shift 
in public opinion can be in part attributed to the British Security Coordination’s efforts to 
manufacture consent regarding American support of the British war effort.8  The BSC 
had penetrated the Gallup organization and the Roosevelt administration also had a man 
working for Gallup.  There men worked to ensure that only the British point of view 
reached the American public.  They went so far as discouraging the publication of any 
polls considered harmful to the British.9 
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By the spring of 1941, with the passage of Lend-Lease, American policy makers 
followed a partial interventionist strategy daring German U-boat commanders to attack 
those naval vessels assigned convoy duty in the North Atlantic.  Ernest Cuneo (Code 
named Crusader), an attorney who worked as the U.S. liaison between U.S. intelligence 
and British Intelligence during the Second World War, succinctly summed up Churchill’s 
plan to drag the United States into the war.  “…As far as the British tricking the U.S. into 
war, FDR was at war with Hitler long before Chamberlain was forced to declare it.”  
During the Great War, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt’s exposure 
to Germany’s spies and saboteurs shaped the future president’s approach to German 
aggression.   Cuneo explained that, “Of course the British were trying to push the U.S. 
into war.”10  The aging lawyer, writing in 1988 about his wartime exploits, stated a 
simple fact—the British, in the summer of 1940, needed U.S. munitions and supplies to 
help stave off a German invasion.  Even as France surrendered and England’s fathers 
rushed to evacuate their sons from Dunkirk, American public opinion polls continued to 
show that an overwhelming majority of Americans supported an anti-colonial, anti-
interventionist, pro-isolationist approach to the war in Europe.11 
Even though there were sections of the country that hoped that England would 
prevail, the average American did not want to risk war with Germany to help support the 
British.  After all, that’s why the nation’s leaders had passed the Neutrality Acts—to 
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ensure that U.S. policymakers did not send American sons to fight and die in another 
predominately European conflict.  Cuneo, however, rightly points out there were 
elements within the U.S. government that secretly supported the British war effort.  These 
men and women zealously worked to provide the British with the support they so 
desperately needed.   So, while the average American did not want war in the summer of 
1940, some U.S. policymakers did.  According to Cuneo, Americans were such 
“pushovers” that he compared British efforts to a famous line from Chaucer, “He fell 
upon her and would have raped her—but for her ready acquiescence!”12 
By the spring of 1940, C, the head of SIS, sent William Stephenson to the United 
States to see if he could reestablish any type of relationship with the FBI.  J. Edgar 
Hoover agree to help the British as long as this relationship remained secret from both the 
State Department and from members of Congress.  Stephenson, with FBI support, 
quickly put together a sophisticated intelligence apparatus.  He knew that by operating in 
a neutral country that he risked alienating the very people he was trying to sway but there 
was a war on and Great Britain have very few options.  Ernest Cuneo explained that 
Given the time, the situation, and the mood, it is not surprising however, 
that BSC also went beyond the legal, the ethical, and the proper.  
Throughout the neutral Americas, and especially in the U.S., it ran 
espionage agents, tampered with the mails, tapped telephone, smuggled 
propaganda into the country, disrupted public gatherings, covertly 
subsidized newspapers, radios, and organizations, perpetrated forgeries—
even palming one off on the President of the United States—violated the 
aliens registration act, shanghaied sailors numerous times, and possibly 
murdered one or more persons in this country.13 
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Looking back the Allies won.  This makes the British efforts and FDR’s decisions easier 
to forgive.  As one historian explained isolationism was the villain.  “If Hitler and the 
Japanese were the aggressors, then why debate the issues…the United States had done 
the right thing.”  The ends justified the means but the extralegal approach used by the 
British did not differ from the ones used by the Germans, the Soviets or by the FBI and 
later by the CIA. 
14Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, members of British Security 
Coordination began to compete with what became known as the China lobby for the 
limited U.S. resources both nations needed to fight the Axis powers.  The use of lobbyists 
has become an inescapable part of contemporary U.S. political discourse.  There are 
cigarette, oil, guns, pharmaceutical and agricultural lobbyists working in Washington to 
secure legislative support for their organizations.  This practice has been around for a 
long time but it was not until the early twentieth century that foreign agents of influence 
began lobbying Congress.  The thought of foreign agents whispering in Congressional 
ears has become the thing of espionage fiction but during these early days this type of 
political warfare operations did not exist.  Today if you mention the word lobbyist most 
people immediately think of the Israeli Lobby, which continues to actively work to 
convince both the American populace and members of Congress to support the nation of 
Israel but this lobby can trace its roots back to the China Lobby.15 
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T.V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek’s brother-in-law, diligently worked to ensure that 
China received as much support as possible.  He followed Stephenson’s example and set 
up a sophisticated political warfare operation.  He made contacts within the upper 
echelons of the U.S. government.  Soong cultivated the myth of the Sino-American 
special relationship but while his efforts fell short of shifting U.S. policy away from 
Europe his efforts laid the foundation for what became known as the China Lobby.  The 
British prevailed and the United States government decided to commit a preponderance 
of its military-industrial resources to first defeating Germany.  Roosevelt and Churchill 
agreed to provide just enough resources to thwart the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) from 
gaining complete control of Asia.  The Chinese, who had been intermittently fighting the 
Japanese since 1894, now scrambled to receive whatever scraps they could get to hold 
out long enough for the Allies to defeat the Germans and then turn their full attention to 
the Far East.16 
It was in the Far East that the Anglo-American alliance struggled.  The Chinese 
did not trust the British and the British did not fully trust the Americans.  Churchill not 
only wanted to win the war but he also wanted to ensure that England regained its lost 
empire.  The British prime minister worried that the American president’s anti-colonial, 
anti-imperial feelings might prove insurmountable when the Allies won the war.  
Roosevelt, whose family made some of their money in the China Trade, saw China as a 
great power.  He believed that China would become the fourth leg upon which world 
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peace would rest.  FDR’s vision of collective security included a security council that 
would work to ensure the peaceful resolution of all disputes.  The political realities of the 
postwar world made this Security Council ineffective. 
The successful conclusion to the Second World War should have ended British 
and Chinese influence but the Soviet Union quickly supplanted Nazi Germany as the 
main enemy.  This shift from one totalitarian régime to another allowed the British and 
the Chinese continued to lobby for American support.  The British and the rest of 
Western Europe, needed money and materiel to rebuild their shattered economies 
especially as communist and socialist parties challenged these democratic capitalistic 
nations to provide for the welfare of their citizens.17  All the while Joseph Stalin, one time 
ally to the West, watched and waited for the opportunity to unite Europe under his iron 
rule—at least that is what the West believed.  In China, the resumption of the civil war 
between Chiang Kai-skek’s Kuomintang (KMT) and Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) threatened to split the country in two.  Chiang Kai-shek desperately needed 
U.S. money, weapons, and soldiers to help destroy the CCP.18 
Once again, British lobbyist efforts prevailed and U.S. industrial materiel and 
financial support began to bolster these shattered European economies.  The Marshal 
Plan economically tied the United States to Western Europe and the UKUSA Agreements 
bound the United States to the British Empire.  Stephenson’s men had provided training 
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to both the OSS and the FBI.  Once Truman created the CIA, the new Director of Central 
Intelligence recruited from the ranks of the former OSS thus giving American 
intelligence a quaint English feel.  The British, however, were broke.  Their empire 
falling apart so they tied themselves to the United States.  This allowed the British to use 
friendly persuasion to ensure that U.S. foreign policy objectives coincided with theirs.  
This secret agreement, signed in 1946, encouraged sharing SIGINT between the 
signatory countries.19  By 1950, the West would share information on the Soviet Union, 
the People’s Republic of China, and several Eastern European nations.20  The first real 
break with England on foreign policy did not occur until 1956 over Suez. 
By 1947, President Harry S. Truman, with the passage of the National Security 
Act of 1947, reorganized the United States armed forces and the burgeoning U.S. 
intelligence community.  The president charted a new course for U.S. foreign policy by 
publicly declaring the United States would support the Greek and Turkish governments’ 
struggle against communist led insurgencies.   Economic and military aid coupled with a 
few U.S. advisers attached to Greek military units ensured that neither nation fell.  
Truman went on to state that it was “the policy of the United States to support free people 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."21 
                                                 
  19 The original signatory nations included the Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand. 
  20 For a detailed look at the formation of this agreement from the British point of view see, “Government 
Communications Headquarters and Predecessor: Records relating to the development of the 1946 
‘UKUSA’ Agreement,” The National Archives (Kew, U.K.), HW 80. 
  21 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1952, (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 129. 
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While U.S. aid thwarted communist insurgencies in Europe, members of the 
China lobby believe America’s failure to provide enough support to Chiang Kai-skek 
directly led to the “fall” of China.  The “loss” of China, the Soviet detonation of its first 
atomic bomb (1949), and the North Korean decision to invade the South provided the 
members of the China lobby with proof that communist spies and socialist sympathizers 
orchestrated twenty years of Democratic misrule. This mismanagement of U.S. foreign 
affairs created a government described by members of the China lobby as one composed 
of “stupidity at the top…treason just below.”22  These communist fifth columnists 
represented a treasonous element within the government, which had to be rooted out if 
the nation was to survive.  This polarizing period gave rise to such demagogues as 
Senator Joseph McCarthy, whose anti-communist crusade still bears his name.  The truth 
of the matter was that the goals of the China Lobby coincided with the Republican Party.  
The GOP used information supplied by lobbyists to attack the Truman administration. 
The Truman administration faltered in the years immediately following the end of 
the Second World War.  While willing to confront the Soviets in the Middle East, 
Truman would only commit conventional forces.  The atomic bomb became a weapon of 
last resort.  The early Cold War confrontations between the USSR and the United States 
were not resolved through nuclear blackmail but diplomatic threats backed up by 
conventional weapons.  It was not until the outbreak of the Korean War and the resultant 
domestic backlash that forced Truman to reevaluate U. S. nuclear strategy.   Truman 
began testing the use of tactical nuclear weapons.  The president quickly discovered that 
                                                 
  22 Alfred Kohlberg, “Stupidity and/or Treason’” The China Monthly, June 1948. 
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atomic weapons made for efficient city killers but failed as a tactical weapon.  A tactical 
nuclear weapon failed to destroy a well dug in opponent.  After the Soviet detonation of 
its first atomic bomb, Truman conceded that if the atomic bomb made for an efficient city 
killer then the hydrogen bomb would ensure that no nation would dare attack the United 
States.  After the Soviet Union’s detonation of its first atomic bomb, Truman ordered Dr. 
Edward Teller to construct his super weapon. 
The late 1940s, U.S. foreign policy underwent an astonishing change as the 
United States intelligence agencies began to conduct their own political warfare 
operations.  Prompted by the decline of the British Empire, the United States began to 
employ black, white and gray propaganda to shape world opinion.  The CIA used the 
same journalists used by British intelligence and the OSS during the Second World War 
to help convince the America public about the dangers of communism.  The FBI 
continued its extralegal investigative practices and little by little the government whittled 
away at U.S. civil liberties.  About three decades of excess would led to Congressional 
inquiries into alleged abuses by the U.S. Intelligence Community.  The results of these 
inquiries led to substantial changes in the IC but these changes would only last until the 
next surprise attack. 
The United States survived the Cold War to become the world’s sole hyper 
power, but at what cost.  The national security apparatus remains.  After September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks, the United States, the great republican experiment, continues to 
struggle to maintain the façade of its republican past.  The executive branch with the 
support of both the legislative and judicial branches continues, in the name of national 
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security, to whittle away at its citizenries’ civil liberties.  The Truman Administration 
took FDR’s New Deal infrastructure, combined it with remnants of America’s World 
War II war machine, and transferred America’s fear of Nazi Germany to a fear of Soviet 
communism to create the foundation of the national security state.  Truman’s advisers 
followed Niccolo di Bernardo dei Machiavelli, an Italian Renaissance political 
philosopher best known for his masterful crafting of realist political theory, in 
establishing the national security state. 
Machiavelli explained the most efficient way to transform a republic into a 
despotic régime was through deception.  “He who desires or attempts to reform the 
government of a state…must at least retain a semblance of the old forms; so that it may 
seem to the people that there has been no change in the institutions, even though in fact 
they are entirely different from the old one.”  Machiavelli realized that “for the great 
majority of mankind are satisfied with appearances, as though they were realities, and are 
often even more influenced by the things that appear to be than those that are.”23  
Machiavelli’s depiction man is just as true today as it was five centuries ago—
expediency trumps morality.  While his books provide a blue print for the despot, they 
also provide a warning for the wary.  
                                                 
  23 Discourses, 1.25. 
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